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The main aim of the study is to document the development of US
Fleet Ballistic Missile technology from its mid-1950s beginnings through to
Trident II D5. This historical documentation is framed by a perspective
which seeks to understand how technology evolves and what the
relationship is between, to put it simply, technology and strategy, or
technology and politics. Of particular interest in this case study is the
relationship between technology and nuclear strategy. It is a commonplace
assertion that technology is a dominant, determining factor in the arms
race, that indeed there is a technological imperative. In particular there
are many who argue that improvements in missile accuracies have driven
changes in nuclear strategy away from counter-city retaliatory deterrence to
war-fighting counter-force postures. Tracing the history of FBM
development from Polaris, considered by many the archetypal counter-city
deterrent, to Trident II, with hard-target kill capability comparable to MX,
helps our understanding of this issue.
In considering this central theme, the development of FBM
technology is analysed in the social constructionist terms of the 'new'
sociology of technology. This approach argues that technical change must
be explained impartially and symmetrically, and that the success of a
particular technology is not sufficient explanation in itself, but is rather
exactly what needs to be explained. Technology is considered to be
underdetermined by the physical world, and thus to be fundamentally
shaped by the social world.
The extreme characterizations of the relationship between
technology and politics - either that technology is simply the tool of
political will or that technology is out-of-control (as in the view that
accuracy improvements have driven strategy) - are found to be inadequate
in this study. Instead it is found that the 'bureaucratic politics' approach
captures much of the rich complexity of the process of technological
change. Yet even this approach fails fully to capture the complex inter-
relatedness of 'technology' and 'polities', nor does it take into account the
importance of the physical production of technology.
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Chapter 1
Introduction - The Sociology ofWeapons Technology
Nuclear weapons pose an unprecedented threat to human
civilization and the ecological health of our planet. Use of even a fraction
of current arsenals would cause massive devastation and millions of
deaths. Yet they also seem to be integral to the defence policies of some of
the nations that possess them - in particular the United States and the
Soviet Union.
Given this pervasive influence and potential danger there can be
few more urgent tasks facing students of technology than analyzing the
dynamics of nuclear weapons development. Understanding the course
taken by the development of weapons technology is crucial if measures are
to be taken to ensure the lowest risk of nuclear war. In particular, without
some foresight, arms control measures will continue to be reactive,
forever attempting to shut the stable door on horses that have long since
bolted.
Technology and the Nuclear Arms Race
Post World War II international relations have been characterized
by rivalry in nuclear weapons. In particular a central Cold War
antagonism between the USA and USSR has accompanied their
acquisition of a combined total of some 50,000 nuclear weapons. However,
quantitative additions to arsenals are not the most worrisome feature of
this 'arms race'. Quantitative limits and reductions are relatively easy to
negotiate and verify, and small numerical imbalances are not of much
'military' significance at the high levels in question.1 More disturbing are
the continuous qualitative 'improvements' in nuclear weapons
technology, which are more difficult to curb with arms control and more
threatening to strategic stability.
1. Though much political capital can be made out of small numerical differences.
1
The main concern is that new technological developments may
increase the risk of nuclear war breaking out during a crisis. That is, they
may reduce crisis stability.2 In particular, technologies which make a pre¬
emptive attack appear more feasible technically, such as improvements in
missile accuracy, may increase the temptation to strike first during a
serious crisis.
Nuclear-armed ballistic missiles are central technologies in the
nuclear confrontation. Their relatively short flight time for 'strategic' use
allows only the briefest possible tactical early warning of imminent attack.
With flight times shorter than 30 minutes ballistic missiles have raised the
pressing concern of pre-emptive nuclear attack by one superpower on the
other.
Ballistic missiles now dominate the strategic arsenals of the
superpowers, carrying some 70% of US warheads and 90% of Soviet
warheads. These arsenals have grown quantitatively since ballistic
missiles were first deployed in the late 1950s, but the most significant
changes, especially recently, have been qualitative. Advances in
technology appear to have altered radically the capabilities of ballistic
missiles, and thus to have opened up new ways of using them.
Of particular importance are the development of multiple warhead
technology and improvements in ballistic missile accuracy. The ability to
carry several independently targetable warheads on one missile allows a
greater 'exchange ratio' thus considerably adding to the potential
effectiveness of a pre-emptive attack.3 Coupled with increasingly better
accuracy - itself a much greater contributor to effectiveness against
hardened targets than extra explosive yield4 - this has marked a general
trend in the ballistic missile forces of both the USA and USSR towards
2. Another concern is that technological advances may also spur on superpower rivalry, thus
undermining arms race stability.
3. If restricted to single warhead missiles, neither of two sides possessing roughly
equivalent missiles forces could expect a first strike to achieve high success. With
reliability inevitably something short of a hundred per cent, the side firing first would
need to expend all its missile force in order to destroy only a portion of the other's.
4. Tojobtain the same increase in a missile's destructive effectiveness against a hardened
target/achieved by a doubling of accuracy would require an eightfold increase in explosive
yield.
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greater hard target kill capability. These changes in technology have
paralleled changes in nuclear strategy which have increasingly
emphasized counterforce targeting, and in particular the destruction of
hardened targets such as missile silos and command posts.
Many have seen this as a distinctive shift from a policy of deterrence
based on the threat of retaliation against cities to a more unstable situation
where the apparent ability to implement an 'effective' first strike (against
fixed, land-based targets) will soon be technically available.5 Some see the
shift as actively desired, indeed the result of a 'secret agenda',6 whereas
others, more typically, attribute it simply to the inevitable, on-going
advance of technology.
Thus Fred Halliday states that 'the possibility of greater accuracy in
targeting missiles led to the shift from the "countervalue" approach,
aiming at cites and economic targets, to one aimed at specific military
targets, i.e. "counterforce'".7 But can technology be held responsible for
this change in nuclear strategy? Indeed what is the relationship between
technology and strategy?
Technology-out-of-control or Politics-in-command?
Attempts to characterize technological change in weaponry are
bounded by two extreme positions - technology-out-of-control and politics-
in-command - exactly paralleling the dichotomy in industrial innovation
studies between technology-push and market-pull. At one pole it is held
that technology is out-of-control, and that technological developments are
a driving force in the formulation of strategic doctrine. Technology is seen
5. The difficulties involved in locating and destroying missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs)
make a complete first strike capability apparently unobtainable in the near-future,
although the Soviet Union's large emphasis on ICBMs, low SSBN alert rate and its
geographic encirclement make it seem most vulnerable in this respect. For a good survey of
strategic anti-submarine warfare, see Donald C. Daniel, Anti-submarine Warfare and
Superpower Strategic Stability (London: Macmillan/International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1986).
6. See, in particular, A. Roberts, 'Preparing to Fight a NuclearWar', Arena, No. 57 (1981),
45-93; reprinted in D. MacKenzie and J. Wajcman (eds), The Social Shaping of Technology
(Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1985), 279-94.
7. F. Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War (London: Verso, 1983), 225, emphasis
added.
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as having its own 'internal', autonomous logic which makes it the
dominant, determining factor in the nuclear arms race.
Such 'technological determinism' appears in many forms. At their
most asocial there is the pervasive notion that technology is simply
applied science, and that science is simply the physical world revealed.
From such a characterization it is but a short step to viewing technical
change as inevitable and monolithic in nature. Thus some appear to
argue that technology possesses innate characteristics based on the 'laws of
physics' that determine the pathways it will follow - that there are natural
'technological trajectories'.8
For example, Dietrich Schroeer argues that progress in computer
capabilities 'may be a driving force producing a technological imperative
towards improved missile accuracy'.9 Technological imperatives, Schroeer
claims, are the result of technologies 'so technically sweet and beautiful
that they are difficult to resist'.10
Similarly Deborah Shapley has argued that the general onward
advance of technology - 'technology creep', as she calls it - feeds back into
military developments even when not specifically sponsored by them:
What has happened is that the creep of technology - of the
different technologies that bear on ICBM accuracy - has
been advancing incrementally, cheaply, and with little
public awareness...11
Another interpretation of technology-out-of-control places the
emphasis not on the technology itself, but on the people and organizations
that foster it. Rather than technology-out-of-control it holds
'technologists-out-of-control' to be responsible for the on-going pursuit of
8. See R.R. Nelson and S.G. Winter, 'In Search of a Useful Theory of Innovation', Research
Policy. Vol. 6 (1977), 36-76, though their view, while not clearly presented, does not appear
to be quite as simple as this.
9. Dietrich Schroeer, 'Quantifying Technological Imperatives in the Arms Race', in D.
Carlton and C. Schaerf, Reassessing Arms Control (Macmillan, 1985), 60-71.
10. Dietrich Schroeer, Science. Technology and the Nuclear Arms Race (New York: Wiley,
1984), 299.
11. D. Shapley, 'Technology Creep and the Arms Race: ICBM Problem a Sleeper', Science.
Vol. 201 (22 September 1978), 1102-1105, at 1102.
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advances in military technology. For example, Lord Zuckerman, former
Chief Scientific Adviser to the U.K. Government, argues that:
military chiefs ... merely serve as a channel through which
the men in the laboratories transmit their views. For it is
the man in the laboratory - not the soldier or sailor or
airman - who at the start proposes that for this or that
arcane reason it would be useful to improve an old or devise
a new nuclear warhead; and if a new warhead, then a new
missile; and given a new missile, a new system within
which it has to fit. It is he, the technician, not the
commander in the field, who starts the process of
formulating the so-called military need.12
Similarly, Mary Kaldor considers that, at least in the US, military
'R&D has played an autonomous role in promoting the arms race.'13 In
particular, she claims, 'the organization of R&D institutions is the main
factor which explains the impact of military R&D on the arms race'.14
Moving further still along the spectrum of views, one comes to
theories of 'technological imperatives' which see technology not so much
completely out-of-control, but instead in the control of a few, rather than
society as a whole. Thus the development of weapons technology has
been attributed to the powerful interests of a 'military-industrial-complex'.
Not only technologists, or those involved in R&D, but also military and
corporate actors are said to be caught up in a massive conspiracy to
promote their own interests, and subvert the democratic political system,
by ensuring the continuing development of weapons technology far
beyond the nation's 'requirements'.15 In this respect military technology
may simply be seen as 'autonomous' due to the powerful vested interests
which develop behind any large scale technological organization, as
Langdon Winner has argued.16
12. Lord Zuckerman, 'Science Advisers and Scientific Advisers', Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society. Vol. 124 (1980), 241-255, at 250-51.
13. Mary Kaldor, 'Military R&D: cause or consequence of the arms race?', International
Social Science journal. Vol. 35, No. 1 (1983), 25-45, at 26.
14. Ibid, 42.
15. A variant of this approach can be found in 'Marxist' explanations of technical change
which seek to implicate 'class struggle' as the motor behind technical change, though here
technology is clearly seen to be only out of the control of those it is being used to exploit.
16. L. Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political
Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977).
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Finally, at the opposite end of the spectrum from technology-out-of-
control is politics-in-command, whereby political elites are said to be able
to consciously shape the technology they desire. Politics-in-command
would be the official viewpoint taken by members of the US military
establishment. Weapons are developed, it would be claimed, to satisfy a
national requirement which would have been politically decided by the
Administration and Congress. National governments are thus seen as
rational actors developing technologies in pursuit of goals which they
expect the technologies to help them satisfy. Developments in nuclear
weapons technology would normally be argued to be necessary tools in
order to achieve the desired deterrence of the Soviet Union.
But critics of official policy have also taken the 'politics-in-
command' viewpoint. Thus, argues Roberts, the development of
counterforce technology has been deliberately pursued by the superpowers
because of the perceived political benefits of such a capability. In so
arguing, Roberts specifically seeks to refute the view that: 'Military
technology is out of control, developing autonomously and dragging
military thought behind it'.17
However, dissatisfaction with rational actor analysis of
international relations - which views states as though they were unitary
actors able to respond rationally to, say, the Soviet 'threat' - has also led to
another approach which assigns primacy to politics in the formulation of
policy, as well as in the development of technology. But rather than the
products of rational decision-making these are seen as the contested
outcome of organizational and bureaucratic conflict and accommodation.18
In this 'bureaucratic politics' model technology is seen as an outcome of
the many turf battles, compromises and wrangles which particularly
predominate in the pluralistic US political system.19
17 Roberts, 279.
18. A classic account of the bureaucratic politics approach is G. T. Allison, Essence of
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971).
19. Major works adopting this approach are Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris System
Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1972) and E. Beard, Developing the ICBM: A Study in
Bureaucratic Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).
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Recent Approaches to Technical Change
Recent work in the sociology and history of technology has
suggested other ways of looking at technical change and the relationship
between technology and its social/political environment.20 Two distinct,
though closely related, approaches can be identified: 'the social
construction of technology' and 'systems' or 'actor-network' building.
Pinch and Bijker have proposed that the 'social construction of
be
technology' can^/analysed in the same relativist manner adopted in the
'strong programme' of the sociology of scientific knowledge.21
Technology, they argue, like science is underdetermined by the physical
world, and needs to be explained by reference to social factors. Success and
failure must be analysed in an impartial and symmetrical manner,
without any reference to 'truth': 'The success of an artefact is precisely
what needs to be explained. For a sociological theory of technology it
should be the explanandum, not the explanans.'22
Pinch and Bijker seek to explain technological outcomes in the
same way that the sociology of scientific knowledge explains the 'closure'
of scientific disagreements.23 Firstly, the technological or scientific issue in
question is shown to display 'interpretative flexibility' - for example, that
there is more than one way to design an artefact, or that more than one
conclusion can be drawn from a particular set of experiments. Such
conditions are usually apparent only during scientific controversy or in
the early stages of the development of a technology, but are always there in
principle. A consensus will usually form around one design or one
interpretation. This 'closure' is effected by social mechanisms, not simply
compelled by logic, or rationality, or efficiency, or whatever.
20. See Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes and Trevor Pinch, The Social Construction of
Technological Systems. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987).
21. T. J. Pinch and W. E. Bijker, 'The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: or How the
Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology might Benefit Each Other', Social




However, whereas one dominant group, the 'Core-Set', is generally
the locus of closure in science, most technology is necessarily involved
with many social groups. Pinch and Bijker therefore argue that it is
necessary to identify the 'relevant social groups' for the technology in
question.24 By adopting a symmetrical and impartial view of their
relations to the technology, it should be possible to explain how
interpretative flexibility undergoes social closure to leave a technology
which is considered successful or failed.
This approach has been criticized as appearing to unduly favour the
'relevant social groups' in their relationship with technology whilst also
artificially separating the two. It suggests that 'the social lies behind and
directs the growth and stabilization of artefacts'.25 In the other main
strand of sociological thinking about technology, successful technological
developments are seen as systems held together through the building of
networks.26
One main contributor to this viewpoint is an historian, not a
sociologist. In the work of Hughes, human system builders, such as
Edison, are seen to be skillful manipulators, not only of 'technical' and
scientific detail, but also of the economic, political and legislative
environment which impinges on their system.27 These system builders,
Hughes argues, advance technological systems by identifying 'reverse
salients', parts of the system which are perceived to be holding up the rest,
upsetting the system's harmony and impairing its growth or performance
(usually judged in economic terms). The reverse salients are generally
obvious to the system builders, who then proceed to define 'critical
problems' which, when solved, will remove the reverse salient. For
example, Edison worked out that a high resistance filament was necessary
for an electric light because it would allow the use of thinner power cables
24. Ibid, 414.
25. J. Law, Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The Case of Portuguese Expansion',
in Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 111-34, at 113.
26. Boelie Elzen, Scientists and Rotors: The Development of Biochemical Ultracentrifuges
(The Haag, Netherlands: Cip-Gegevens Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 1988), 5-7 considers the
'systems' and 'network' approaches as sufficiently different to be considered separately, but
this seems more a reflection of their differing origins and terminology than of anything
substantive.
27. This section draws particularly from T. P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in
Western Society (London and Baltimore, MD.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983).
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and reduce the capital outlay on copper, so ensuring that electric lighting
would be economically competitive with the established gas lighting.28
In his study of the growth of electric power systems, Hughes
identifies several chronological phases. At first, the system builders are
inventors and entrepreneurs, attempting to build a working system. Once
the system is established, however, growth and efficiency become more
important, and financiers and trained engineers begin to dominate. Later
still, when the system reaches a mature phase, growth stabilizes and the
manager and consulting engineer achieve preeminence. Whereas the
original system builders were interested in changing the world with their
technology, in the mature phase their prime concern is simply to maintain
the status quo.
Others have also taken a 'systems' approach to explaining the
development of technology. Law has coined the phrase 'heterogeneous
engineer' to describe what effective system builders need to be when
'attempting to build a world where bits and pieces, social, natural, physical
or economic, are interrelated and keep each other in place in a hostile and
dissociating world'.29 Like Hughes, Law does not see social factors as
necessarily dominant: 'Other factors - natural, economic, or technical -
may be more obdurate than the social and may resist the best efforts of the
system builder to shape them.'30 According to Latour, the task facing the
heterogeneous engineer is to 'make your environment such that
whatever other human or non-human actors think or do, they are either
kept at bay or else they help strengthen your position, making the world
safer, more predictable and more enjoyable for you.'31
To do this, Law, Latour and their collaborator Callon argue, the
heterogeneous engineer must 'translate' the interests of disparate actors in
28. T. P. Hughes, 'The Electrification of America: The System Builders', Technology and
Culture. Vol. 20, No. 1 (1979), 124-161, at 135-7.
29. J. Law, 'On the Social Explanation of Technical Change: The Case of the Portuguese
Maritime Expansion', Technology and Culture. Vol. 28, No. 2 (1987), 227-252, at 231,
emphasis in original.
30. Law, 'Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering', 113.
31. B. Latour, 'The Prince for Machines as well as for Machinations', in Brian Elliott (ed.),
Technology and Social Process (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1988), 20-43, at 29.
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order to build the desired technological network.32 They must enrol other
actors' support without at the same time surrendering control over the
nature of the technology produced. Moreover, technology does not simply
'diffuse' once developed, but is constantly subject to the shifting efforts at
translation that necessarily accompany it thjough its use and
modification.33
In the systems or network approach there is no attempt to decide
whether 'technical' or 'social' factors are dominant. Any such distinction
is simply considered artificial and unhelpful. But whereas Law and
Latour, for example, regard constant heterogeneous engineering as vital to
keep systems together, Hughes emphasizes the persistence of technological
systems with his notion of 'technological momentum'. This he has
defined as 'loosely connected, mutually reinforcing components that
constitute a system of vested interests involving people, institutions,
ideas, and artefacts ... that tends to resist change and softly determine the
course of events.'34
The Empirical Study - US Heet Ballistic Missiles
These concepts seem to be useful aids in a study of the development
of weapons technology, and of the relationship between technology and
strategy. Some previous studies of weapons technology have tackled this
issue. However, almost without exception they have the general failing of
limiting their scope to the time span of a single weapon system. Technical
change is thus frozen in time, and technology appears as a static given - a
resource that can be drawn on - rather than a dynamic part of the system.
This study deliberately focuses not on a single generation of a
weapon system, but on the evolution of fleet ballistic missile (FBM)
technology over a period of over thirty years. (Some of the main features
of US FBMs are summarized in Figure 1.1.) By tracing the parallel
32. See, in particular, B. Latour, Science in Action (Milton Keynes: Open University Press,
1987), 108-132.
33. Ibid, 132-44.
34. Quoted in Alex Roland, 'Technology and War: A Bibliographic Essay', in Merritt Roe
Smith (ed), Military Enterprise and Technological Change (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1985), 378, fn 220.
10
development of technology and nuclear strategy during this time it is
hoped that a more sophisticated understanding of their interaction can be
obtained.
The shift in missile technology and targeting rationale towards
counterforce is particularly evident in the US Navy's Fleet Ballistic
Missiles. The original Polaris, first deployed in I960, seemingly provided
the ideal deterrent, able to remain submerged and invulnerable at sea and
capable of little other than deadly retaliation against Soviet cities as a last
resort. Due for deployment some thirty years later, the latest FBM, Trident
II, is claimed to have a combination of accuracy and explosive yield which
makes it comparable to the Air Force MX in its high likelihood of
destroying hardened targets.
This shift provides the central focus of this study, which will
describe the evolution of those parts of FBM technology that most
generally relate to the system's perceived strategic capability. It is not
possible to cover every aspect of the development of FBM technology here.
Instead some technologies - such as navigation and guidance - will play a
much greater part in the story than others because of their greater strategic
significance.
These central changes in the technology and strategic role of the
FBM system are documented chronologically in chapters two to seven.
Although not following any theoretical perspective rigorously the
narrative of these chapters implicitly uses ideas drawn from the sociology
of technology. In constructing this history the empirical material will be
generally presented in a systems framework. Emphasis will be placed on
the heterogeneous engineering needed to build and maintain the FBM
system. At the same time explanations of technological developments
will be guided by empirical relativism. What it means for a technology to















A-l A-2 A-3 C-3 C-4 D-5
POLARIS POLARIS POLARIS POSEIDON TRIDENT TRIDENT
Length (feet) 28.5 31.0 32.3 34.0 34.0 45.8
Nominal Range 1200 1500 2500 2500- 4000 4000+
(nautical miles) 3200
Weight at launch 28.8 32.5 35.7 65.0 73.0 C130.0
(1000s of lbs)
Year first deployed 1960 1962 1964 1971 1979 1989
No. of warheads 1 1 3 average of 8 10-14
[MRV] 10 [MIRV] [MIRV] [MIRV]
Yield per warhead 600 800 200 40 100 475 or 100
(kilotons) [W47] [W47] [W58] [W68] [W76] [W88 or W76]
Guidance System Mkl Mkl Mk2 Mk3 Mk5 Mk6




General data and diagram from FBM facts/chronology - POLARIS. POSEIDON. TRIDENT
(Washington, DC: Strategic Systems program Office, 1986) and earlier editions.
Accuracy and warhead yield figures are officially classified and have been deduced from a
number of other sources: T. B. Cochran et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 1: US
Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge. Mass.: Ballinger, 1984); W. M. Arkin,
'Sleight of Hand with Trident II', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Vol. 40 (December
1984), 5-6; R. S. Norris, 'Counterforce at Sea', Arms Control Today. (September 1985), 5-12.
Figure 1.1: US Fleet Ballistic Missiles
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However, the historical nature of the study presents some difficulty
here. As sociologists of science have found, it is not easy to recover
interpretative flexibility once closure has occurred. Likewise many of the
historical accounts of FBM technology provide little sense of alternative
approaches that are long forgotten. Nor do participants tend to remember
in detail the potential malleability of technology, except for the few deeply
contested instances. The social nature of technology can thus seem
neglected as 'purely technical' explanations of success dominate the
historical record. Where things are described as technical in the following
ihis refers to the beliefs of participants, and their definitions of what
'technical', 'political', 'strategic' or 'economic' mean, and should not be
taken as implying that technology can be usefully explained monocausally.
Indeed it is exactly to avoid such over-rigid explanations that no single
theoretical perspective is used to constrain the historical narrative, but
instead the empirical material is allowed to 'speak for itself'.
In the final chapter the different concepts concerning the role of
technology in the arms race, and different theories of technical change, are
discussed in the light of the case study. In addition, the implications of
such studies of weapons technology for arms control are considered.
A Note on Sources
As well as the open literature, which is extensive, and some
archival material, this study draws heavily on interviews with present and
former participants in the FBM programme. A full list of those
interviewed is given in the Appendix, but interviewees are not cited by
name in the footnotes. No source material, whether it be an interview,
archival document or published article has simply been accepted
uncritically at face value. In attempting an explanation of technology
which takes care to understand the role of social factors, it would be naive
to ignore their role in the way people write or speak about technology!
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In addition to 45 interviews carried carried out directly for this study
it has also been possible to draw on some other related interviews carried
out by Donald MacKenzie in his work on inertial guidance and navigation
technologies. These are also listed in the Appendix.
Interviews were arranged simply by writing to or telephoning the
relevant individuals. Once a few key people and organizations had been
identified, others 'mushroomed' quickly. Simple lack of time meant that
it was not possible to interview everyone. However, those interviewed
include most of the 'core-set' of major participants in the FBM
programme. I am particularly grateful to the Strategic Systems Program
Office of the US Navy for their cooperation in arranging interviews (and
to Andrew DePrete who was my contact there), as well as to the other
organizations and individuals who were helpful.
In these interviews no attempt was made to gain access to classified
information, and the study as a whole is based solely on unclassified (and
declassified) sources. Perhaps surprisingly this is not an insurmountable
obstacle to writing a technical history of a nuclear weapons system
programme. Much technical information is not classified, and where
quantitative details are so, it still remains possible to gain adequate
qualitative descriptions.
Considerable technical detail can also be found in the open
literature, especially in journals such as Aviation Week & Space
Technology, and for the early period of FBM development, Missiles &
Rockets. These and other historical accounts have an unfortunate
tendency, however, to construct a dichotomy between the 'technical' on
one hand and the 'political' or 'social' on the other. Technical accounts
are overwhelmingly of the 'B followed A because it was better' variety, in
which the social world enters only rarely. Accounts by political scientists,
on the other hand, tend to treat the technology largely as a black box, the
content of which is not considered especially important.
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Nevertheless, although in this vein, Harvey Sapolsky's book
remains an excellent source of information on Polaris.35 Ted Greenwood's
account of the development of MIRV technology not only provides one of
the best interminglings of the technical and political, but also the best
description of the origins of Poseidon.36 The third book-length account by
political scientists of the FBM programme, Dalgleish and Schweikart's
discussion of Trident, is less helpful.37 Numerous other pieces of
academic and indeed journalistic writing also provided useful sources of
information. Finally, a rich source of information (though very time-
consuming to use) lies in the various Congressional hearings. Most useful
for this study have been hearings from the Senate Armed Services
Committee Subcommittee on Research and Development, particularly
during the 1970s. (To save repetition, hearings from this committee will
be abbreviated to SASC in the footnotes).
35. H. M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic
Success in Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).
36. T. Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making (Cambridge,
Mass.: Ballinger, 1975).
37. D. Douglas Dalgleish and Larry Schweikart, Trident (Carbondale, II.: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1984). For a review, see G. Spinardi, 'Trident: Tracing the Course of




and the origins of the Fleet Ballistic Missile.
I don't care how big and ornery it is,
we're going to take the bastard to sea.
Admiral RabornJ
Polaris was not simply the coming together of several ripe
technologies, the inevitable outcome of technical progress. Nor did it
just appear ready-made in response to a national call to arms. In
retrospect a submarine-launched ballistic missile seems an obvious
enough technology, providing as it does a method of basing nuclear-armed
missiles that is relatively invulnerable, both to enemy attack and to
domestic protest. However, in the early 1950s it was far from obvious that
ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads over the desired
range could be deployed in submarines.
The Wrong Stuff
Indeed if any missile was going to carry nuclear warheads from
submarines, or anywhere else for that matter, to the Soviet Union, it was
the conventional wisdom in the decade following World War II that it
would be a cruise missile not a ballistic one. In the USA dominant
opinion considered ballistic missiles to be the more difficult technology,
something to be considered in, say, twenty years time, when the
1. Cited in James Baar and William E. Howard, Polaris! (New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World, 1960), 52.
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technology had matured.2 For the time being, cruise missiles, analogues of
the German VI rather than the V2, were thought most promising.
Both types of missile had, of course, been brought to fruition as
weapons by the Germans. The VI 'doodlebug' was essentially a pilotless
aircraft powered by a jet engine capable of carrying a one ton warhead a
distance of about 150 miles. Some 8000 were used during the war, mainly
o.
against Southern England. The V2 was^liquid-fueled rocket with sufficient
thrust to lift it to an altitude of about 50 miles from which it plummeted
ballistically on a parabolic flight path to impact.
As Germany was overrun, the Allies scrambled to capture the V
weapon technology - both the hardware and the know-how of the German
engineers. Most went to the USA, where the Armed Services each had
their different approach. The Army Ordnance Corps was already
sponsoring work which had led to the invention in 1943 of the Corporal E
at Caltech's Jet Propulsion Laboratory.3 After the war, in project Hermes,
the Army used the captured V2s and the German missile engineers and
scientists to carry out high-altitude research.4
Whereas Ordnance favoured a short-term approach to a military
missile, making the best of what technology was available, the Army Air
Forces wanted one of intercontinental range. In 1946 the Air Forces
sponsored a 5000-mile range ballistic missile, extrapolated from V2
technology. However, it was soon agreed that such a missile was at least a
decade away and the Air Forces dropped the development, deciding
instead to concentrate on long-range cruise missiles. Towards the end of
the war a semi-formal division of responsibility was agreed between
2. The reasons for this in the US Air Force are considered in R. Perry, The Interaction of
Technology and Doctrine in the USAF (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation,
January 1979; P-6281), esp. 8-15.
3. See Clayton R. Koppers, JPL and the American Space Program (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1982).
4. W. Lucas, 'Political Bugs' in 'Rocketry in the 50s', Astronautics and Aeronautics. Vol 10,
No 10 (Oct 1972), 44.
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Ordnance and Air Forces, with Ordnance given jurisdiction over ballistic
missiles and Air Forces over aerodynamic designs.5
The Navy too, initially investigated the V2 technology, and on
September 6, 1947 launched one from the aircraft carrier Midway.6 In
addition enthusiasts within the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer) secured
Navy support for the development of a satellite launch system, a liquid-
fueled rocket called Viking. This also demonstrated the feasibility of
launching a missile from a ship, and in 1952 spawned a proposal for a 500-
mile range military version.7 This, however, was vetoed by the director of
the Navy's guided missile program, Captain Sides, and by the Chief of
Naval Operations.
Cutbacks in Navy funding ensured strong resistance to spending
money on new, unproven technology. Moreover, in Operation Pushover
in 1949 the Navy had investigated the effects of an accident to a V2 on a
mock-up ship. The damage caused by the liquid fuel explosion left a long
impression: 'One look at that mess, and a shudder ran through every ship
in the Navy'.8 Instead the only long-range missiles developed by the Navy
were again of the aerodynamic cruise missile type. Postwar tests of
improved Vis, known as Loons, had been successful enough to lead the
Navy to begin developing its own cruise missile, the 575-mile range
Regulus, in 1948.9 This was the responsibility of the Navy's Bureau of
Ordnance, which, so committed, gave little support to BuAer's pressure for
ballistic missile development.10
5.Robert Perry, The Ballistic Missile Decisions (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND
Corporation, 1967; P-3686), 4fn.
6. W. D. Miles, 'The Polaris' in E. M. Emme (ed.), The History of Rocket Technology: Essays
on Research. Development and Utility (Wayne State University Press, 1964), 163.
7. Vincent Davis, The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases, the Social Science
Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies Monograph Series in World
Affairs, IV, 3 (Denver, Colo.: University of Denver Press, 1967), 33.
8. Baar and Howard, 14.
9. Captain Dominic A. Paolucci (US Navy, Retd), 'The Development of Navy Strategic
Offensive and Defensive Systems', United States Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. 96 (May
1970),204-223, at 210. ' "
10 Ibid.
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Thus up until 1954 research and development on long-range
ballistic missile technology languished in the USA.11 Cruise missiles,
which then really were just pilotless aircraft, seemed a natural evolution
of current technology, compared to which ballistic missiles looked radical
and distant. But far from being a 'natural technological trajectory', the
preference for cruise over ballistic missiles stemmed more from the nature
and expectations of the organizations involved. What seemed technically
easier was also organizationally easier for the Navy and Air Force, where
ballistic missiles implied a radical change in roles.
For the Air Force pilotless aircraft required less getting used to; they
could simply replace their manned analogues. For the Navy ballistic
missiles seemed at this time to necessarily require the feared liquid fuel,
but to offer much poorer accuracy than cruise missiles.12 The expected low
accuracy meant that ballistic missiles were considered to be of little use
against 'targets of naval interest'. They could only be used for 'strategic'
bombardment against cities, a role which was unpalatable to many in the
Navy (who had criticized the Air Force's adherence to such a policy) and
which would have led to unwanted rivalry over the strategic mission.13
Defining the FBM
But throughout the early 1950s the advocates of a sea-launched
ballistic missile became increasingly convinced of 'technical' feasibility. To
those working in the area, advances in solid propellant technology showed
promising potential. There was a sense that 'even though solid rocketry
was in ... its very early phases, we felt that by extrapolation we could see
the feasibility of building a solid system that could do the job'.14 Indeed
the recollection of Admiral Levering Smith - a central figure in the
11. For extensive documentation of this, see, in addition to Perry, 'Ballistic Missile
Decisions', E. Beard, Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1976).
12. In 1955 the operational requirement for the Triton Navy cruise missile was a Circular
Error Probable of 600 yards, whilst that of the proposed FBM was 4000 yards. B. D. Bruins,
'U.S. Naval Bombardment Missiles, 1940-1958: A Study of the Weapons Innovations
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development of Navy ballistic missiles - was that 'it was our conclusion at
that time that the technology would reasonably support all the elements of
such a system except for knowing where the launch platform was with
sufficient accuracy.'15
But, of course, 'technical' feasibility alone neither brings new
technology into being, nor defines its workability. What did lead to the
creation of fleet ballistic missile technology had to do with the many wider
concerns which are important to all technology, but which are rarely
considered strictly technical. Most important was 'selling' the
technological projections which was all the Fleet Ballistic Missile - as the
Navy would dub their sea-based IRBM to highlight its differences from the
land-based Jupiter and Thor16 - constituted at the time.
The nature of ballistic missile technology (in common with many
other large-scale technologies) makes this particularly striking. FBM
advocates had to convince both the Navy and then the Administration to
provide funding for a very expensive hypothetical technology based on
extrapolations of what had so far been achieved. The only way to really
'know' if it 'worked' was to build it and see; by which time it would be too
late to ask for the money back if it was considered a failure. FBM advocates
were thus not 'selling' hardware, but rather concepts and a 'paper' system.
Lacking whole-hearted support within the Navy, FBM proponents
might have been frustrated for many more years had it not been for the
establishment of a special committee by President Eisenhower in the
spring of 1954. Officially known as the 'Technological Capabilities Panel',
the Killian Committee looked at the prospects for and significance of long
range missile developments. Navy FBM advocates in BuAer - Captain
Robert F. Freitag and Abraham Hyatt - channeled papers supportive of a
Navy missile through the Killian Committee's Navy Department liaison
representative, Commander Peter Aurand.17
15. Interview.
1^. According to one interviewee: 'the term fleet ballistic missile was used for political
reasons. If they'd called it an IRBM, an intermediate range missile, it would then have
been seen as competing with Thor and Jupiter.'
17. Davis, 34.
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The Killian Committee's report, entitled 'Meeting the Threat of
Surprise Attack', was presented to the National Security Council on
February 14 1955. Amongst many other recommendations it gave
acceleration of ballistic missiles a high priority, as had the Strategic Missile
Evaluation Committee, headed by John Von Neumann, the previous year.
What was different, however, was the emphasis which the Killian
Committee placed on the urgent development of intermediate range
ballistic missiles (IRBM). In their view, developing 1500-mile range
IRBMs would be 'much easier and have much greater assurance of
success' than relying entirely on building a 5000-mile ICBM.18
Endorsement by the Killian Committee of the fleet ballistic missile
concept, as noted in high-level papers circulated in early 1955, was then
used to bolster support for it within the Armed Services. Significantly
Freitag and Hyatt could now count on the backing of senior officers within
BuAer, including the most senior of all, their Chief, Rear Admiral James
S. Russell.
Nevertheless, substantial resistance to a FBM still remained in the
Navy. Doubts about feasibility strengthened the position of those
concerned about the opportunity costs. As Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Carney, and the director of guided missile developments on his
staff, Rear Admiral Sides, saw it, the technical requirements of a viable
FBM system were some way from being satisfied. In short, they felt that
there was no proven small warhead of adequate yield, no sufficiently
accurate guidance system, no suitable fire control or navigation system,
and no sufficiently powerful solid propellant. 'There wasn't even a
concept as to a launching system', as Admiral Arleigh Burke later
recalled.19 Consequently when Admiral Russell sent a memorandum to
the Chief of Naval Operations in July stating that the Bureau of
Aeronautics was proceeding with the development of a ballistic missile,
Admiral Carney's response was negative. He decided that no research and




directing BuAer to discontinue all efforts in this area, and to enter into no
formal budget commitments or contractual arrangements.20
But it arrived too late. By then Freitag and Hyatt had already mailed
out a letter to 22 aerospace contractors and defence research laboratories.
The letter stated Freitag and Hyatt's FBM vision and asked for advice and
suggestions. On the whole the responses were encouraging, and helped
generate further support for the concept. At about the same time,Admiral
Russell exercised his privilege as a Bureau Chief in by-passing the Chief of
Naval Operations and appealing directly to the civilian Secretariat of the
Navy. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, James H. Smith, was
converted to the cause, and he, in turn, converted other influential
figures. The importance of Smith's support was such, according to one
observer, that without it 'the Navy would have probably missed forever
the opportunity to develop and acquire fleet ballistic missiles'.21
Even so, considerable opposition to a Navy LRBM remained. In the
summer of 1955 Deputy Secretary of Defense Ruben Robertson prepared a
memorandum for Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson which
recommended giving the Air Force a monopoly over IRBM development.
Only the strong protests of the Navy Secretariat prevented the
memorandum from being sent.22
Robertson had sought to exploit the Navy's internal divisions to
limit the cost of missile development by excluding the Navy (as well as the
Army) from long range missile work. But with the appointment of
Admiral Arleigh Burke as Chief of Naval Operations on August 17 1955
the Navy would at last present a unified front on the FBM question.
Whilst preparing to take over as CNO during July Admiral Burke
had visited the Heavy Electronics Division of the General Electric
Company in Syracuse, where he was briefed on work done for the Air
20 Ibid.
21. Ibid, 38.
22. Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic
Success in Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 21.
22
Force on ICBM guidance. He was told that the guidance systems could be
adapted for a sea-launched ballistic missile if the Navy was prepared to
sponsor such work.23 Within twenty four hours of taking office he called
for a briefing on the FBM concept. In less than a week he had made up his
mind. The restrictions which Carney had placed on the Bureau of
Aeronautics were lifted, and they were urged to make efforts to increase
backing for the FBM within the Navy.24
Thus when the Killian report was endorsed by the National Security
Council in September 1955, with both land and sea-based IRBMs to be
considered, the Navy was at last in a position to put forward a positive
proposal. Although still receiving advice from some of his staff
recommending that the Navy should not give priority to an IRBM, Burke
decided on 19 October to press ahead. At his instigation a widespread
campaign was organized to ensure support for a Navy FBM.25 Written
assurance which seemed to say that IRBM costs would be allocated
separately from the normal Navy and Army budgets helped quell internal
Navy opposition to the project.26
However, by this time the President and Department of Defense
officials had decided that, although getting the highest priority, ballistic
missile programmes should be limited to four. Already the Air Force had
three programmes approved - the Atlas ICBM; the back-up Titan ICBM;
and the Thor IRBM - and because of their German engineers' experience it
was felt that the Army Jupiter IRBM should be the fourth. Only if the
Navy could find a partner would they be able to become involved in
ballistic missile development at this critical stage. At first the Air Force
was approached to see if it would be willing to allow a sea-based version of
the Thor to be developed. Unhappy about the technical changes required
to make the Thor adaptable to sea-launching and in no need of an ally the
23. D. A. Rosenberg, 'Arleigh Albert Burke' in R. W. Love, Jr., The Chiefs of Naval
Operations (Annapolis. Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 263-319, at 278.
24. Davis, 38.
25. Rosenberg, 'Arleigh Albert Burke', 278.
26. A November 1955 memo from Secretary of Defense Wilson said that: 'The dollar
requirements for the IRBM program are separate from the dollar requirements or
limitations applicable to any other Army and Navy program, and will be justified
separately.' Quoted in Bruins, 287.
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Air Force rejected the offer. The Navy then went to the Army with a
proposal for a joint IRBM. Such a collaboration was 'technically' no more
appealing to the Army than to the Air Force, but it seemed to offer better
prospects of preventing Air Force hegemony over ballistic missile forces.
In early November Admiral Burke and the Army's Chief of Staff, General
Maxwell D. Taylor, agreed to the collaboration.
On 8 November 1955 memoranda were sent from Secretary of
Defense Wilson to the Service Secretaries authorizing the development of
IRBM at the 'maximum speed permitted by technology'. The whole IRBM
programme was to consist of 'a land-based development by the Air Force
(IRBM No.l) and a joint Army-Navy Program (IRBM No.2) having the
dual objective of achieving an early shipboard capability and also
providing a land-based alternative to the Air Force program'.27
Thus defined the FBM was an organizational compromise. Its
nature was determined not by any clearly defined strategic role, nor by the
technical preferences of FBM advocates, but simply by the 'need' to get a
share of the ballistic missile 'pie'. Many in the Navy doubted that this was
the correct course to take, either because they preferred to stick with the
more evolutionary, 'easier' Regulus technology, or more generally because
they feared the effect the financial drain of ballistic missiles would have on
the Navy's traditional surface fleet roles: 'most of the senior officers in
Washington, with the exception of Admiral Burke, were not deliriously
happy to embark on such a risky and costly venture as this'.28 Admiral
Burke, however, believed that the Navy needed to take advantage of the
new technology, and to compete with the Air Force for a share in the
resources allocated to it.29
27. M. H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Tupiter Controversy
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 71.
28 Interview with Vice Admiral W. F. Raborn by J. T. Mason, Jr. (15 September 1978), 17.
29. Rosenberg, 'Arleigh Albert Burke', 278.
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The Special Projects Office
Burke moved quickly to consolidate the Navy's ballistic missile
role. A new programme office was established on November 17. Simply
named the Special Projects Office (SPO) this broke with a Navy tradition
whereby procurement was the responsibility of various technical bureaus.
Thus Burke avoided the difficult and divisive choice between the Bureau
of Aeronautics and the Bureau of Ordnance, both of which now sought
control of the FBM programme.30 With a single programme office
bureaucratic intrigues would be minimized. Burke's shrewdness also
guided the choice of SPO's first director, Rear Admiral William F. Raborn,
a naval aviator: 'I did not want a technical expert because a technical expert
would be too narrow-minded. I wanted an aviator because if this missile
were successful it would jeopardize the aviation branch.'31
Burke then gave Raborn the power necessary to assure the FBM of
the highest priority in the Navy. A December 2 memorandum from
Burke soon became known as Raborn's 'hunting license' as he used it to
obtain the Navy's best technical officers and civilians:
If Admiral Raborn runs into any difficulty with which I can
help, I will want to know about it at once along with his
recommended course of action for me to take. Ifmoremoney
is needed, we will get it. If he needs more people, those
people will be ordered in. If there is anything that slows
this project up beyond the capacity of the Navy
Department we will immediately take it to the highest
level. ..32
The memorandum also highlights Burke's concern over the
urgency of consolidating the idea of an FBM, built and run by the Navy.
Believing that 'the first service that demonstrates a capability for this is
very likely to continue the project and that others may very well drop out',
30. BuOrd and BuAer were combined in a Bureau of Naval Weapons (BuWeps) in 1958.
31. Quoted in Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc., Fleet Ballistic Missiles - 25 Years
(Sunnyvale, Calif.: Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc., n.d.), 1.
32 The memorandum is reprinted in Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc., The Fleet
Ballistic Missile System: Polaris. Poseidon. Trident (Sunnyvale, Calif.: LM&SC, n.d.), 6-7.
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he called for an early demonstration firing 'even though the equipment in
the ships is not as desirable as can be conceived'.33 In the very first
instance, 'technical' feasibility mattered only in so much as it affected the
ability of the Navy to retain control of the programme.
Raborn proved to be a felicitous choice for Director of SPO. His
personal enthusiasm helped create an atmosphere approaching religious
fervour in SPO. A feeling of eliteness was encouraged (unusually for
Washington uniforms were required for Naval personnel), and overtime
was the norm, as Raborn 'put himself and everyone around him on a
wartime footing'.34 Raborn made it the standard practice in SPO to work
Saturday mornings, reportedly joking that:
We may not get much done here on Saturdays, but by gosh,
people are going to know that we're dedicated.35
Raborn was also adept at working the bureaucracy towards two
interlinked objectives: getting the resources needed quickly to meet an
urgent schedule, whilst preventing outside interference in the
programme. Taking full advantage of the general urgency over missile
developments, especially following Sputnik, Raborn and Burke were able
to provide SPO with powerful manifestations of its eliteness. For all but
five months (between February and July 1957) the Polaris programme was
assigned top priority 'DX' rating which in theory entitled it to priority over
'DO' rated programmes in the allocation of resources.36 In January 1958
this was supplemented by the creation of a special 'management fund',
which, if not in itself greatly adding to SPO's accounting flexibility,
provided another powerful symbol of SPO's status.37
33. Ibid.
34. Baar and Howard, 43; also Robert E. Hunter, 'Politics and Polaris: The Special Projects
Office of the Navy as a Political Phenomenon' (unpublished Senior Honours Thesis,
Wesleyan University, June 1962), 61.
35. Ibid, paraphrased from Raborn's regular 'peptalk'.
36. Ibid, 56.
37. Sapolsky, 187-88, refutes beliefs that the management fund greatly enhanced SPO's
ability for flexible accounting.
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In any case it was prior to Sputnik, especially during 1957, that SPO's
direct budget allocation most required supplementing. With Burke's
support, however, SPO was able to borrow funds originally allocated to
other Navy programmes so as to avoid delays whilst Congress made the
necessary appropriations.38 In addition funds from the canceled Regulus
II, Triton and Seamaster (strategic seaplane) were reprogrammed to pay for
early Polaris development.39
Raborn, with the help of Burke, sold the FBM as a concept and
ensured SPO's programmatic independence and access to almost
unlimited resources. To do this required skilful manipulation of the
social world (the Administration, Congress, the rest of the Navy, etc) on
the basis of hypothetical technical projections and assumptions. But for
SPO to maintain its pre-eminent position, for the social network they had
engineered to remain in place, these promises of technical success would
have to be kept. Raborn and Burke had given the programme an ideal
start bureaucratically, but the technical people picked by Raborn needed
simultaneously to engineer the physical world to produce FBM technology
that 'worked'.
Jupiter
At first the newly assembled SPO team had the problem of making
the large, liquid-fueled Jupiter IRBM 'work'. Its sheer size and the
volatility of its fuel made it seem quite unsuited to submarine launching,
and only marginally more attractive for deployment on ships. Whereas
the Army's only size limitation was apparently the Berne International
Railway Tunnel40 - to allow 'rapid' transportation around Europe - SPO
hoped to carry several onboard submarines. In an attempt to make the
missile's shape more suitable for basing on ship or submarine, SPO
proposed that Jupiter's envelope be changed from about 90 feet in length
and 95 inches in diameter .to a 50-foot length, 120-inch diameter missile.
38 Hunter, 100.
39. Ibid, 104; Sapolsky, 35.
40. E. Rees, The Seas and the Subs (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), 139.
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This led to a compromise worked out by Secretary of Defense Wilson for a
missile of about 58 feet in length and 105 inches in diameter.41
This missile would continue to be developed by the Army's
German team in conjunction with their main contractor, Chrysler
Corporation. SPO's responsibility was to develop a sea-launching
platform, with the necessary fire control and stabilization systems for that
purpose. Their schedule was to have a ship-based IRBM system ready for
operational evaluation by January 1, 1960, and a submarine-based one by
January 1, 1965.42
However, right from the start SPO was deeply dissatisfied with the
liquid fuel IRBM. Post-war tests of captured German V2s had instilled a
deep fear of putting liquid-fueled missiles on Naval vessels. Two other
operational problems were also noted, as SPO sought to investigate solid
propellant options. Firstly, the cryogenic liquid fuel was not only very
dangerous to handle, but also very time-consuming. The time between
the firing command and actual launch could be hours, and the missiles
could not be kept permanently fueled. Second, an argument was made
that liquid-fueled rockets provided relatively low initial acceleration,
which could be disadvantageous in launching a missile from a moving
platform in certain sea states.43
Whatever the merit of these particular arguments, Admiral Raborn
raised the issue of SPO investigating solid propellants at the first meeting
of the Joint Army Navy Ballistic Missile Committee. This was blocked at
the next level of management, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Ballistic Missile Committee (OSDBMC), which saw the Navy request as an
attempt to initiate the fifth ballistic missile programme barred only a few
months previously.44 However, the Navy had already taken the initiative
41. Robert A. Fuhrman, 'The Fleet Ballistic Missile System; Polaris to Trident', Tournal of
Spacecraft. Vol. 5, No. 5 (Sept-Oct 1978), 265-86, at 267.
42. Ibid, 266.
43. Ibid, 267; see also N. L. Baker, 'Polaris Pioneers Future Ballistic Missile Design',
Missiles and Rockets (February 1958), 137, which stresses the advantage of the higher
acceleration of solid fuel.
44 See Sapolsky, 25-26.
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by approaching the Aerojet-General Corporation and the Lockheed Missile
and Space Division for technical assistance in developing a solid-fueled
ballistic missile.45
This led to a solid-fueled design based on the largest solid propellant
motors that could be developed at the time, using one for the second stage
and a cluster of six for the first. Designed to carry the proposed Jupiter
payload of 3000 pounds to the designated 1500-mile range, this solid
design, though shorter than the Jupiter, was both heavier and larger in
diameter. To de-emphasize the radical change in technology the new
missile was shrewdly called the Jupiter S.
It soon received the backing of the Navy Secretariat and in March
the OSDBMC approved the Jupiter S as a 'back-up program' for the IRBM
No. 2.46 The Navy was now officially in the business of developing a
solid-fuel ballistic missile. An experienced missile engineer, Captain
Levering Smith, who had previously developed the solid-propellant Big
Stoop missile at the Naval Ordnance Test Station, joined SPO in April to
direct this work.47
However, the Jupiter S was considered only marginally more
practical a weapon system than the liquid-fueled Jupiter. Just as the
original joint missile concept was the Navy's way of 'buying' into ballistic
missile work, so the Jupiter S was a way of 'buying' into solid propellant
missiles. Both served their purposes, but neither was to come near to fleet
deployment. Without even being built they proved to be important links
in the development of FBM technology. Whilst work continued both on
the joint project and on the Jupiter S, other approaches were intensively
pursued.
In particular, Captain Smith requested his former staff at the Naval
Ordnance Test Station at China Lake in California to do some system
45. Ibid, 26.
46. Ibid, 27.
47. Baar and Howard, 15. Big Stoop was tested three times in 1951 to a range of about 20
miles.
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improvement studies. These suggested that a radical redesign of all the
missile's components could make a 30,000 pound missile feasible on the
same time schedule as the 160,000 pound Jupiter S.48
SPO, however, did not push for the acceptance of this new approach
straightaway. Having just won the right to pursue the Jupiter S it was
considered too risky to then ask to move to another design apparently
requiring even more technological breakthroughs. Instead SPO
consolidated its position and the right of the Navy to an FBM. Plans were
made to test a liquid-fueled Jupiter on a surface ship in 1958 and to deploy
a submarine-based Jupiter S in 1965.49
Polaris Conceived
During 1956 technical advances, both actual and predicted, paved
the way for the acceptance of a smaller, solid-fueled design. Navy work on
solid propellants demonstrated that the addition of aluminium could
result in a large increase in specific impulse. Meanwhile MIT's
Instrumentation Laboratory kept SPO well informed of its inertial
guidance work for the Air Force, which suggested that a lighter guidance
system was possible. Then in the summer of 1956 a vital contribution to
the FBM programme came from a somewhat unexpected source - a Navy
sponsored National Academy of Sciences summer study on anti¬
submarine warfare. Known as Project NOBSKA (it was held at Nobska
Point, Woods Hole, Massachusetts), the study brought together Edward
Teller of the Atomic Energy Commission and Lawrence Radiation
Laboratory and Frank E. Bothwell of the Naval Ordnance Test Station.
Bothwell had been working on the studies for SPO which suggested
the feasibility of a 30,000 pound solid fuel FBM, and he relayed the concept
to the study group. The problem was that this required too many
technological advances for SPO to take the risk of endorsing, and then
possibly failing and losing the right to any ballistic missile. Warhead




weight of the warhead had a multiplier effect on the amount of thrust
required to reach any given range. Yet at the time there remained a strong
adherence in the Armed Services to the notion that a militarily useful
weapon required at least a one megaton warhead.50
Just before leaving China Lake Bothwell had heard from Dr John
Foster who was head of the weapons group at Livermore, that there were
good prospects for developing smaller physics packages than currently
available.51 Then at the NOBSKA summer study Edward Teller made his
famous contribution to the FBM programme. Ever the nuclear salesman,
he suggested that nuclear-armed torpedoes could be substituted for
conventional ones to provide a new anti-submarine weapon. This
seemed inconceivable with the current size of nuclear warheads, and
Teller was challenged to support his assertion. In doing so he pointed to
the trend in warhead technology, which indicated reduced weight to yield
ratios in each succeeding generation. When asked about the applicability
of this to the FBM programme, he asked, 'Why use a 1958 warhead in a
1965 weapon system?'52
If correct, Teller's prediction provided just the technical basis on
which SPO could push for their preferred option of a small, solid-fueled
missile. Already, by mid-July 1956 the Secretary of Defense's Scientific
Advisory Committee had recommended that a solid-propellant missile
programme be fully instigated, but not using the unsuitable Jupiter
payload and guidance system.53 Official confirmation of Dr Teller's
prediction was sought from the AEC, whilst Captain Levering Smith was
given a couple of weeks to prepare technical specifications for the small
missile he had long supported. When the AEC backed up Teller's estimate
in early September Admiral Burke and the Navy Secretariat decided to
support SPO in vigorously pushing for the new missile, now named
Polaris by Admiral Raborn.
50. See Herbert York, Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1970), 90.
51. Interview.
52. William F. Whitmore, 'Military Operations Research - A Personal Retrospective',




In October 1956 a study group comprising key figures from Navy,
industry and academic organizations was set up. This considered the
various design parameters of the Polaris system, and the trade-offs
between different sub-sections.54 The earlier estimate that a 30,000 pound
missile could deliver a suitable warhead over 1500 nautical miles was
endorsed. Armed with this optimistic prediction, and with the AECs
official warhead prediction, the Navy now decided to quit the Jupiter
programme altogether, and to seek Department of Defense backing for a
separate Navy missile.
Raborn briefed Secretary of Defense Wilson on the advantages of
the smaller missile, completing his slide show with an estimation of how
much it would 'save' by comparison with Jupiter, because fewer, smaller
ships would be required for deployment. This 'saving' seemed crucial in
convincing Wilson, who told Raborn, 'You've shown me a lot of sexy
slides, young man. But that's the sexiest, that half-billion-dollar saving'.55
On December 8, 1956 Wilson issued the directive that officially started the
Polaris programme.
The Navy, Nuclear Strategy and the FBM Programme
The Navy's changing attitude to the FBM system - from indifference
to advocacy - also meant a shift in thinking about its role in nuclear
strategy. Following World War II the Navy had not as a whole been
greatly interested in a major nuclear role. Some Navy officers were
trained to operate nuclear bombs and aircraft were adapted to carry these
from aircraft carriers,56 but this was simply considered an extension of the
power projection role of the carrier fleet developed during the war.
Despite the important role played by submarines in the war, the
surface fleet, and especially aircraft carriers, remained central to the Navy,
54. Ibid, 268.
55. Baar and Howard, 73.
56. By the end of 1949 the carrier Midway was equipped with aircraft able to carry atomic
bombs. SeePaolucci, 209.
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and were the principal avenue by which officers gained promotion.
During the late 1940s cutbacks in the defence budget by the Truman
administration were the Navy's main concern. Attempts to prevent
reductions in the Navy budget allocation led to what was dubbed the
'Admirals Revolt' in 1949.
What was at issue was the general shift in funding towards the
newly formed Air Force, and in particular to the Strategic Air Command
which had responsibility for long-range nuclear bombardment. The
specific focus of the debate was a proposed new Air Force bomber, the B-36,
which was to be capable of delivering nuclear bombs to any part of the
Soviet Union. However, the Navy's attack on the B-36 did not restrict
itself to criticism of the utility of that particular system, but instead went
right to the core of the Air Force's nuclear strategy.
The objectives of the early nuclear targeting plans drew heavily on
the strategic bombing experience of the war, during which German and
Japanese cities suffered immense destruction from Allied bombing.
American targeting policy concentrated mainly on damaging Soviet war-
supporting capabilities such as production of petroleum, steel and rubber.
However, there was little accurate intelligence concerning targets in the
Soviet Union, and so up until the end of the 1940s the practical result was
that cities were the main targets. After all, Air Force planners noted, 'what
was a city besides a collection of industry?'57
This trend towards waging war against enemy cities threatened the
Navy's traditional military role and looked likely to leave the Air Force as
the main beneficiary. Truman's $14.4 billion ceiling on defence spending,
announced on May 13 1948, had fallen far short of the amount desired by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide a balanced military capability.58 Instead
the USA would have to rely more and more on the ultimate threat of
nuclear attack on enemy populations. In an attempt to deflect the
budgetary cuts from them, Navy officers argued against the counter-city
57. Quoted in D. A. Rosenberg, 'The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American
Strategy, 1945-1960', International Security. (1983), 3-71, at 15.
58. D. A. Rosenberg, 'American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision', Journal
of American History. Vol. 66, No. 1 (1979), 62-87, at 69.
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strategy, on both strategic and moral grounds. In one summary of Navy
doubts Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery, assistant chief of naval operations
for guided missiles noted that 'leveling large cities has a tendency to
alienate the affections of the inhabitants and does not create an
atmosphere of international good will after the war.'59
Navy concerns about the efficacy of the counter-city targeting policy
were echoed by analysis of the TROJAN war plan. Approved in December
1948 this required an attack on 70 Soviet cities with 133 atomic bombs to be
carried out over the duration of thirty days.60 Such an attack was expected
to create 2.7 million mortalities and an additional 4 million casualties.61
The following year a study of the TROJAN plan, known as the Harmon
Report, predicted that even this level of destruction would not by itself
'bring about capitulation, destroy the roots of Communism, or critically
weaken the power of Soviet leadership to dominate the people.'62
A small group of Navy officers including Gallery and Arleigh Burke
proposed an alternative to the Air Force policy of city bombardment:
They proposed ... that atomic weapons be used primarily
against tactical military targets, such as armies, airfields,
oil supplies, and submarine pens, which would have to be
destroyed to prevent the Soviet Union from taking Western
Europe. They argued that scarce budget funds should be
spent on conventional tactical air forces and the rebuilding
of Western European armies, rather than on expanding
capability for an atomic air offensive.65
As a corollary to this, they opposed the B-36 bomber, arguing that instead
the Navy should build super-carriers to carry aircraft capable of precision
bombing of military targets. In October 1949 top Navy officers, including
Chief of Naval Operations Denfield, even went so far as to testify to the
House Armed Services Committee with their criticisms of counter-city
nuclear targeting. The outcome was that several senior Navy officers were
59. Quoted in Ibid, 70.
60. Rosenberg, 'Origins of Overkill', 16.
61. Rosenberg, 'American Atomic Strategy', 73.
62. Quoted in ibid, 72.
63. Ibid, 74.
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relieved of their positions and that the Navy suffered a demoralizing
defeat over the B-36 issue. The Air Force, in the form of the Strategic Air
Command (SAC), became the primary agent of strategic nuclear warfare,
with dominance over bombers to add to its ICBM monopoly.
After the B-36 defeat there were few left in the Navy who wanted
further confrontation. Instead during the early 1950s the Navy stuck to the
more central concern of protecting its budget share without publicly
questioning the nuclear strategy. Navy nuclear forces expanded in line
with the Navy's perception of its wartime role, as bombs carried by aircraft
were deployed on the surface fleet. Aircraft carriers first achieved a
'rudimentary nuclear capability in 1950-1951', and were considered by the
Eisenhower administration to be part of the nation's 'offensive striking
power'.64 These carrier-based nuclear weapons were assigned to 'targets
directly or indirectly of naval interest, such as ports, shipbuilding facilities,
submarine pens, and naval airfields'.65 As was the Regulus I cruise
missile, which became operational in May 1954.66
It was only with the advent of the FBM programme under Admiral
Burke that Navy thinking on nuclear strategy under-went a reorientation,
and led to another major attack on Air Force strategic orthodoxy. The
issue now was not that the Air Force wees targeting cities, but that they
were targeting so much else besides, including many speculative military
targets, and thus justifying huge force levels. In 1956 Admiral Burke
argued that money would be better spent on more conventional forces,
especially Naval ones, than on more nuclear forces which were already
adequate 'to destroy the USSR several times over'.67
By this date Air Force policy was for an all-out attack against the
whole range of Soviet targets, civil and military - the so-called 'Sunday
64. Rosenberg, 'Origins of Overkill', 51.
65 Ibid.
66. Paolucci, 211. Regulus I was finally retired from active service ten years later in mid
1964. '
67. Rosenberg, 'Arleigh Albert Burke', at 282.
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punch'.68 If launched pre-emptively, on warning of imminent hostilities,
the Air Force felt that it could thus achieve a decisive blow. Burke and
other Navy and Army sceptics argued that SAC's bomber force would soon
be vulnerable to the expected Soviet ICBM force and that they therefore
could not be sure that they would be able to strike first. Instead they
argued that an 'alternative undertaking' should be planned for, providing
for the possibility of 'general war initiated under disadvantageous
conditions'.69
Initially Polaris had been spoken of as though it was simply an
extension of the Navy's tactical role, intended to cover the same types of
targets as Regulus and the carrier-based aircraft, but at a longer range. The
Navy tried to avoid direct competition with the Air Force by
differentiating the role of the FBM from the strategic mission of the Air
Force. Thus for a while they talked about Polaris 'striking targets of naval
opportunity', such as submarine pens and port facilities.70 Indeed, in its
early days SPO was particularly careful to reassure not only the Air Force,
but also the dominant group within the Navy, those officers committed to
aircraft carriers. In a 1957 article, Admiral Raborn described the role of
Polaris, stressing subservience to the carrier force:
Its tactical mission would be to beat down fixed base air and
missile defenses to pave the way for carrier strikes aimed
at destroying mobile or concealed primary targets.71
However, some Navy planners were keen to 'stake out a claim' to a
strategic role.72 The Naval Warfare Analysis Group's first study of the
FBM, distributed in January 1957, recommended that 'population or
industrial targets should be specified by CNO as the target for the initial
FBM capability'.73 Polaris now was acknowledged as a strategic weapon,
68. See D. A. Rosenberg, '"A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours": Documents
on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1945-1955', International
Security. Vol. 7 (1983), 3-38.
69. Rosenberg, 'Origins of Overkill', 53.
70. Sapolsky, 44; see also Baar and Howard, 26.
71. 'Navy Views Polaris as Support Weapon', Aviation Week. Vol. 66 (June 17, 1957), 31.
72. Vice Admiral R.E. Libby quoted in Rosenberg, 'Origins of Overkill', 52.
73. Naval Warfare Analysis Group Study No. 1, 'Introduction of the Fleet Ballistic Missile
into Service' (January 1957), Serial 007P93. I am grateful to the author John Coyle for
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but was still carefully differentiated from Air Force systems. Skillfully
combining national concern over SAC vulnerability with the Navy's
dislike of Air Force 'overkill', Burke outlined a strategic concept, now
known as 'finite deterrence', whereby retaliation would be threatened by a
relatively small, invulnerable force with, as he put it, its size determined
by 'an objective of generous adequacy for deterrence alone (ie, for an
ability to destroy major urban areas), not by the false goal of adequacy for
"winning"'.74
Such an invulnerable counter-city weapon was, of course,
exactly what Polaris was expected to provide. It was to be a strategic
weapon, but not (at least not primarily) a counterforce one - its mission
was to destroy cities in retaliation for a Soviet strike. This rationale made
sense both vis a vis the Soviet Union and vis a vis the Air Force. Both the
pressure for early availability and the evolution of the 'assured
destruction' rationale tended to de-emphasize the pursuit of accuracy.
Polaris had to be accurate enough reliably to destroy cities - but that did not
mean very accurate. If it was less accurate than the Air Force ICBMs, this
did not matter much - indeed it could even be taken as an advantage, as a
clear technical manifestation of the bureaucratic strategy of
'differentiation'. What mattered most of all though, both in the 'cold war'
with the Soviet Union, and in the interservice war with the Air Force, was
to get Polaris built as soon as possible, and to show that it 'worked'.
supplying me with a copy of this report which was declassified in March 1980 by the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations.




Our religion was to build Polaris.
Admiral Raborn. ^
Thus by the beginning of 1957 a combination of technological
advances (or predictions of advances) and astute political manoeuvring
had created the Polaris programme. As director of SPO, Admiral Raborn
continued to see his role as managing the outside world, to: 'Get the
money, and keep other people off our program managers' backs'.2 In his
now classic study, Harvey Sapolsky notes four strategies which contributed
to SPO's bureaucratic success in doing this: differentiation of a special
role, which was represented as of crucial national importance; co-optation
of potential critics and disruptive elements; moderation of short-term
goals in order to maximize long-term support; and managerial innovation
in order to create an aura of efficiency.3
Differentiation meant not only encouraging a feeling of eliteness
amongst those who worked on Polaris, but also creating a distinct mission
for the FBM force to justify its existence alongside the missile programmes
of the other services.4 Co-optation involved drawing potential critics into
becoming involved with and so committed to the programme. Thus
money was always available to fund someone who had ideas relevant to
Polaris, and good relations with scientists were particularly encouraged.5
Likewise in an attempt to placate the concern of the surface Navy, SPO
frequently raised the possibility of basing Polaris on surface ships during
the late 1950s, though only one such proposal was ever given the go-
ahead. This plan to deploy Polaris on the nuclear-powered cruiser Long
L Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic
Success in Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 158.
2. Rear Admiral William F. Raborn, 'Navy within a Navy' in 'Rocketry in the 50's',
Astronautics and Aeronautics Vol. 10, No. 10 (October 1972), 63-65, at 64.
3. Sapolsky, 41-60.
4. The differentiation of nuclear strategy is discussed in detail in chapter 2 above.
5. Sapolsky, 48-50.
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Beach was instituted in January 1961 by the Eisenhower administration,
but canceled two months later under Kennedy.6
Moreover, whilst SPO sought autonomy over anything affecting the
development of Polaris, it was careful to show restraint on issues that were
not vital to this concern and that might foster long-term resentment.
Such moderation meant, for example, that SPO avoided publicly
reciprocating the Air Force's vocal criticism of Polaris. Finally, SPO had a
new management system devised, the Program Evaluation Review
Technique, known as PERT.7 This was initially very unpopular with
SPO's technical staff and with the contractors, but it soon came to be
valued for the image it created: 'It had lots of pizzazz and that's valuable
in selling a program.'8 The image of managerial efficiency thus created
greatly aided SPO in their job, as Sapolsky has noted:
An alchemous combination of whirling computers, brightly
colored charts, and fast-talking public relations officers
gave the Special Projects Office a truly effective
management system. It mattered not whether parts of the
system functioned or even existed. It mattered only that
certain people for a period of time believed that they did.9
But the success of the FBM programme did not depend on SPO's
bureaucratic prowess alone. Successful heterogeneous engineering
certainly requires skilful manipulation of the social world, but it cannot
neglect the physical world.
Technical Decisions
A Polaris Steering Task Group (STG), headed by Captain Levering
Smith, was set up to oversee the technical development of the
programme. This convened for the first time on January 7, 1957. The next
few months were then spent defining the technical specifications of the
Polaris system, even though 'the exact characteristics of the re-entry
6. Robert E. Hunter, 'Politics and Polaris: The Special Projects Office of the Navy as a
Political Phenomenon' (unpublished Senior Honours Thesis, Wesleyan University, June
1962), 102-4.
7. PERT is discussed in great detail in Sapolsky, 94-130.
8 Quoted in Ibid, 124
9 Ibid, 129.
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vehicle and payload were still an educated guess'.10 An initial,
fundamental issue was to decide on the performance goal of the system.
Delivery of a one megaton warhead to a range of 1500 miles was the
original goal set for the IRBMs by the Killian Report. This remained SPO's
eventual goal, but was relegated to a later development. In the meantime
an interim Polaris missile was to be rapidly built, providing the nation
with deterrent capability at the earliest possible time, and more
pertinently, consolidating the Navy's claim to a ballistic missile. SPO's
Chief Scientist recalls the flexible way they viewed the performance goal of
the first Polaris:
So it was clear that we were not confronted with a standard
request to design an optimum system meeting a fixed
operational requirement. The task was rather to set
minimum acceptable initial operational performance,
expecting the total system capability to improve with time
... In very crude terms, we felt that the Polaris missile had
to be able to reach Moscow from a position at sea and cause a
reasonable amount of damage when it got there. Based on
our knowledge of geography and weapon effects in 1957,
this implied about 900 miles range and a half-megaton
yield.11
The FBM System operational requirement specified in February 1957 was:
'provide an all-weather capability to deliver from ships to strategic land
targets at intermediate ranges, with minimum susceptibility to
countermeasures, a weapon which will provide the required damage
probability.'12 In May 1957 SPO redefined their schedule, calling for an
interim Polaris A missile, with nominal range of 1200 nautical miles, to
provide a surface launch submarine capability by January 1, 1963. Full
submerged launch and a 1500-mile range were to be provided with the
Polaris B by January 1,1965.13
The programme was then accelerated further following the Soviet
launch of the Sputnik satellite on October 4, 1957 and the
10. William F. YVhitmore, 'The Origins of Polaris', United States Naval Institute
Proceeding's [(March 1980), 56-59, at 57.
» Ibid. k
12. Robert A. Fuhrman, 'The Fleet Ballistic Missile System; Polaris to Trident', Journal of
Spacecraft. Vol. 5, No. 5 (Sept-Oct 1978), 268.
13. Ibid.
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recommendations of the Gaither Report in early November.14
Deployment of the interim missile, now known as Polaris Al, was
rescheduled first to 1961, and then to November 1960. Deployment of A1X
test missiles to provide an even 'more interim' capability - of about 1000-
mile range - somewhat earlier was also considered, if emergency measures
were invoked.15
To meet this schedule SPO decided to use the hull of an existing
nuclear-powered submarine currently under construction at Electric Boat's
shipyard in Groton, Connecticut. This was to be literally cut in half and a
missile section inserted. The length of this section was determined by the
number of missiles each submarine was to carry and the method of
stowage. The preferred stowage configuration was vertical, two abreast.
There was less consensus about the optimum number of missiles per
submarine. Economic considerations pushed towards large numbers, up
to 32 per vessel, whereas operational flexibility, survivability, and the
preferences of submarine commanders pushed the other way. The
question defied exact analysis and in the end was put to 'a sort of opinion
poll of ship designers, analysts, and submarine operators'.16 This looked
likely to result in a twenty-four tube design, but sixteen was chosen by the
intervention of Admiral Raborn - as always sensitive to the need to enrol
support - once he learnt that this was the maximum that the submariners
felt desirable.17
Submarine conversion was estimated to take about four years and
thus needed to begin without delay. Missile development was not
expected to take as long, perhaps only two years, but obviously the roughly
simultaneous development of the various elements of the system had to
be compatible when brought together. It was thus critical right at the start
to define the subsystem 'envelopes' and their interfaces, something which
the STG did during the first few months of 1957.
14. D. A. Rosenberg, 'Arleigh Albert Burke' in R. W. Love, Jr., The Chiefs of Naval
Operations (Annapolis. Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 284-85. The Gaither






Each subsystem was assigned to a separate technical branch of SPO,
most of which had already been formed for the sea-basing of the Jupiter.
SP-22 was responsible for the launcher subsystem, which needed to be able
to store the missile for long periods of time, and ideally allow submerged
launch. SP-23 had handled fire control for the Jupiter and now took on
missile guidance as well (which was initially intended to be assigned to the
missile branch). The two were grouped together because of the difficulty of
clearly defining their interface at this early stage.18 SP-24 was navigation,
critical to the overall accuracy of the system because of the importance of
knowledge of the initial launch position. SP-26 was ship installation,
devoted to the building of the submarines and installing the other
subsystems. Finally, with the start of the Polaris programme another
branch was formed, SP-27, for the missile subsystem, including warhead
and re-entry vehicle but not guidance.
Each branch chief would have responsibility for their subsystem,
reporting regularly to Levering Smith, who became Technical Director of
SPO in June 1957, and to the Steering Task Group which met every few













































shipswec || lmso | | sperry || iec| lmso
Special Projects Office Organization - 1957





By the time Polaris was approved, SPO's launcher branch, SP-22,
headed by Commander Dennet 'Deke' Ela had already spent a lot of time
thinking about the problem of launching the Jupiter missile from a surface
ship. A major concern with the liquid-fueled Jupiter, of course, was safety,
and launching from the rolling, pitching, windswept deck of a ship
exacerbated this concern. It was decided that the dangers involved in
fueling the missile would be minimized if done below decks, with the
missile then raised immediately prior to launch. This would require an
elevator system, but that was a technology much used by the Navy for
moving planes around in aircraft carriers.
This scheme was approved and Westinghouse Electric
Corporation's elevator division were contracted to build it. The plan was
to install three missiles per ship, starting initially by converting a Mariner-
class merchant vessel, the Observation Island.19 Submarine launching for
Jupiter seemed a much longer term prospect because no current nuclear-
powered submarine design was anywhere near large enough to
accommodate the missile. Although large by the standards of the day, the
world's first nuclear powered submarine, the Nautilus had a
displacement less than half that considered necessary to carry four Jupiter
missiles.20 And although slightly shorter the solid-fueled Jupiter S was
both fatter and heavier.
With the arrival of the concept of Polaris, size was no longer a
problem, and the sixteen tube submarine was decided upon. Surface
launch also seemed relatively simple to achieve, but the militarily
preferable submerged launch did not: 'The means to do this were simply
not identified and the capability to do it was completely unknown'.21
Westinghouse were retained as the launcher contractor, and they
established a systems group to tackle the problem. Two options were





identified. The one considered the more conservative involved releasing
the missiles from the submarine in capsules which would then float to the
surface and open up to allow launch. The other was bare missile launch,
where the missile would be launched unprotected through the water.
The two approaches were pursued simultaneously for some time on
the basis of a missile size, shape and weight 'envelope' defined by the
Steering Task Group. However, although size and shape were by now
defined quite precisely, weight and structural load were not. The launcher
branch was thus in the difficult position of having to meet an urgent
schedule whilst retaining some flexibility:
The missile was the least well defined of all these things
in this timescale and so the people who were designing the
launcher were caught between the ship-builder who was
actually making things and the missile people who were
still trying to define what this missile was like in terms of
its structural load, and so on... So the job of designing the
launcher got to be to figure out how you could build
something that was sufficiently flexible in its design that
you could define the interfaces it had with the ship under
circumstances when the interfaces it had with the missile
were only vaguely defined. ... You didn't know what the
shock resistance of the missile was going to be. You simply
had to have enough rattle space that whatever it turned
out to be you could accommodate that.22
This 'over-designing' of the launcher system would later prove highly
significant, allowing larger missiles to be developed for use within the
same submarines.
In June 1957 Captain Ela of SP-22 established a deadline for the first
underwater launch of a dummy missile - by January 1958.23 Scale model
testing done at the Naval Ordnance Test Station suggested that the bare
missile could be launched at a depth of the order of a hundred feet and still
arrive at the surface sufficiently vertical to recover its trajectory when
ignited.24 The launcher subsystem was required to provide 'a protective
cocoon that would cradle the missile against both lateral and vertical
22 Ibid.
23. Baar and Howard, 111.
24. Interview.
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shock', eject it with sufficient velocity when required, and withstand the
effect of the backflooding seawater.25
It was decided to hold the missile snug within the launch tube with
three rings of flexible pads, known as stowage launch adaptors, which
would fall off when the missile was ejected. The nature of these pads was
considered to require a very rigid, smooth launch tube for which heavy-
walled, machined steel was chosen. This launch tube was to be suspended
within the submarine mount tube, with a requirement that it be able to
withstand the shock of an under-water depth charge explosion. Oil-filled
double-acting Dowdy shock absorbers were chosen to provide this
suspension as they could be made with a 'null' position from which they
deviated only after experiencing a significant force. The advantage this
had over competing spring technologies was that it facilitated the precise
positioning of the missile for the optical alignment required by fire control
to 'ready' the missile guidance system.26
Missile ejection was achieved by compressed air pressure controlled
by a programmed air valve adapted from the type used in catapult
equipment for assisting plane take-off from air craft carriers. Prior to
launch the heavy outside hatches covering the launch tubes would be
opened leaving the tube sealed only by a thin diaphragm which was
explosively removed at the instant of launch.
Thus the main elements of the launch system evolved.27 At each
stage testing was carried out, with the scale models replaced first by
redwood logs launched from the 'Peashooter' test facility at the San
Francisco Naval Shipyard, and then by inert test vehicles supplied by the
missile contractor, Lockheed. Underwater testing was performed at the
'Pop-up' test site of the Naval Ordnance Test Station's underwater test
range near San Clemente Island. The first underwater test was carried out
there in March 1958, after a delay due to bad weather, when a dummy
missile was successfully 'launched'.
Westinghouse, To the End of the Rainbow - Evolution of the Marine Division
(typescript), 49. I am grateful to David Nixon of Westinghouse for providing me with this.
26. Interview.
27. See 'Polaris Launcher Production Hits Four a Week', Missiles and Rockets. Vol. 10
(February 12, 1962), 32-33.
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Guidance and Fire Control
SP-23 was initially set up to develop a fire control system to
coordinate the Jupiter guidance system, designed by the Army's German
team, with the ship or submarine navigation system, and to perform all
the functions necessary for launching at the desired target. When the
switch was made to Polaris the Navy became free to choose its own
guidance team rather than relying on the Army's, whose approach,
although feasible, became organizationally unappealing. The German
team had worked with Bendix on a smaller guidance system which might
have been suitable for Polaris, but their enthusiasm was not matched by
that of the head of the Army's Ballistic Missile Office, General Medaris.
One SPO officer recalls that Medaris 'was not very fond of the Navy from
the beginning and he and Raborn didn't get along worth a dime'.28
But SPO's urgent schedule, as well as their service pride, made
relying on the Army's expertise an uninviting option, if it could be
avoided. It could, as indeed SPO had become increasingly aware of prior to
the break with the Army. An alternative was to be found at the MIT
Instrumentation Laboratory with which SPO had contracted to investigate
ship stabilization for the Jupiter missile, and whose pioneering work on
inertial navigation was also to feedjback into the Polaris submarine
navigation system.
Under the directorship of Charles Stark Draper the Instrumentation
Laboratory had been at the forefront of developing inertial technology for
navigation and guidance since 1945. Refining a gyroscope design
developed during the war for gun control systems, Draper became an
influential proponent of inertial technology.29 Whilst working with SPO
on ship stabilization for the Jupiter, the Instrumentation Laboratory was
also developing a guidance system for the Air Force's Thor IRBM. One
member of the team working on the Air Force contract remembers:
28. Interview.
29. See D. MacKenzie, 'Missile Accuracy: A Case Study in the Social Processes of
Technological Change', in W. E. Bijker, T. P. Hughes and T. Pinch, The Social Construction
of Technological Systems (Cambridge. Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), 195-222.
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...it looked twenty years ... before they [would] ever put a
ballistic missile in a submarine. Submarines did not want
[liquid] ballistic rockets, and ... the [Jupiter] missile was just
plain ... too big and too unsafe for the submarines to put up
with ... I said to Sam Forter [Commander Forter, an MIT
alumnus, in SP-23] ... 'What we really ought to be doing for
you is ... doing studies on a smaller ... ballistic missile for a
submarine ... we know how to make you a small one'... So he
took me in to talk with then Captain Smith [SPO's
Technical Director] ...3(1
In addition, SP-23's branch engineer Dave Gold had worked with the
Instrumentation Laboratory as the Bureau of Ordnance's project engineer
on Project MAST, an early application of inertial technology to weapon
system stabilization.31 SPO arranged a contract with the Instrumentation
Laboratory using Bureau of Ordnance funds ('the Navy didn't care too
much as long as we didn't embezzle it'32). So the Instrumentation
Laboratory 'had six months head start on a design for a ballistic missile for
submarines before the Polaris program was signed and given a name'.33
As well as their general inertial expertise and their familiarity to
many in the Navy, the Instrumentation Laboratory also could offer
another crucial 'technical detail': a mathematical guidance formulation
which seemed particularly well-suited to Polaris. Moving to a smaller
missile placed a high premium on miniaturization, which was clearly a
constraint on the onboard computer that had to perform the computations
necessary to guide the missile. Digital computation seemed to be taking
over from analogue, but by modern standards was slow and bulky. Two
mathematicians at the Laboratory, Richard H. Battin and J. Halcombe
Laning Jr., through work they were doing for the Air Force Atlas ICBM,
developed a mathematical scheme that became known as 'Q-guidance'.
The enormous advantage of this method was that, though a lot of
computation was involved, much of it could be done well in advance of
3®. Interview.
31. See W. F. Raborn and J. P. Craven, 'The Significance of Draper's Work in the
Development of Naval Weapons', in S. Lees (ed.), Air, Space and Instruments: Draper




firing the missile (the calculation of the elements of the Q matrix), leaving
only fairly simple tasks for the onboard computer.34
Whilst still working on the liquid-fueled Jupiter, SPO was
discussing Q-guidance with people at the Instrumentation Laboratory. On
one occasion Ralph Ragan and David Hoag of the Instrumentation
Laboratory and Sam Forter of SP-23 tried to explain the principle of Q-
guidance to SP's Technical Director, Levering Smith. When they became
confused over how it really worked, it was Levering Smith who
eventually clarified the principle.35 He became convinced that it was
particularly suitable for guiding solid-fueled missiles 'because Q-guidance
did not need to adjust the thrust program in flight as others did. Unlike
liquid-fueled missiles there was no practical means for adjusting the thrust
program of solid-fueled missiles'.36 Admiral Levering Smith recalls that
MIT was chosen over the Redstone Arsenal at Huntsville 'primarily
because of the Q-guidance. It did appear that we could work more closely
with Draper than with Huntsville, partly because I thought the [Draper]
fluid floated gyro would adapt easier to the solid motor accelerations, but
to my way of thinking it was driven more by Q-guidance than anything
else'.37
The culmination of all this was that on 10 October 1956 Raborn and
some of his staff 'visited Draper to elicit his interest in developing the
Polaris inertial guidance. The result was a direct contract for its
development... The General Electric Company was selected to provide
industrial support and to build the resulting guidance system'.38 Thus was
set the organizational pattern that has persisted to this day for the
development of Fleet Ballistic Missile guidance systems: a direct contract
awarded to the Draper Laboratory, with the systems designed by Draper
being produced by major industrial firms.
34. Interviews; see also R. H. Battin, 'Space Guidance Evolution - A Personal Narrative',
Tournal of Guidance and Control. Vol. 5 (1982), 97-110.
35. Interview.
36. Letter from Vice Admiral Levering Smith to Donald MacKenzie (13 October 1986).
37. Interview.
38. Raborn and Craven, 27. General Electric had already been working on a radio-inertial
guidance scheme for Jupiter.
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Working on a very tight schedule, which became even tighter in
December 1957 following the launch of Sputnik, the Instrumentation
Laboratory designed and developed the Mkl guidance system for Polaris.
The gyroscope was a 'paradigmatic' Draper design: the 25-size (i.e. 2.5 inch
diameter) inertial rate-integrating gyroscope (IRIG), which had been
developed for the Air Force. The accelerometer was a pendulous
integrating gyro accelerometer (PIGA) based on the same 25-size gyroscope.
'Each PIGA contained a [gyroscope] which was the same design as the 25-
size IRIG with an additional unbalanced mass'.39 Three 25-IRIGs mutually
at right angles held a stable platform carrying three similarly positioned 25-
PIGAs in a known orientation. This platform was supported by three
gimbals made of beryllium allowing relatively free, but not unlimited,
movement. The onboard computer was the first digital fully
transistorized guidance computer, but it was not a full general-purpose
digital computer. Of the type known as a Digital Differential Analyzer, it
was customized to perform the few repetitive calculations required to
solve the differential equations used in Q-guidance. Using germanium
components - discrete diodes and transistors - the Mkl electronics had a
total gate count of about 400, comparable to a modern digital wrist-watch.40
The Mkl guidance system combined inertial components and
electronics into one module weighing 225 pounds.41 Relatively simple in
concept, the Mkl was a nightmare to make, with difficulties in 'every
aspect of production'.42 With the computer there was 'a lot of trouble with
the memory cores...trouble in the wiring and testing...and there was
trouble with the transistors' - 'they had a terrible time getting any degree of
reliability out of it.'43 Participants still remember the 'purple plague': 'at
the junction of the lead to the transistor they would start to rot, mould, or
whatever you call it, and under the right light, or maybe by bare eye, it
turned purple, and you lost connection...it was like a disease that went
through all the early transistors'.44 Gyroscopes also were very difficult to
produce to the standard required: 'You'd make a batch of bearings that







would work phenomenally...and had life times of 100,000 hours. And
then a year later all the production people... were getting poor gyros. All
the bearings would go bad in all the production lines.'45
Nevertheless, the Mkl guidance system was ready in time to meet
Polaris schedules. Although its mean time between failures was not ideal,
with careful attention it was adequate for the short duration of guided
flight - of the order of a minute.46 During first stage flight the missile's
flight was to be controlled by a programmed autopilot, with the guidance
system controlling second stage flight up to thrust termination and
separation of the re-entry vehicle.
Meanwhile SP-23 was also working on a fire-control system to
prepare the missile guidance systems for launch. Information from the
navigation system was communicated to missile guidance systems
through the fire control system. The original Polaris fire control system,
the Mk. 80, was 'less of a system than it was just what could be done in the
time'. It had little computational capability: it was more a 'card reader'.47
Crucial data such as the components of the Q-matrix were calculated
onshore, at the Naval Ordnance Station in Dahlgren, Virginia, and the
data for a particular target read into the fire control system on cards. After
the first ten submarines, and for the UK Polaris fleet, it was replaced by the
Mk. 84 system. This did have a digital computer integral to the system - 'a
"militarized" version of Control Data Corp's "1604" commercial
computer' - which provided a more rapid on-board retargeting capability.48
Fire control not only provided the missile guidance systems with
navigation information and targeting data, but it also played a role in
preparing them physically for launching: the processes known as
'alignment' (determining orientation in the horizontal plane) and
'erection' (determining the direction of the vertical). 'The guidance
interface was quite complex in that all the loops... were closed through fire
45 Ibid.
46. R. B. Walter, 'The "Brain" of the Polaris Missile', Missiles and Rockets. Vol. 8 (June 12,
1961), 30-31, 53, at 30.
47. Interview.
48. M. Getler, 'Improved Polaris Fire-Control System Going to Sea Duty Shortly', Missiles
and Rockets. Vol. 13 (November 4,1963), 32-33, at 32.
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control, so that alignment and erection was done through fire control... All
of that interface..., connected through resolvers, was extraordinarily
complex, very touchy. Everything had to be done just right for both
alignment and erection. Quite honestly I look back on it and it's a miracle
it ever worked, but it did, and does'.49
Navigation
However, the missile guidance system was initially perceived as less
demanding than the closely related question of submarine navigation. An
error in knowledge of the submarine's position at launch would lead to
missing the target, and even a small error in azimuth (orientation in the
horizontal plane) could lead to a very large miss. State-of-the-art
submerged submarine navigation was approximate at best, and the
capacity of the nuclear submarine to remain submerged for long periods
would be of no value if frequent surfacing was required to work out
position and azimuth.
A possible solution existed, but in 1956 had not been proven for
submarine use. Self-contained inertial navigation had been developed at
the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory, under Draper, and at the Autonetics
Division of North American Aviation, for use in bomber aircraft and
long-range cruise missiles. The Instrumentation Laboratory had also
worked for the Navy on applying this technology to submarines, even
before the FBM was conceived. In 1951 the Laboratory was awarded a
Navy Bureau of Ships contract to develop a prototype Ships Inertial
Navigation System (SINS), which they delivered in 1954. For the Polaris
programme, the Laboratory's work was taken up by the Sperry
Corporation, pioneers of gyroscope technology, and a firm with especially
strong links to the US Navy.50
A 'little detail' of the MIT/Sperry design led to almost as much
anxiety for the developers of Polaris as any other issue. Charles Stark
Draper of MIT believed in the elegant virtues of letting gyroscopes remain
in fixed orientation in inertial space (ie with respect to the stars). But as
49. Interview.
50. Raborn and Craven, 25.
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the earth rotated and the submarine's position changed this meant that
the gyroscopes were subjected to a varying gravity field. The slightest mass
imbalance of their rotors would lead to significant errors. But achieving
perfect or near perfect mass balance was an exceedingly difficult task,
especially as one moved outside the laboratory to the 'real world' of
production.
Fortunately for Polaris's tight schedule an alternative was available.
As interest in ballistic missiles grew during the 1950s, air-breathing cruise
missiles fell out of favour. In July 1957 the 5000-mile US Air Force
Navaho was abruptly canceled and the Autonetics Division of North
American Aviation were left with a guidance system known as the
Autonavigator. Autonetics moved quickly to find a new customer, and
received a contract from SPO to adapt the Autonavigator for submarine
use. The XN6 guidance system developed for Navaho incorporated a
novel feature - each of the three axes had two gyroscopes which could be
reversed, averaging out 'drift' of the gyros. Unlike the MIT/Sperry design,
it was a 'local level' system, kept horizontal at all times, so the gyros were
not subject to sudden, large changes in the direction of gravity. By 1958,
the XN6 system, modified as the N6A Inertial Navigator, was mature and
reliable enough to be taken on a submarine mission that ensured its fame
and rescued it from the status of a component in a canceled system. It
navigated the USS Nautilus on its widely publicized voyage from the
Pacific to the Atlantic under the ice surrounding the North Pole.
SPO ran sea trials on their test platform, the USS Compass Island, to
compare the performance of the Sperry/MIT SINS, known as the Mk-1
and the N6A. The Autonetics SINS performed much better, but both
companies were awarded contracts to develop a SINS for Polaris. With
navigation requirements so stringent by the standards of the day, Sperry
supporters found it easy to argue for duplication; Admiral Raborn himself
particularly favoured maintaining competition in the navigation system.51
51. Interview.
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At this point a program initiated in 1954 by the Underseas Warfare
Branch of the Office of Naval Research came to fruition.52 This led to the
development of gyroscopes in which the the ball-bearings of the early
designs were replaced with gas spin bearings with a substantial
improvement in performance. A new SINS using the gas spin gyro was
developed by Autonetics.
Meanwhile, it seemed the modified Sperry system, the Mk3
Gyronavigator, would be installed in the first five submarines, the 598-
class. The new Autonetics design, the Mk2 Autonavigator, was to go in
the next five 608-class. However, when it came to the decision the
Autonetics SINS was 'much nearer to being ready than the Sperry' and
this deployment pattern was reversed.53 After a few years these Sperry
systems were replaced and the Autonetics Mk2 (in various modifications)
became standard on FBM submarines.54
The Mk2 SINS was based on a stable platform carrying three
orthogonal G7A self-activating gas spin gyroscopes which sense
accelerations and maintain the known orientation of the platform via
servo motors. Three orthogonal accelerometers then measure the
accelerations which the platform experiences. By 'deducting' gravitational
accelerations, it is possible to derive velocity and position by integration.
But even the best SINS cannot operate autonomously for an
indefinite time. Periodic 'resets' - updates from external sources of
navigational information - are needed to stop unacceptable errors building
up. In Polaris it was decided to do this every eight hours if possible.55 In
addition, the SINS, like any inertial system, needs knowledge of the
52 See B. McKelvie and H. Gait, Jr. 'The Evolution of the Ship's Inertial Navigation
System for the Fleet Ballistic Missile Program', Navigation: Tournal of the Institute of
Navigation. Vol. 25 (Fall 1978), 310-322, at 312.
53. Interviews.
54. A considerable mystique developed around the admittedly demanding SINS
technology. Extraordinary restrictions, for example,were placed on British access to the
SINS that were sold to the UK as part of the Polaris purchase. The UK, including the
captains and navigators of the Polaris submarines and the Admiralty's technical
specialists, were not and are not allowed navigational data from the SINS. It is
transmitted directly to the American-provided fire-control system and thence to the
missile, with its diversion into British (human) hands prohibited.
55. Interview.
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gravitational field through which it is passing. These necessities implied
heterogeneous engineering of a potentially difficult kind, since delicate
matters of international relations were involved.
One solution to the reset problem free of international relations
difficulties was to use the human navigator's old stand-by, the stars. The
'type 11 periscope' enabled 'an operator to visually locate a true star
position and manually enter the information which corrects the inertial
system's prediction of the ship's position'. In use the 'Type 11 was a real
dog. I mean it was a mechanical marvel, but it was a hydraulically-driven,
hydraulically-supported periscope: it's like taking... sights at the top of a 40
foot pole, and you've got to remember that you've got to track and
everything else while the ship is moving all over the place, and we were
only too happy to get rid of it'.56 With its 'usefulness...limited by marginal
accuracy, cloud cover, daylight, alignment problems, and maintenance
costs'57, the Type 11 had been discarded by the time the navigation systems
for the British Polaris submarines were supplied by the US, and was finally
eliminated from the US fleet in 1969.58 A similar technique provided
resets from radio wave emission from the sun or moon using a
radiometric sextant, providing an all-weather capability lacking in the
Type ll.59
However, three other sources of external fixes were concentrated
on.60 One involved surveying the sea floor with sonar and identifying
distinctive features. The first Polaris submarines were to be deployed in
the Norwegian Sea, and so initially only a limited area needed to be
surveyed. The submarine could then navigate from one surveyed feature
to another, updating its SINS at each, in just the same way that modern
56. Interview.
57. S. A. Conigliaro, 'From Polaris to Trident Navigation' (Mimeo of speech given to
National Marine Meeting, Institute of Navigation, US Merchant Marine Academy, Kings
Point, Long Island, New York, 23 October 1973), 6; 'marginal accuracy' had been added to
the text by hand, in the copy provided to me at Unisys.
58. Interestingly, however, periscopes of this general kind remain in use in the French
submarine-launched ballistic missile fleet, whose dependence on other, American
dominated, navigation aids would be unacceptable. v/e>( ^7
59. See B. Miller, 'Radio Sextant Developed for Submarines', Aviation WeekUFebruarv 29,
1960), 81.
68. A useful summary of navigation resets can be found in Owen Wilkes and Nils Petter
Gleditsch, Loran-C and Omega: A study of the military importance of radio navigation
aids (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1987).
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cruise missile guidance uses terrain mapping. So long as no extraordinary
manoeuvres were required, a submarine could follow surveyed features
without coming near the surface (except for communications). Of course,
both this and accurate gravitational mapping required detailed surveying
of future Polaris patrol areas by surface ships. This attracted the attention
of the Soviet Union, and Soviet vessels began to shadow the survey ships.
Even so the true purpose of the survey ships was apparently considered
too sensitive to be imparted to America's NATO allies except in most
general terms.61
Two further solutions to the reset problem were also pursued. In
addition, both helped the survey ships in the task of locating the sea-floor
features they mapped. One was a more accurate version of Loran (Long
Range Aid to Navigation) known as Loran-C.62 Loran was developed
during the Second World War at the MIT Radiation Laboratory. Time
differences between the arrival of radio signals from widely spaced land-
based transmitters enabled positional fixes to be made. By the late 1950s
Loran-C receivers were able to provide absolute navigational accuracy of
about a quarter of a mile at a thousand mile range, and were sensitive to
differences of thirty to forty feet.63 Loran-C was actually an Air Force
development which was avidly taken up by SPO's navigation branch. It
was used first on the USS Compass Island, then for the survey ships as
they mapped sea-bed features, and was available for the first Polaris
submarines when they went on patrol. By 1962 Loran-C networks were
operating in the Northern and Western Atlantic, the Mediterranean,
round Hawaii, and in the North Pacific and Aleutians.64 In these areas a
trailing wire antenna would be 'often deployed for continuous reception'
of Loran-C so that it could 'be used continuously to monitor SINS
performance'.65
The new Loran-C stations were built - in Norway, Italy, Spain,
Turkey, Denmark, Libya, and elsewhere - without creating political
61. See Ibid, 81.
62. See P. J. Klass, 'Computer Simplifies Loran-C Navigation', Aviation Week and Space
Technology |l5 June 1964), 95-97.
63. Interview.
64. D. A. Anderton, 'Loran-C Extension Proposed for Tracking', Aviation Week and Space
Technology ^October 1,1962), 41-47.
65. Conigliaro, 6.
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controversy. In future years, however, stations designed - or believed to be
designed - for FBM navigation were to lead to open political dispute in
New Zealand, Australia and Norway.66
Free from such risks, and also at least in the immediate future safe
from possible Soviet attack, was the third reset system. This was the
world's first satellite navigation system, Transit. Scientists at Johns
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory were developing a
technique for tracking the orbit of Sputnik using the Doppler shift in the
frequency of its transmission at a ground station of known location. By
reversing the process a navigational fix could be obtained from a satellite
of known orbit.67 Although not available for the first Polaris patrols,
Transit would soon prove to be not only an additional source of
navigational fixes, but perhaps more importantly, a major source of
geodetic information.68
So the standard navigation equipment of the first Polaris
submarines was three SINS; an electromagnetic log which measured water
speed (necessary to damp oscillations in the SINS); Loran-C receiver,
Transit receiver (when developed), Type 11 periscope, and terrain
matching sonar (all for updating the SINS); and two NAVDAC
(Navigation Data Assimilation Computer) systems to integrate all the
information.
Missile
SPO's missile branch, SP-27, was formed when the all-clear was
given to develop Polaris in December 1956. A year earlier Lockheed
Missile System Division had been chosen as the FBM system program
manager, and they were then given a contract by SPO in April 1957 'to
determine the suitability of missile development for submarines'.69 They
were chosen to replace Chrysler Corporation as the missile contractor.
66. Wilkes and Gleditsch, especially Chapter 11.
67. See The First Forty Years (Silver Spring, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Applied
Physics Laboratory, 1983), 109-17.
68. The Transit programme is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
69. Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc., Fleet Ballistic Missiles - 25 Years
(Sunnyvale, Calif.: Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc., n.d.), 8.
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LMSD had already developed a three-stage solid-propellant ballistic
missile, the X-17, as a test vehicle for the Air Force.70 Using this they were
able to begin a series of flight tests for the FBM programme almost
immediately - the first was on 11 January 1957.71 The key technologies
which were required for the Polaris missile subsystem included: a high
impulse, large diameter solid propellant; a casing for the missile; a method
of steering the missile; a means of terminating the thrust; and a light
enough payload - warhead/re-entry vehicle combination - that would
survive atmospheric re-entry.
Developments in solid propellant technology during 1955 and 1956
had been central in SPO's successful campaign for its own missile. Two
kinds of solid propellant were under development. Double base cast
propellants had been developed under OSRD sponsorship in World War
II and combined nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine in a solvent producing a
mixture which could then be extruded to the desired size. In the 1950s
double base propellants became widely used in JATOs (jet assisted take-off
systems) for boosting missile or aircraft take-off. They also were used in
the the Talos and Terrier class missiles, which were developed under
Navy sponsorship by the Allegany Ballistics Laboratory and Johns Flopkins
Applied Physics Laboratory. Flowever, the resultant propellant was very
hard and inelastic and could not be case-bonded into a missile casing.72
The alternative, composite propellant technology was more recent.
Rubbery compounds such as polyurethane were combined with
ammonium perchlorate oxidizer, and allowed relatively fluid casting. In
late 1955 scientists working under a Navy Bureau of Ordnance contract at
the Atlantic Research Corporation made an important breakthrough. By
adding large amounts of aluminium powder to the propellant they
obtained a significant increase in specific impulse.73 Aerojet Corporation
was the main manufacturer of composite propellant and they built the
70. The X-17 was the launch vehicle used to explode nuclear warheads at an altitude of 300
miles in PROJECT ARGUS.
71. 'A History of Lockheed', Lockheed Horizons. Issue Twelve (Burbank, Calif.: Lockheed
Corporation, 1983), 81.
72. Interview.
73. See Baar and Howard, 32-3.
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rocket motors for both the first and second stages of the Polaris Al.
Meanwhile, in the search for higher specific impulse, SPO also sponsored
continuing research on double base type propellants with the Hercules-
Allegany Ballistics Laboratory team.74
Aerojet cast their composite propellant into steel cases for the first
Polaris missiles. Simple in concept, each missile casing nevertheless had
to cope with the high temperatures and pressures created by the burning
propellant. To meet these demands whilst improving weldability a low-
alloy steel was specially developed for Polaris.75 By reducing the weight of
the cases and increasing the propellant thrust, SPO could now work on
increasing missile range.
However, for the first Polaris range increases were not crucial once
about 900 nautical miles had been obtained - that was enough to
demonstrate feasibility and consolidate the FBM programme. Methods of
controlling the direction of the thrust vector and of terminating thrust in
the second stage were more critical, if the purported deterrence role of
threatening Soviet cities was to seem credible. Without thrust vector
control the trajectory of the missile could not be changed after launch. The
preliminary flight tests indicated that a number of approaches might be
feasible. One was simply to use jet vanes, and this remained the back-up
option. A more elegant solution was the 'jetevator', invented by the
former VI scientist, Dr Willy Fiedler.
The jetevator was basically a solid ring with a spherical inside
surface which was hinged over the rocket nozzle. When turned into the
exhaust stream it deflected the flow. The two Polaris Al stages both had
four nozzles with jetevators to simplify the flight control formulations.
Nevertheless, the corrosive nature of the exhaust stream, and its high
content of aluminium oxide, led to considerable problems in getting the
jetevators to work reliably during the static motor tests.76
74. E. H. Kolcum, 'First Polaris Launched From Submarine', Aviation Week. Vol. 73 (July 25,
1960), 32
75. G.G. Whipple, 'Power for Polaris', Ordnance (January-February 1962), 583-85 at 584.
76. Fuhrman, 275.
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The other critical issue was thrust termination. The whole purpose
of the rocket stages was to bring the payload - the warhead and re-entry-
vehicle - to a point in space where it would fall ballistically to its target.
Just as the missile reached the desired velocity its second stage rocket
needed to be turned off instantaneously. This was a relatively easy task in
liquid-fueled missiles, but not in solid-fueled ones. One way of doing this
was simply to blow the nozzles off, so causing a rapid drop in pressure that
would extinguish the motor, but with such large motors this looked
difficult to make reliable for all the conceivable ranges and the large shock
wave caused was felt likely to upset the missile electronics.77
That and various other conceptual methods of thrust termination
lost out to a system in which vents were opened at the front of the second
stage - the escaping exhaust gases causing it to reverse at the time of
separation from the payload. Six ports were built into the front of each
second stage with plugs that could be pyrotechnically removed when
required. Although more laborious and expensive than simply
pyrotechnically cutting ports through an homogeneous steel case, this
approach was considered likely to work well without causing undesirable
shock levels.78 At this stage all other considerations were subsumed to
demonstrating feasibility on schedule.
Lockheed also had responsibility for developing the payload carried
by Polaris. Lawrence Livermore's predicted small warhead needed to be
built along with a protective shield to prevent damage during atmospheric
re-entry. With payload weight critical because of its large effect on range, it
was decided that the only way to keep the payload sufficiently light would
be to integrate the warhead and re-entry system. Current design practice,
as used in the other ballistic missile programmes, was to build the
warhead and re-entry shield as separate entities.
Headed by Lt. Robert Wertheim, the re-entry section of SP-27
coordinated this work, with Lockheed responsible for re-entry vehicle




Laboratory, White Oak for arming and fuzing devices.79 Teller's warhead
prediction had in fact been something of a 'guesstimate' and Livermore
were unable to meet the original yield goal on schedule. However, the
megaton goal was not considered critical at SPO, whereas schedule was. In
July 1957 the Atomic Energy Commission detonated an experimental
warhead design which confirmed the general feasibility of a Polaris
warhead.80 By the time Polaris A1 was first deployed in 1960 a yield of the
order of 450 kilotons had been achieved in the W-47 warhead.81 This
comfortably exceeding SPO's internal minimum satisfactory yield of 300
kilotons.82
Designed to be integral with the warhead - that is, to share structural
and functional components - the re-entry vehicle needed to be able to
protect it from the rigours of atmospheric re-entry. The choice had to be
made between the two main technical approaches to this challenge. The
approach then favoured by the Army, and used in the Jupiter IRBM, was
to dissipate re-entry heating by the ablation, or 'burning off' of the outer
layers of the re-entry vehicle. The Air Force, on the other hand, initially
favoured heat sink re-entry vehicles whose metallic construction simply
absorbed (and partially re-emitted) the heat. Although they later moved to
ablative re-entry vehicles for ICBMs the Air Force used the heat sink type
in their Thor IRBM.83 SPO also chose to use a heat sink design for Polaris,
mainly because it looked likely to require less flight testing to validate the
design. As Admiral Smith recalls:
The Jupiter re-entry system was an ablative cooling system,
as opposed to a heat sink, and the estimates that had been
made by Bothwell and later updated by Lockheed were
also based on that ablative cooling assumption. There's no
doubt that it's . . . proven a very efficient, weight efficient
method of disposing of the heat generated in re-entry.
However, as I saw it, at least, it has the disadvantage that
the amount of ablative material cannot be reasonably
validated without flight tests. ... So when Lockheed . . .
proposed a quite different shape, and a heat sink approach,
79. Fuhrman, 270.
80. Ibid, 275.
81. Various sources give the yield of the first version of the Polaris warhead, the W47-Y1,
as between 450 to 600 kilotons.
82. Interview.
83. See M. A. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1969), 144-46.
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which could much more reasonably be calculated ... I
favoured that approach.84
A problem then with heatsink designs was 'the extreme aerodynamic
heating associated with high-speed re-entry of streamlined, slender
cones.'85 To avoid this most re-entry vehicles at the time were blunt
designs whose slower descent reduced heating, but also made them more
susceptible to wind drift inaccuracy.86 For Polaris beryllium was chosen for
the heatsink because of its 'light weight, high strength-weight ratio at high
temperature and high specific heat'.87
Consequently, SPO achieved their goal of a warhead/re-entry
vehicle combination weighing less than 900 pounds.88 Whilst other
services were combining warheads weighing some 1500 lbs with re-entry
vehicles to give total weights over 3000 lbs, Teller's promised warhead was
of the order of 600 lbs, which when designed into an integral re-entry
vehicle produced a total of weight of about 850 lbs.89 This was designed to
be ejected from the second stage motor at the time of thrust termination by
an airspring. A flare section attached to the rear of the re-entry vehicle
provided 'aerodynamic damping at re-entry and stabilization during
descent', and contained gas nozzles which spun the re-entry vehicle to
provide stability and symmetry during re-entry.90
However, although the Polaris payload was an innovative success it
was not without problems. Just prior to the nuclear test moratorium
began in October 1958, Livermore conducted a 'one-point' safety test on the
W-47, which surprisingly gave a yield of about 100 tons.91 Because the
84. Interview.
85 Aviation Week. Vol. 68 (March 17,1958), 24.
86. Heating is reduced because the blunt re-entry vehicle creates a detached shock wave in
advance of it which dissipates most of the energy of re-entry.
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moratorium prevented the tests considered necessary to develop a design
that was inherently one-point safe, a mechanical safing system was
incorporated. This, however, failed to operate satisfactorily, even after
several fixes and in many instances the mechanism would have failed to
arm the warhead resulting in a dud.92
Submarine Construction
Getting submarines ready to carry Polaris was the responsibility of
the ship installation branch of SPO, SP-26. When the missile
development was accelerated in December 1957 it was decided that the
long development time of an all-new FBM submarine would delay
deployment. On December 30, Electric Boat were awarded a contract for
the design and construction of the first submarine, the USS George
Washington, which was in fact a conversion of an attack submarine, the
USS Scorpion, already under construction.
With submarine construction already the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Ships, SP-26 thus had a rather different and potentially more difficult
role than the other technical branches, who could deal directly with
contractors under freshly instigated arrangements. Whereas guidance,
navigation, launcher and missile developments were assigned to 'prime
contractors' all keen for new business and willing to match the new
technology with new management approaches,93 SP-26 had to deal with
BuShips bureaucracy and the traditional management techniques of their
construction companies. To make matters potentially even more fraught,
nuclear-powered vessels required BuShips themselves to work together
with Admiral Hyman Rickover, whose power derived not only from his
technical expertise and position as head of the Navy's Nuclear Propulsion
Directorate, but also from his other role as director of the AEC's Naval
Reactors Branch and his strong support in Congress.
not exceed one in one million in the event of a detonation initiated at the single most
sensitive point in the high explosive system'.
92. Interview.
93. Except perhaps for Sperry, who became navigation integrator in 1958 and were a
traditional Navy contractor.
62
However, at this crucial stage in the submarine development
Rickover's ability to interfere was minimized by Burke's firm control, and
in any case SPO were able to convince him that his interests (getting
nuclear power into the US Navy) were closely tied to the success of the
Polaris submarines.94 Indeed Rickover's technical prowess and drive
made him a formidable ally in the construction of the first Polaris
submarines, once the danger of him attempting to alter the design had
been alleviated. Although the construction of the first FBM submarine,
the George Washington, was 'plagued by scores of mistakes' and 'many
goofs' it was still completed at the Electric Boat yard on schedule and
launched on June 9, 1959.95
Testing Polaris
During 1957 and 1958 flight tests continued using an assortment of
available rocket boosters to assess the chosen methods of thrust
termination and vector control, and to investigate re-entry vehicle
thermodynamics. A total of twenty-two of these FTV (flight test vehicle)
flights were carried out.96 In September 1958 the first of seventeen Polaris
prototype AX series test flights began, with initially not very impressive
results.97
The first took off satisfactorily, but continued to climb vertically,
apparently because of a malfunction in the autopilot programmer used in
place of the inertial guidance system.98 In the second test flight the first
stage rocket malfunctioned and the missile never left the pad. AX-3 and
AX-4 demonstrated erratic behaviour during the first-stage flight, caused
by overheating at the base of the stage and consequent malfunction of
electrical wiring. This led to an intensive investigation to understand the
problem, 'Operation Hotfoot', and to corrective changes in 'Operation
Phoenix' which had remedied it by AX-6." Of the seventeen AX flights,
94. See Chapter 4.
98. Baar and Howard, 139.
96. Fuhrman, 275.
97. For a complete listing of AX tests, see 'Longer Range Promised Through Improved




five were classed as successful, eleven partially successful, and one (AX-2)
as a failure.100 'Partial success' was, however, something of an SPO
euphemism since any test that returned some useful data was not
considered a complete failure.101
In September 1959 the A1X flight tests began using hardware very
similar to that of the Polaris A1 missile later deployed. The MIT inertial
guidance system was first introduced in January 1960 and from flight A1X-
14 onwards the hardware flown was 'substantially the same as the
production design except for the added instrumentation and range safety
provisions'.102 Forty A1X flight tests were carried out with twenty-eight
evaluated as complete successes, eleven as partially successful, and only
one a complete failure.103
A1X-31, however, was a particularly important test, the first from a
submerged submarine. On 20 July 1960 it was launched successfully to a
range of about a thousand miles from the USS George Washington. A few
hours later a second Polaris missile was launched, again with complete
success. After many set-backs SPO could breathe a sigh of relief. Admiral
Burke's faith in the Polaris project had been justified. The Polaris concept
was now technology, and it worked!
100 Ibid, 277.
101. See 'Polaris A3 Reaches Advanced Test Phase', Aviation Week & Space Technology






This is not an ultimate missile here. We are going to keep
improving this missile as we go along, even after it is first
installed in the ships, so we are not going to get an ultimate
missile and stop.
Admiral BurkeJ
Polaris A1 became operational on November 15^1960, when the
submarine George Washington left Charleston, South Carolina to patrol
the Norwegian Sea. Then in December the second FBM submarine, the
Patrick Henry, went on patrol. Each carried sixteen Polaris A1 missiles
capable of delivering a nuclear warhead over a range of about a thousand
miles to within a few miles of the intended target. Polaris seemed to be an
indisputable success.
The Social Construction of Success
Within four years SPO had developed and deployed a complex, new
type of weapon system which provided a threat of potential retaliation
against Soviet cities, but which itself seemed invulnerable. This success
owed much to the skill and dedication of the people that worked on the
programme. In particular SPO demonstrated great skill in managing both
the 'technical' and 'social' aspects of technology. Moreover, within certain
limits they were able to 'engineer' the expectations that Polaris had to
meet just as well as the technology that met them.
Schedule was paramount, with a sense of urgency generated not
only by concern about the need to counter possible Soviet developments,
but also to establish a Navy right to ballistic missiles before the Air Force
achieved the hegemony it clearly desired. To meet the schedule other
system parameters could be traded off. Thus the A1 initially fell somewhat
1. Quoted in Robert E. Hunter, 'Politics and Polaris: The Special Projects Office of the Navy
as a Political Phenomenon' (unpublished Senior Honours Thesis, Wesleyan University, June
1962), 272.
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short of the 1200 mile range goal and carried a warhead with a yield about
half the one megaton goal. Neither trade-off mattered since SPO was able
to argue that Polaris A1 still provided a useful interim deterrent capability.
Likewise SPO set a pattern for future systems by agreeing to an accuracy
figure as a goal and not as a requirement.
For the original Polaris this goal was 'a couple of miles CEP', 'about
the size of a city' which at the start of the programme seemed to many to
be 'probably ... unobtainable' because of the then state-of-the-art of ship
navigation.2 Even a four mile CEP would have been considered
satisfactory, but participants recollect that accuracy goals were met 'as far as
we could tell'.3 Polaris A1 probably averaged an accuracy better than two
miles. But at the time, before the geodetic mapping carried out using
Transit, knowledge of the precise location of targets was itself a major
inaccuracy. For example, in 1959, before Transit, 'the location of Australia
was wrong by several thousand meters'.4
What mattered was demonstrating feasibility: that it could be built,
that the components would function individually and collectively.
Within broad limits its precise characteristics, such as accuracy, mattered
less than this overall question of whether it would, in a general sense,
'work'. If the CEP of Polaris A1 had turned out to be ten miles, or twenty
miles, then it might have been judged a failure, but anything under five
was quite adequate. The Naval Warfare Analysis Group's first study of the
FBM, distributed in January 1957, emphasized the flexibility of
performance characteristics: 'Requirements for yield and accuracy should
be subordinated to early availability of the weapon'.5
This relaxed attitude to accuracy, as to other performance criteria
that were not considered critical, helped ensure the success of the
programme. SPO realized the importance of demonstrating feasibility on
schedule, and avoided any unnecessary 'requirements'. To meet
2. Interviews.
3. Interview.
4. Richard B. Kershner, 'Technical Innovations in the APL Space Department', lohns
Hopkins APL Technical Digest. Vol. 2 (Jan-March 1981), 264-78, at 269.
5. Naval Warfare Analysis Group Study No. 1, 'Introduction of the Fleet Ballistic into
Service '(January 1957), Serial 007P93, 7.
* cep- c'lfOAtcir zrrtr -is- defined. w the rcduu of oVcle arw/uj Jhc
ukik of- woi/li be -ft, £aLL.
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schedule, as Harvey Sapolsky has noted: 'Performance was a
manipulatable variable in the Polaris program'.6 Moreover, whilst SPO
was developing the weapon that would provide an 'assured destruction'
retaliatory threat to cities, Admiral Burke and others were developing the
strategic logic that would require it. High accuracy looked to be beyond
foreseeable technology in a sea-based ballistic missile (and to be inherently
easier for the land-based Air Force ICBMs) and so it was not 'needed'.
However, the success of Polaris cannot be attributed entirely to the
heterogeneous engineering of its proponents, highly skilled though this
was. Polaris also benefited from the wider social context of the day, a
context which partly lay beyond the influence of SPO and their
collaborators. Polaris was a success because its need was perceived to be so
great and so urgent at the time. But the national paranoia following
Sputnik was something which would probably have occurred if SPO and
the Polaris programme had not existed, as indeed would Senator Kennedy
and the 'missile gap' mythology he exploited in his bid for the Presidency.
Nor did the success of Polaris go completely unchallenged. During
its development there had been criticism from Air Force sources
suggesting that the FBM concept was beyond the state-of-the-art in
technology, especially in the area of submarine navigation.7 By attacking
the feasibility of Polaris the Air Force sought to counter the challenge that
it constituted to their control over strategic weaponry:
The Air Force could see a fight ahead for dollars that
formerly had "Air Force" written all over them. Therefore,
the Air Force missed few opportunities to remind the
administration that Polaris was unproved.®
But as Polaris tests progressed the credibility of the mainstream
arguments against its feasibility began to weaken. Although the validity of
the tests, and what they actually demonstrated, remained open to question,
in practice the Air Force could not do so without raising the same doubts
6. Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic
Success in Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 141.
7. Interview.
®. James Baar and William E. Howard, Polaris! (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World,
1960), 198.
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about its own comparable ICBM and IRBM testing. Even in the area of
navigation - where the technical challenge was significantly different for a
sea-based system - Navy demonstrations provided convincing evidence
that adequate accuracy could be achieved. And, of course, Burke and SPO
were promulgating a strategic doctrine in which 'adequate accuracy' to
threaten urban-industrial targets was not only sufficient, but even
preferable to 'pinpoint' accuracy.
By carefully differentiating their targeting doctrine from that of the
Air Force, Polaris supporters thus made irrelevant such doubts raised by
the Air Force about the ability of Polaris to destroy hardened military
targets:
It is still unclear, however, how efficient the low-payload
Polaris will be against hardened targets, for no prototype
missile has yet been fired, nor has the radically new ship's
inertial navigation system - crucial to accurate firing - been
perfected.9
By instead stressing the counter-city role of Polaris - retaliation against
large, 'soft' targets - it was possible to deflect such criticism. It also left the
Air Force able to justify its ICBM and bomber forces by reference to their
primary counterforce mission (hence the concentration on improving
ICBM hard target effectiveness from the early 1960s on), and so reduced
their need to criticize Polaris. This did not stop the interservice fight over
ballistic missile control and funding, but it differentiated the Air Force and
Navy programmes sufficiently to allow for neither side to lose out
completely as they could be seen as complementary rather than direct
competitors.
Indeed the attempt during 1959 and 1960 by the Air Force to obtain
jurisdiction over Polaris was a tacit acceptance of its technical feasibility
and strategic legitimacy. Technical criticism specific to a sea-based ballistic
missile was largely laid to rest by a RANJD Corporation analysis of Polaris
produced in October 1958 in response to an Air Staff request for a 'factual
9. C. E. Selberman and S. S. Parker, 'The Economic Impact of Defense', Fortune. Vol. 57 (June
1958), 215. Cited in Hunter, 145. See also Baar and Howard, 215-6; D. A. Rosenberg,
'Arleigh Albert Burke' in R. W. Love, Jr., The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis.
Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 310-12.
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and unbiased assessment'.10 (But see below for continued opposition to all
ballistic missiles by Air Force bomber stalwarts.) Thereafter, the Air
Force's attitude to Polaris centred on the targeting issue. Burke's
minimum deterrence, counter-city strategy was actively criticized as the
Air Force sought to justify its own preference for counterforce.11 But at the
same time Strategic Air Command leaders sought to gain control of Polaris
by proposing the integration of all US strategic forces for the purpose of
coordinating targeting.
This, of course, met fierce resistance, as a 'high ranking' naval
officer remarked:
Polaris is perhaps the most attractive missile system under
development. ... Of course they want control of Polaris. But
they will have to walk over a prostrate Arleigh Burke to
get it.12
The takeover attempt did not succeed, but the Air Force move did result in
the coordination of targeting into a Single Integrated Operational Plan
(SIOP) in 1960. Since the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff set up to
produce the SIOP was dominated by Strategic Air Command officers it
effectively settled the interservice argument over targeting.13 The SIOP
embodied the Air Force belief in a massive (and preferably pre-emptive)
attack against the complete range of counterforce and urban-industrial
targets. Air Force criticism of Polaris was now muted though the much
vaunted invulnerability of Polaris was still publicly questioned by the Air
Force.
But in contrast to the previous decade the early 1960s saw the Air
Force very much on the defensive, attempting to protect their budget share
from the rationalization plans of President Kennedy's new Secretary of
Defense, Robert McNamara. The main focus of Air Force/Navy
competition shifted to the issue of cost-effectiveness which now came to
10. Quoted in D. A. Rosenberg, 'The Origins of Overkill: NuclearWeapons and American
Strategy, 1945-1960', International Security. (1983), 57.
11. Ibid, 58-60.
12. Quoted in Ibid, 61.
13. The JSTPS comprised 219 SAC personnel, 29 Navy, 10 Army, 3 Marine and 8 additional
non-SAC Air Force. Ibid, 5.
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dominate Pentagon thinking.14 Now that the reputations of SPO and
Polaris were established, Navy support for the proposed B-70 bomber was
no longer forthcoming in 1961 and it was canceled despite attempts to sell
it as an alternative mobile ballistic missile basing system for the Skybolt
air-launched ballistic missile.15 Likewise the Air Force pushed the mobile
Minuteman in an attempt to compete on the invulnerability issue:
The railroad-based Minuteman ... could elude the enemy in
the event of hostilities and avoid a first strike in the same
way that the Navy's Polaris missile submarines can evade
detection.16
The Air Force argued that their new Minuteman ICBMs would be
much cheaper to deploy than Polaris. According to McNamara's own
figures in 1961 the cost for each Polaris missile on station would be $9.7
million, whereas a mobile Minuteman would cost $5.0 million, and a
fixed-base Minuteman only $3.2 million.17 SPO countered this by stressing
that the invulnerability of Polaris made it more cost-effective than
Minuteman and that Polaris was already available, whereas Minuteman
had yet to be tested. Doubts about whether the Air Force would deliver
Minuteman on cost and schedule were also echoed by Budget Director
Stans:
... we were not quite certain that the development of the
Minuteman could be successfully accomplished with the
level of costs estimated by the Air Force. Or whether or not
the timetable could be wholly relied upon. And finally, we
had no estimate of the cost of hardening the Minuteman
system that we could rely upon.18
Polaris was also looked on very favourably within McNamara's
OSD, where it came out well in the cost-effectiveness calculations.19
Herbert York, the first Director of Defense Research and Engineering, who
14. A good account of McNamara's new management philosophy and methods can be found in
Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense
Program. 1961-1969 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).
15. See testimony of Admiral Burke quoted in Hunter, 149.
16. Quoted in Hunter, 155.
17. Cited in Hunter, 146.
18. Quoted in Hunter, 147.
19. Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 254-
5.
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stayed on briefly from the Eisenhower administration, considered 'Polaris
to be one of the really well run programs in the Defense Department'.20
Although the Kennedy administration soon discovered that pre-election
rhetoric about the 'missile gap' was erroneous, it remained politically
expedient to bolster strategic forces.21 Polaris became a major beneficiary of
this. The Air Force alternatives were either considered somewhat obsolete
already (the liquid-fueled Atlas and Titan ICBMs) or unproven (the solid-
fueled Minuteman). Although a Minuteman force of 1000 was approved
by McNamara, this fell far short of Air Force demands, and the mobile
Minuteman was first deferred and then canceled in December 1961.
However, following the successful test flights of Polaris and of other
US ballistic missiles, a different, more general challenge to their feasibility
emerged. A group of critics, centred around Air Force bomber officers,
began to argue that although the flight tests might demonstrate the
feasibility of certain components under test conditions, they did not
demonstrate the effectiveness of the system under 'real' operational
conditions.
In what was apparently an attempt to settle this question the Navy
carried out a 'live' test of a Polaris A1 on May 6, 1962 - the only such test
performed by a US ballistic missile. Known as 'Operation Frigate Bird' this
involved launching a missile from the USS Ethan Allen over 1000 miles
to the nuclear testing ground at Christmas Island. The test was considered
a resounding success, and was reported to have 'hit "right in the pickle
barrel'" exploding with a yield estimated at half a megaton.22 Ironically
this was the W-47 warhead incorporating the faulty mechanical safing
device which was later estimated to have perhaps a fifty per cent chance of
producing a dud.
In any case the 'Frigate Bird' test did not entirely mollify missile
critics and the Partial Test Ban Treaty signed in 1963 prevented a repeat.
20. Interview.
21. See Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the
Kennedy Administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
22. 'Live Polaris Launch', Aviation Week (14 May, 1962), 35; also Robert A. Fuhrman, 'The
Fleet Ballistic Missile System; Polaris to Trident', journal of Spacecraft. Vol. 5, No. 5
(Sept-Oct 1978), 277.
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Public criticism of ballistic missile reliability continued through 1964 with
both Senator Barry Goldwater (an Air Force reserve Major General who
had 'long identified himself with the bomber faction'23) and Air Force
Chief of Staff (and former head of SAC) General Curtis LeMay voicing
their doubts. However, such criticisms were difficult to sustain when
many of the main critics were also institutionally committed to ICBMs. As
Air Force Chief of Staff, LeMay was at the same time arguing for a force of
several thousand Minuteman ICBMs. In the end the argument over
whether ballistic missiles would actually work lost credibility not because
tests proved that they would, but because these influential critics ceased to
argue that they would not.
The success of Polaris was thus not simply a technical matter.
Whether the missiles would actually work in a nuclear war was, and is, an
issue that can always be questioned in principle. In practice, however, SPO
developed an unrivalled reputation for producing what they had
committed^to. If any US ballistic missile was going to work then SPO's
impressive managerial style and avoidance of technical over-elaboration
suggested that it would be Polaris. But Polaris A1 was only SPO's first step
in the development and establishment of the FBM system.
Polaris A2
The Polaris A2 was developed almost simultaneously with the Al,
with the understanding that the Al schedule was paramount. Meeting
this schedule resulted in a production missile which fell short of the range
and warhead yield initially hoped for, and which had low reliability.24 It
had 'worked' very effectively, in that it had demonstrated the feasibility of
the concept and staked out the Navy's claim to it. But its reliability was
not considered very good, as one Lockheed manager recalled:
[the] Polaris Al propulsion system was inherently not
reliable. ... Polaris Al was a vehicle that had been
23. Anon., 'Fixes planned for Minuteman deficiencies', Aviation Week and Space
Technology (February 3,1964), 26-7.
24. R. Lindsey, 'B-3 Polaris Expected To Be Operational in '70', Missiles and Rockets. Vol. 15
(August 24,1964), 28, quotes Lockheed Missiles and Space Corporation general manager
Stanley Burris as saying that Polaris A3 was 'at least 25 to 30%* more reliable than A2,
which was a similar advance over Al.
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designed to be flight tested by engineers. It was then turned
over to the Navy as a weapon. It demanded, but you
couldn't give it, tender loving care in all electrical
connections. And so it had electrical failures, no one failure
mode predominating, that is no one area predominating, just
lots of them. ... A1 was a hell of a fine weapon considering
the circumstances in which it was done but it was not
acceptable when it was possible to have the A2.2^
The main changes in A2 were a new second stage to provide longer
range, an improvement of the warhead design to provide slightly greater
yield, and more reliable electronics. Originally the increased range was to
have been achieved by increasing propellant energy and reducing inert
weight throughout the missile. However, the much greater effect of
improvements in the second stage, coupled with a conservative attitude to
changing too much of the design at once, led to-a decision to retain
basically the same technology in the first stage, with an alternative second
stage design. The first stage was simply increased some thirty inches over
the A1 first stage to take advantage of space originally set aside for the
launcher's buoyancy compensation tanks, but used the same propellant
formulation and case construction as in Al.
The alternative higher performance second stage was the result of
work that SPO had sponsored at the Hercules-run, government-owned
Allegany Ballistics Laboratory. This had come about because Admiral
Raborn had wanted a backup for the original Polaris. Technical Director
Levering Smith had then argued that the backup 'should be different in
every respect. It should have a completely different approach to the
propellant, have a completely different approach to the case, and the thrust
vector control system should be different.'26 A double base
(nitrocellulose/nitroglycerine) propellant using ammonium perchlorate
oxidizer and aluminium fuel was developed that could be cast into rocket
cases. Full scale development was given the go-ahead in June 1958.27
Hercules Powder Co. were also responsible for pioneering the
development of fibre-glass as a rocket case material. This was apparently





would jeopardize the programme.28 Fibre-glass also appeared to offer
higher strength-to-weight ratios than steel. Development of the second
stage chamber for the Polaris A2 was started in 1958, with the first flight in
November I960.29
The alternative approach also considered thrust vector control.
This sought to overcome the problems that the jetevator had experienced,
to reduce the inert weight of the vector control system and minimize the
loss of axial thrust in steering. Out of the several concepts investigated a
rotatable nozzle design, similar to that already proving successful in the
Air Force Minuteman ICBM programme, was chosen for use in the second
stage.30
Polaris A2 was initially deployed with the half megaton W47
(known as W47-Y1), but this was later replaced by a W47-Y2 with a yield
close to the original one megaton goal.31 This upgrade was obtained
during the 1958-62 nuclear test moratorium by replacing the secondary
device (the fusion part of a hydrogen bomb) of the existing design, but this
version of the W47 still incorporated the faulty mechanical safing device.
The problem was eventually remedied by the replacement of the warhead
primary in 1967.32
Thus the A2 provided very similar, but slightly enhanced
performance as compared to Al. But whereas 'the thing that drove A1
was to get there as soon as possible, the thing that drove A2 was improve
the reliability'.33 Both were considered to have the same strategic mission,
to target Soviet cities, and hold them to ransom against communist
aggression by the threat of retaliatory devastation. A2 was what the Navy
had originally promised to provide for this purpose, but Al allowed them
28. Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc., Fleet Ballistic Missiles - 25 Years
(Sunnyvale, Calif.: Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc., n.d.), 4. „, ,
29. Ibid.
30. See 'Longer Range Promised Through Improved Motors', Missiles and Rockets.j20.31. Interview.
32. Statement of Roy D. Woodruff, Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control and
Disarmament, Armed Services Committee, US House of Representatives (September 20,
1985), mimeo, 11. The W-47 warhead also suffered from problems with corrosion of its
fissile material. See Chuck Hansen, US Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (Arlington,
Texas: Aerofax, 1988), 204-05.
33. Interview.
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to provide a lesser, but conceptually similar, capability sooner. It also
helped consolidate the Navy's role in ballistic missile weaponry. The first
successful submerged launch of the A2 was from the USS Ethan Allen on
October 23, 1961, and the A2 became operational in June 1962.34
Polaris A3
With the A1 and A2 programmes on schedule, SPO began to
consider another generation of Polaris in 1959. Initially the obvious
approach seemed simply to increase the range yet further and to use a
larger warhead, as was desired by a faction in the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, who favoured attempting to match the counterforce
role of the Air Force ICBMs.35
However, a number of factors mill seated against this option. Firstly,
the nuclear test moratorium still prevented testing of new warhead
designs, and a larger warhead was only available as an adaption of one de¬
signed for Air Force use, or by scaling up a smaller yield design. Secondly,
the Soviet Union (like the USA) had started the development of anti-
ballistic missile systems which were intended to provide some defence
against ballistic missile attack by intercepting them in flight. As concern
grew some provisions were made to carry penetration aids on the already
deployed Polaris missiles, and electronic countermeasures developed by
Lockheed Electronics and Raytheon were flight tested.36
SPO's design for the Polaris A3 neatly combined these factors to
counter expected developments in Soviet ABM defences, whilst meeting
the original one megaton goal of Polaris without using warhead designs
that were either untested or of Air Force provenance. Instead of the single
warhead/re-entry vehicle combination carried by Polaris A1/A2 and all
other ballistic missiles of the time, SPO again broke new ground in de¬
veloping a multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV) system.
34. Strategic Systems Program Office, FBM Facts/Chronology - Polaris. Poseidon. Trident
(Washington, DC: Navy Department, 1986), 28.
33. Interview.
36. B. Miller, 'Studies of Penetration Aids Broadening', Aviation Week & Space Technology
(January 20, 1964), 87.
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The warhead used was a 200 kiloton design known as Tuba which
the Livermore laboratory had developed and tested prior to the
moratorium.37 Livermore offered to scale this up to the one megaton goal,
but because it could not be tested at that yield SPO declined, preferring to
use the tested version. Instead the A3 missile was designed to carry three
of the 200 kiloton warheads, which weighed about 200 lbs, providing an
equivalent megatonnage roughly the same as a single one megaton
warhead.38
A new re-entry vehicle, the Mk2, was developed to carry the W58, as
the Polaris version of Tuba was designated. This differed significantly
from the Mkl, using a 'nylon-phenolic ablative heat shield' over an
aluminium structure instead of a heatsink design.39 The reason for this
was that at the longer 2500 miles range of the A3, heatsink re-entry
vehicles needed to be increasingly larger to absorb the extra heat of re-entry
and consequently the lower weight (not to mention lower expense) of
ablative designs became more attractive.40 Moreover, with the Polaris A1
and A2 deployed, schedule was no longer quite so urgent and by now the
ablative approach had been validated, not only by continuing SPO
sponsored research, but also by Air Force and Army developments.41
The Mk2 re-entry vehicles were to be released simultaneously from
the missile when the correct velocity was reached to take them to their
target area. This separation was achieved by small solid-fuel rockets which
separated the re-entry vehicles from the missile second stage, and spun
them (for stability).42 The second stage simply carried on till burn out and
37. Interview; also T. Greenwood, Making the MIRY: A Study of Defense Decision Making
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975), 161.
38. Equivalent megatonage is a measure of the destructive effect against a large, 'soft'
target, such as a city. If y is the yield of a warhead, its equivalent megatonnage is y 2/3.
The blast, etc., from a nuclear explosion is propagated outwards in what is roughly a
sphere, so the 'lethal radius' for any immediate effect is approximately proportional to
the cube root of the yield. Area damage is therefore roughly proportional to the square of
the cube root - i.e. y2/3.
39. Fuhrman, 280.
40. Interview.
41. See M. Yaffee, 'Ablation Wins Missile Performance Gain', Aviation Week (July 18,
1960), 54-65; and 'Pyrolytic Graphite Studied for Re-Entry', Aviation Week (July 25, 1960),
26-28.
42. Fuhrman, 280; Interview.
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the need for a thrust termination system - with its likely addition to
deployment inaccuracy - was thus avoided in A3.
The angle of separation of the re-entry vehicles from the missile
was determined by the perceived nature of Soviet ABM developments.
This perception was very general, however, and so design criteria were
based on the current American state-of-the-art in ABM interceptors, the
Army's Nike-Zeus missile. The separation had to be small enough for all
three warheads to explode over the same target area, but large enough to
prevent a single Nike-Zeus type destroying or disabling all three with the
radiation blast from its nuclear warhead. In practice the separation
achieved led to a 'footprint' at the target area about a mile across,
depending, of course, on the exact distance traveled.43 Because of this
warhead separation the A3 was known as 'The Claw'.
Concern about Soviet ABM defences also inspired Navy work on
penetration aids for the A3. Work was done to develop decoys that could
mimic the appearance of real re-entry vehicles (as far as the ABM radars
were concerned), but be a fraction of the weight. Such light decoys could
only 'look' like real re-entry vehicles outside the atmosphere before the
friction of re-entry slowed them down more rapidly than the real thing or
burnt them up. However, although the Nike-Zeus was an endo-
atmospheric interceptor its slow speed required it to be launched before its
target entered the atmosphere. This meant that light decoys could prove
very effective in confusing and overwhelming a defence based solely on
Nike-Zeus type interceptors. Thus it was considered that Polaris A3/have
the option of replacing one of the Mk2 re-entry vehicles with a decoy
package.44
However, it became clear when the Soviet Galosh ABM system was
displayed at a Red Square parade in Moscow in 1964, and when its
accompanying radars became operational, that the Soviet Union had not
after all chosen to design an ABM similar to Nike-Zeus. Galosh was much
larger, and clearly intended to carry a large warhead (exceeding a megaton)




which included chaff and decoys, were designed to cope with the wrong
threat:
... they were all cut to the wrong frequencies, they were all
too small to have been seen by these low frequency radars
and they were spaced improperly to accommodate the large
yield weapons effects ranges of the big warheads. So other
than that everything was just fine!45
In addition to the new payload, the other main concern of Polaris
A3 was increased range, with a goal of 2500 nautical miles set. This was
not a figure arbitrarily imposed on SPO, but rather derived from their
studies of what seemed achievable. Such an increase over the 1500-mile
A2 looked possible because of the potential to reduce inert weight in the
missile design whilst increasing both the amount and the specific impulse
of the propellant. Moreover, there was confidence that the over-designed
shock protection of the launcher system would allow a heavier missile to
be accommodated.
Many of the weight-saving components planned for A3 were tested
on A1 or A2 test missiles. A new approach to thrust vector control which
cut down on inert weight used the injection of Freon 114 into the nozzles
to deflect the exhaust stream. This was first successfully demonstrated
during the second stage flight of A1X-50 on September 29, 1961.46 It was
incorporated in the design of the A3 second stage, whereas the first stage
now used rotatable nozzles. Both stages were built of fibreglass and
utilized denser, higher specific impulse propellant formulations.
The higher temperatures involved (over 6000°F), along with the
high pressure (800-900 psi), led to difficulties with the first stage. The
composite propellant developed by Aerojet for this stage was apparently
more corrosive than the Hercules/Allegany Ballistic Laboratories double-
base propellant used in the second stage.47 In early tests the first stage
nozzles were destroyed and it was considered necessary to reduce the
45. Interview.
4^. Fuhrman, 280.
47 'Problems May Cut Polaris A3 Range Goal', Aviation Week and Space Technology
(September 4,1961), 31.
78
propellant burning temperature, thus sacrificing a little range. The final
A3 first stage design used silver-infiltrated tungsten nozzle throats.48
A new guidance system, the Mk2, was developed, and flight tested
on A2 missiles starting in November 1961.49 To meet SPO's range goal the
missile contractor, Lockheed, wanted a much smaller and lighter system,
and also wanted the inertial measurement unit (IMU) to be separate from
the electronics assembly (EA) so as to make it easier to pack into the
limited space in the missile. Altogether the Mk2 was about half the size
and one third the weight of the Mkl. Redesign of its physical structure
contributed to this with the large bar beryllium gimbals replaced by smaller
spherical aluminium gimbals. The pressure from Lockheed to save
weight also led to the choice of magnesium for the stable member on
which the inertial components were mounted. Distortion of this
magnesium due to internal corrosion was to be a source of future concern
for those Mk2 guidance systems kept in service by the UK Royal Navy.50
Much smaller resolvers were also used in the Mk2 and a higher density of
electronics packaging was achieved by the first use of 'cordwood' welded
(rather than soldered) construction in a missile.51
In addition the Mk2 used smaller accelerometers (16-size - 1.6 inch
diameter - rather than 25-size). Moreover, the PIGAs, Pendulous
Integrating Gyro Accelerometers, were replaced with PIPAs, Pulsed
Integrating Pendulous Accelerometers, on all but the most sensitive thrust
axis. Unlike the PIGA with its gyro wheel and internal gimbal, the PIPA
consists simply of a pendulum which is held in null position by pulses
sent from a signal generator to an electromagnetic torquer. A PIPA is
therefore smaller than a PIGA, and is also generally acknowledged to be a
simpler, easier to produce and therefore cheaper device - although one
that does not match the accuracy of the best PIGAs.52
Nevertheless, accuracy improvements were sought in the Mk2
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52. Ibid; Interviews.
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accurate as its predecessors at the longer range. SPO, however, went
further still, setting an objective of making the Polaris A3 about four times
more accurate than the A2 at the longer range.53 But improvements in
technology were incorporated only in so much as they fitted the strategic
and organizational goals of the programme. Increasing the missile's
range, and giving it the capability to penetrate anticipated ABM defences,
seemed a natural development of a counter-city ultimate deterrent. The
increase in accuracy was more a consequence of lessons learnt in
developing the original Polaris than a sign of a major shift to a new
strategic role or any abandonment of 'differentiation' of the Navy's
technology from that of the Air Force.
There had been voices calling for just that, but they do not appear to
have swayed the leadership of SPO. Thus Charles Stark Draper had argued
as early as 1959, in a paper to the Polaris Steering Task Group, that 'fleet
ballistic missiles offer many well-known advantages, but will surely be
handicapped in competition for national support unless they can be fired
with accuracy levels comparable to those of land-based missiles'.54 But,
despite the desire of some in the Navy to make Polaris A3 'a warfighting
machine',55 this line of argument did not win the day. SPO did not
attempt to compete with the Air Force in the accuracy stakes, and the
improvements that did occur remained in the context of an assured
destruction weapon. Polaris A3 was more effective than its predecessors
against military targets, but only large, unhardened ones.
Two new FBM guidance technologies were developed, but not used.
One, a much smaller system, called MIGIT, could have been used in a
smaller missile (either for torpedo tube use or multiple packaging in the
launch tube) or for re-entry body guidance. The other was a strapdown
guidance system 'to duplicate the Mk2 mission requirements'.56 As the
name implies, in a strapdown system the gyroscopes and accelerometers
53. L. Smith, R. H. Wertheim and R. A. Duffy, 'Innovative Engineering in the Trident
Missile Development', Bridge (National Academy of Engineering), Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer
1980), 10-19, at 11.
54. C. S. Draper, 'Submarine Inertial Navigation - A Review and some Predictions', paper





are held in fixed relation to the body of the missile. Mechanically this is
much simpler, therefore presumably cheaper and more reliable, than the
conventional stable platform design. Maintenance would be greatly
simplified, as defective components could be 'unbolted' and replaced, no
easy task in the complex, tightly-packed gimbal structure of a stable
platform.
Strapdown does, however, place greater demands on some of the
guidance system components. The gyroscopes experience, and have to
measure reliably, much greater rotation rates. Also much more computer
power is required. In a stable platform system, the inertial components are
kept in a known frame of reference physically. In strapdown, the
analogous task is performed computationally. 'The lack of suitably fast
computers to exploit fully strapdown advantages was the major
technological barrier'.57
As computer capabilities improved during the 1960s, strapdown
became a real option, and 'a substitution for Mk2 could have been made if
desired'.58 It was not. Although not (as an organization) necessarily
committed to greater accuracy, SPO however did not want a less accurate
system, which might have been the case with strapdown, and there were
also worries about the calibration difficulties involved.
In the end the only modification developed for the A3 was a SPALT
(Special Projects alteration!) to provide some protection of the Mk2
guidance system and other electronics from the radiation effects of nuclear
detonations, a further 'solution' to the growing perception of an ABM
problem. Intended to provide protection from both direct nuclear
radiation and EMP (the electromagnetic pulse which can cause widespread
damage to electrical equipment, especially from high-altitude detonations)
this hardening was introduced in the so-called 'Topsy' improvements.59
57. J. C. Hung and G. B. Doane, III, 'Progress in Strapdown Technology' in Inertial
Navigation Components and Systems: AGARD Conference Proceedings No. 116 (papers
presented at the 15th meeting of the Guidance and Control Panel of the NATO Advisory
Group for Aerospace Research and Development, Florence, 2-5 October 1972), 14-1-14-9, at
14-1.
58. Olson, 4.
59. SASC FY76, Part 10, R&D (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1975), 5353; also Interview.
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The A3 was first flight tested on August 7, 1962, had its first
submerged launch on October 26, 1963 and became fully deployed on
September 28, 1964, when the USS Daniel Webster began her first
operational patrol.60 These original A3P missiles were replaced by the
Topsy improved A3T version during the late 1960s.61
Transit - the Navy Navigation Satellite System
Ironically Project Transit, instigated to provide another source of
navigational resets for the FBM submarines, was a direct outcome of the
event which stimulated the acceleration of the Polaris programme - the
launch of the Soviet Sputnik satellite. Whilst monitoring Sputnik's radio
signal, scientists at the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) of Johns Hopkins
University had noted the Doppler effect produced. As with a train whistle
the frequency of the signal recorded was higher as the satellite approached
the listener and lower as it went away. It was realized that variation in the
way the signal changed could be used to precisely plot the orbit taken by
the satellite so long as the position of the listener was accurately known.
The key insight in the development of Transit then came from Dr. F. T.
McClure of APL, who realized that it was possible to reverse the process. If
the satellite's orbit was accurately known then the Doppler effect could be
used to provide a listener with an accurate positional fix.
This was in March 1958 and by July APL was receiving the first of
the funding for the development of a navigation satellite system in Project
Transit. This came initially through the Advanced Research Projects
Agency and then subsequently directly from SPO. As well as providing
navigation fixes and geodetic information for military users, Transit
would also become an extremely popular source of navigational fixes for
non-military users. In 1981 about 10,000 Transit user sets were in use with
about four-fifths owned and operated by non-military users.62
60 Fuhrman, 280.
61. The completion of the A3T exchange in July 1970 is noted in SSPO, 'FBM Facts', 36.
62. Tom Logsdon and Charles W. Helms, 'Comparison Between the Capabilities of the
Navstar GPS and other Operational Radionavigation Systems', Paper prepared for
Presentation at EASCON '81, Washington, DC (Rockwell International: November 16,
1981), 5.
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In May 1960 responsibility for Transit was formally transferred from
ARPA to SPO.63 By then there had been two attempted satellite launches
of Transit 1A and IB. Transit 1A was launched on 17 September 1959 by a
Thor Able rocket from Cape Canaveral. However, the third stage rocket
failed to ignite and consequently it and the satellite re-entered the
atmosphere rather prematurely. Nevertheless, the data obtained during
this twenty minute 'partial orbit' confirmed the predictions made for the
Doppler tracking concept.64
Transit IB was successfully launched into orbit on 13 April 1960.
Amongst other information it provided confirmation of the earth's pear
shape and highlighted the inadequacy of current knowledge of the earth's
gravitational field for prediction of satellite orbits.65 Such prediction was,
of course, essential for Transit's navigational role by which receivers
would determine their own position by monitoring the Doppler shift from
a satellite of 'known' orbit. The technique used in Transit required a
memory device carried on the satellites which was updated with its
predicted orbit from the ground tracking station every twelve hours. The
satellite then broadcast this information so that users could obtain their
navigation fix.
It was recognized very early in the Transit programme that more
accurate geodetic knowledge was required to predict the satellites' orbits
with the desired accuracy. Richard Kershner, Director of the Transit
programme at APL noted in May 1961 that:
Meeting the ultimate program goals for Transit thus
requires considerable improvement in the present
knowledge of these factors (roughly the shape and mass
distribution of the earth). This is the primary remaining
development challenge of the Transit program.66
Thus in the early 1960s accurate geodetic mapping was the primary role of
Transit, without which its 'ultimate' goal could not be achieved. Various
63. Captain Robert F. Freitag, 'Project Transit - Navigation Satellite', US Naval Institute
Proceedings (May 1961), 77-83, at 83.
64. Richard B. Kershner, 'Technical Innovations in the APL Space Department', Tohns
Hopkins APL Technical Digest. Vol. 2 (Jan-March 1981), 264-78, at 265.
65 Ibid, 268.
66. Richard B. Kershner, 'Transit Program Results', Astronautics (May 1961), 113.
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other approaches to improving geodetic knowledge were undertaken, such
as the Air Force programmes which used flashing-light beacons on
satellites and laser-ranging, but Doppler tracking had the great advantage
of providing data whatever the time-of-day or weather.67 This was so
successful that:
By 1964, APL had developed a sophisticated model of the
gravitational field of the earth ... that was sufficiently
accurate to make possible our goal of better than 0.1 mile
navigation at sea. This model was based solely on the
analysis of Doppler tracking of a variety of APL satellites.
At that point the gravitational-field knowledge was no
longer a limiting factor in the navigation accuracy
achieved at sea, which instead was dominated by orbit
prediction errors caused by the inherent unpredictability of
drag and the effect of errors in the estimate of ship's
velocity. Continued geodetic work would not contribute to
our primary task of providing at-sea position fixes for the
Polaris submarines.6®
By then the first operational navigation satellite (Transit 5BN-2) was
in orbit, and further launches during the 1960s established a 'birdcage'
usually consisting of five or six satellites in polar orbits. Each of the early
satellites varied somewhat from its predecessor as improvements were
quickly incorporated. Once a design was settled on RCA was chosen as the
prime contractor to build the Oscar series of Transit satellites, the first of
which was launched in 1965. When designed the expectations of
component reliability led to a prediction of a mean-time-between-failure
of two years and it was decided to build twenty Oscar satellites initially.69
This, however, turned out to be rather pessimistic - the first Oscar satellite
lasted thirteen years - and some would still be operational over twenty
years later.
Transit thus provided the navigational reset system for the FBM
system that it was originally conceived for. However, its initially
unintended contribution to geodetic mapping had more profound and
widespread applications. It enabled the location of targets to be 'known'
with unprecedented accuracy, as could other important navigational sites.
67. Kershrier, 'Technical Innovations', 269; see also Leon H. Dulberger, 'Geodetic
Measurements From Space', Space/Aeronautics (June 1965), 34-43.
68. Kershner, 'Technical Innovations', 269.
69. Interview.
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According to R. J. Anderle of the Naval Surface Weapons Center at
Dahlgren in Virginia: 'Doppler observations of Navy Navigation
Satellites have been used by the Department of Defense since 1963 to
determine the geodetic positions of isolated sites such as LORAN-C
navigation beacons'.70 Improved gravity mapping could also feed back
into gravity models developed for the guidance and navigation systems
used in the FBM system.
The Polaris Submarines
Meeting the tight schedule agreed for the interim A1 missile had
-h*.
required the adaption of attack submarines to produce the George
Washington class of FBM submarines, SSBN598 to 602. All five were
initially equipped with A1 missiles and the first generation of navigation,
fire control and launcher systems. Their first overhauls in 1966/67
replaced the A1 missiles with Polaris A3 and upgraded the navigation
systems, redesignating the SINS as Mk2 Mod4.71
The first FBM submarines designed from the keel up were the
Ethan Allen class, submarines SSBN608 to 611 and 618. These became
operational between June 26, 1962 when the USS Ethan Allen first went
on patrol, and October 28, 1963. Each was initially deployed carrying A2
missiles with the necessary changes in the launcher systems to
accommodate them. Like the 598-class, they carried the Mk-80 fire control
system, but in the 608-class this was linked initially to the Sperry
Gyroscope Company's Mk3 ModO SINS. These were replaced during the
late 1960s with Autonetics Mk2 Mod3 SINS.72
The remainder of the Polaris submarines were a new, larger type,
beginning with the USS Lafayette SSBN616, which was launched on May
8, 1962, and began her first operational patrol on January 4, 1964. The
70. R. J. Anderle, 'Error Model for Geodetic Positions Derived from Doppler Satellite
Observations', Bull. Geod.. Vol. 50 (1976), 43-77, at 43.
71. B. McKelvie and H. Gait, Jr. 'The Evolution of the Ship's Inertial Navigation System
for the Fleet Ballistic Missile Program', Navigation: Journal of the Institute of Navigation.
Vol. 25 (Fall 1978), 310-322, at 315; 'Navy Standardizes Polaris SINS System', Aviation
Week & Space Technology (May 4,1964), 16.
72. C. D. LaFond, 'New SINS Nears Sea Tests', Missile and Rockets. Vol. 10 (April 30, 1962),
33.
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larger size of the 616-class was not the result of any perceived military
need; it simply took advantage of the lessons learnt in building the first
ten FBM submarines to improve the general design and to provide more
space and facilities to make the lives of the submariners more bearable on
their long patrols. At the particular behest of Admiral Raborn the
submarine design was extended by increasing the length of the centre
section.73 This, however, also increased the displacement of the
submarines by about 400 tons over the 608-class, which seemed 'initially a
bit of a problem', requiring the addition of an extra 400 tons of lead to
provide ballast.74 But, again, as in the over-design of the missile mount
tubes this would eventually prove to be a fortuitous decision. The extra
buoyancy provided by the larger submarines meant that they - but not the
first ten - would be able to accommodate missiles that were not only larger,
but also much heavier, than those of the Polaris generation.
Eight of the Lafayette 616-class were initially deployed carrying A2
missiles, with the other one, the USS Daniel Webster, and the James
Madison 627-class and Benjamin Franklin 640-class carrying the A3 when
it became ready.75 All carried the new Mk-84 fire control system, with the
navigation system depending on which missile was carried. The
submarines deployed with A2 had the same Mk2 ModO SINS used in the
George Washington class submarines, whereas submarines carrying the
A3 were felt to require greater accuracy. The 627-class were fitted with the
Mk2 Mod2 which later had 'field modifications' to convert it to the Mk2
Mod3 installed in the 640-class and retrofitted to the 608-class.76
The early Polaris submarines had been authorized piecemeal
throughout the last years of the Eisenhower administration, which
seemed to have reached no clear decision on how many submarines the
FBM force should eventually comprise.77 By the time J. F. Kennedy
73. Interview.
74 Ibid.
75 SSPO, 'FBM Facts', 30.
76. McKelvie and Gait, 316.
77. G. B. Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1976), 162.
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became President in January 1961 nineteen submarines had been
authorized, with long-lead-time funding for a further five more.78
Within the Navy itself a consensus had already been reached that
something of the order of 45 submarines was the correct size, providing a
neat force structure of five squadrons of nine submarines each. With its
self-proclaimed adherence to 'finite deterrence' and internal divisions
over what many believed to be the financial burden of Polaris on the
surface fleet, a larger force was hard to support. The first public estimate of
the Navy's desired number of FBM submarines came from Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Burke, in January 1957. In response to a
congressional request he came up with the figure of 41, admitting later that
it took him 'about one hour ... I figured it out on the back of an
envelope'.79 Despite the public counter-city rationale of Polaris the
number was apparently based 'entirely on military targets'.80 During 1958
there were reports of some senators and Navy officers seeking as many as
100 Polaris submarines, but SPO seem to have been quite content with a
lower figure. On April 6, 1959 Admiral Raborn proposed a 45 submarine
force 81
This remained the Navy position throughout 1960 and 1961.
Moreover, not only was the Navy reasonably moderate in the size of its
demand (as compared to the Air Force's projected ICBM force), but it also
preferred to maintain a steady rate of construction at six submarines per
year, rejecting additional funds voted by Congress in I960.82 When
President Kennedy's State of the Union message of January 30, 1961 called
for an acceleration in submarine delivery - presumably as a political
gesture following his campaigning 'missile gap' rhetoric - the Navy
opposed it.
The Navy's projected programme of a 45-submarine force was
presented to Secretary of Defense McNamara on July 3, 1961. He
78. See D. Ball, 'Politics and Force Levels', 46.
79. Ibid, 63, fn 7.
80. D. Ball, 'The Counterforce Potential of American SLBM Systems', Journal of Peace
Research. Vol. XIV (1977), 23-40, at 25.
8T Ball, 'Politics and Force Levels', 63.
82 Ibid, 64.
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responded in September by cutting this by four for a total of 41, but leaving
the possibility open of more later. The Navy initially argued for more,
even setting a new figure of 50 as a prelude to compromise, but by 1962 had
agreed to settle for 41. According to Dr Alain Enthoven, who was closely
involved in the relevant decisions, the choice of 41 was:
simply an historical accident. There was no precise
calculation of the necessary number of missiles. The
Administration had inherited a program of 19 [Polaris
submarines] then added ten, and then six and six, for forty-
one.83
The construction of these 41 submarines over a period of about
seven years was a considerable achievement, given the disparate
organizations involved. SPO coordinated the activities of BuShips, and its
Nuclear Power Directorate headed by Admiral Rickover, and four
shipyards: two private companies, Electric Boat and Newport News
Shipbuilding and Drydock Company; and two Navy yards, Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard and Mare Island Naval Shipyard.
What made this all the more extraordinary was that BuShips and
Rickover's Nuclear Power Directorate both had formal control over parts
of the programme; BuShips over the submarine construction and
Rickover over the nuclear reactor.84 But the great scope for bureaucratic
wranglings and internecine power struggles interfering with the Polaris
programme was not exploited.
At least in part this stemmed from a unanimity of purpose that
Polaris was necessary, indeed vital, not just for the nation, but also for the
Navy. Of course, not everyone shared the lalter belief, and some even
doubted/foe former required such a rate of submarine construction. But
such dissent had little power in the relevant organizations at the time, and
CNO Burke was very effective in imposing unanimity when required.
Rickover's main concern was to put his nuclear reactor designs to
sea. The Nautilis had demonstrated the feasibility of his technical dream,
and now only a few years later he had the opportunity for its large-scale
83. Quoted in Ibid, 275.
84. Sapolsky, 69.
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application. Without the Polaris programme he would have had to
struggle to find such an eager user for what was a relatively expensive
technology (at least in terms of initial capital outlay).
Thus although initially concerned that Polaris might divert
resources from his reactor work,85 Rickover soon came to see that their
common purpose, to combat Soviet military developments, could also
have mutual benefit. Rickover's potential for disruptive interference
remained, of course, and was recognized by CNO Burke from the very
start. When describing the attributes that led him to choose Raborn to
head SPO Burke even went as far to as to emphasize that: 'In other words I
didn't want a Rickover in there'.86 'Under unwritten orders from
Admiral Burke, Raborn and [the Chief of BuShips, Rear Admiral]
Mumma excluded Rickover from all the preliminary studies'.87
Rickover first received official information on the intended Polaris
submarine design on April 16, 1957 when it reached the Nuclear
Propulsion Directorate.88 It was to be a single screw design using the S5W
reactor being developed for the Skipjack and Thresher class submarines.
Rickover objected to this, arguing instead that a twin-screw reactor design
should be used, but he was overruled, and thus kept out of Polaris design
details. In other instances too - for example, when he attempted to restrict
the operating depth of the Ethan Allen class submarines because he
doubted the adequacy of some of their components, or when he was held
to be delaying recruitment of FBM submariners with his tortuous
interviewing technique (which involved him personally interviewing all
officers) - Rickover also found himself forced to concede.89
FBM Communications
Communication with the FBM submarines was obviously an
important part of the technological system. Even a last resort retaliatory
deterrent needs to be told to unleash its vengeance. Indeed the report of
85. Vincent Davis, The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases, the Social Science
Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies Monograph Series in World
Affairs, IV, 3 (Denver, Colo.: University of Denver Press, 1967), 36.
86. Quoted in N. Polmar and T. Allen, Rickover (New York: Simon & Schustep 1982), 540.
87. R. Hewlett and F. Duncan, Nuclear Navy (Chicago: University of Chicago/ 1974), 308.
88. Polmar and Allen, 543.
89. Ibid, 548-49
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the Steering Task Group in the spring of 1957 described command and
control communications as a potential 'Achilles heel of the entire Polaris
operation'.90 However, unlike the other FBM technologies,
communications was not assigned to a technical branch of SPO.
Instead jurisdiction over FBM communications was shared between
SPO, the Bureau of Ships and the Director of Naval Communications.91
SPO tolerated this arrangement, it seems, for two reasons. Firstly, it was a
politic compromise which enrolled other parts of the Navy into
supporting Polaris. Certainly, if SPO had attempted to assert dominance
over communications it could have involved a damaging dispute.
Secondly, although communications were important in the long-term for
the operational deployment of Polaris, they were not so vital to the short-
term demonstration of its feasibility. SPO were thus not too unhappy to
leave those problems to another part of the Navy. Their more pressing
concern was to build a missile that could be fired from submerged
submarines.
It was also the feeling at SPO that a sophisticated communications
system was not essential to the deterrent mission of Polaris. A two part
FBM communications programme had been set up, and the first part,
aimed at the development of a reliable and secure system, indicated that a
basic system was not difficult to achieve, though it would be expensive.
The second part of the programme was orientated to long-term research
and development of more exotic solutions to the evident weaknesses of
the basic approach - mainly that it might take quite a while for all the
submarines to receive the message and that you could not be sure that they
had.
Earlier submarine voyages -such as the round-the-world trip of the
Triton - had already indicated that an antenna raised to the water's surface
could receive radio transmissions.92 By using very low frequency (VLF)
radio waves (14 to 30 kilohertz) it was possible to receive messages over
great distances. In early 1959 messages sent from a Navy VLF transmitter
at Annapolis were said to have been received some six thousand miles
90. Quoted in Sapolsky, 238.
91. Ibid, 238-9.
92. E. Rees, The Seas and the Subs (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), 169.
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away, by a submarine in the Mediterranean.93 Beginning in the late 1950s
six major US VLF transmitters were constructed at Annapolis, Maryland;
Cutler, Maine; Oso, Washington; Wahiawa, Hawaii; Yosami, Japan; and
North West Cape, Australia.94 These consist of very large antennas with
power outputs of the order of a million watts.95 Supplemented by a
further 21 low frequency (LF) transmitters they have been the main
method of communication with the FBM submarines since the first one
went on patrol in 1960.
The main problem with VLF and LF is their limited penetration of
water. VLF only penetrates to depths of about 9 metres and LF to about 5
metres.96 To remain contactable submarines must therefore have an aerial
continuously deployed near the surface. Two types of aerial can be used
for this. One has an antenna buoy at the end of a long cable, which is
deployed some 6-9 metres below the surface, whilst the submarine can
remain at a depth of about 45 metres. However, submarine speed is
limited to about four knots. In the other method a trailing buoyant wire
antenna about 550 to 640 metres long is extended behind the submarine
which can then travel at around ten knots, but is restricted to a depth of
around 15-18 metres.97
In addition to these limitations, both forms of antenna also increase
the vulnerability of the submarines to detection. The trailing buoyant
antenna is also only bi-directional and so limits submarine movement
when monitoring a particular VLF transmitter. The buoy antenna was
plagued by unreliability problems in its early use by Polaris submarines.98
Nor does the VLF system provide complete assurance that messages
will be received in a timely fashion, or indeed at all. In 1972 Rear Admiral
93. Ibid.
94. W. M. Arkin and R. Fieldhouse. 'NuclearWeapon Command, Control and
Communication', in SIPRI Yearbook 1984.512, fn 156. Following Annapolis, the first to be
completed was at Cutler which went on air on January 1,1961, SSPO, 'FBM Facts', 28.
95. See testimony of Vice Admiral R. Y. Kaufman, SASC Hearings FY1978 (Washington,
DC.: US GPO, 1977), 6706.
96. Ibid.
97. M. Spaven, 'Communicating with submarines', lane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 4 (November
23, 1985), 1152-56, at 1153. '
98 Ibid.
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Samuel Gravely revealed that 'one of our problems is that some of our
messages never get delivered'.99 For this reason the basic VLF and LF
transmitters have now been complemented by other higher frequency
systems, in the high (HF) and ultra-high (UHF) bandwidths, able to take
advantage of a wide range of US communications systems. These require
an antenna to be raised above the water surface, thus risking detection, but
provide much greater data transmission rates than the lower frequency
systems. In operation FBM submarines would normally monitor VLF, but
progressively move to higher frequencies if no messages were available.100
Finally, one radio frequency, despite some apparent advantages, has
become publicly controversial and had its development delayed for many
years. The extremely low frequency (ELF) bandwidth was recognized in
the late 1950s as a potential communications system for submarines.
Amongst its apparent advantages are much lower attenuation than VLF by
the atmosphere (so providing longer range) and by seawater (so
penetrating much deeper), and low susceptibility to jamming. The
disadvantages are that data rate transmission is very low and that
producing the long wavelength requires a correspondingly large
transmitter with very high power output.101
ELF research began in 1958 and feasibility was demonstrated in 1962,
but after a succession of increasingly modest schemes, an operational ELF
system has only just been adopted by the US Navy. During this period ELF
developments have been canceled once by a US President, once by the
Chief of Naval Operations and once by the legal action of the State of
Wisconsin.102 Local environmental opposition to ELF seems to have
focused on the potentially harmful effects of the low frequency radiation,
though given the comparative absence of opposition to the smaller VLF
transmitters, the initial concern may simply have been the sheer size of
99. Los Angeles Times (May 26, 1972), cited in Desmond Ball, Can Nuclear War Be
Controlled (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981; Adelphi Paper #
169), 24.
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(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), 98, fn 35; M. Spaven, Extremely Low
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the original ELF proposals. Each successive ELF proposal has been clearly
shaped by these concerns as size and power output have been reduced (See
Figure 4.1).
Year Project Location Antenna Antenna Power Estimated
name length cables input cost
1968-75 Sanguine Wisconsin 10,000 km buried 800 MW $2-300 m
1975-78 Seafarer Wisconsin 3900 km buried 20 MW $590 m
1978-81 Austere ELF Wisconsin/ 45 plus buried 2.4 MW $455 m
Michigan 210km
1981- Project ELF Wisconsin/ 45 plus above 2.6 MW $260 m?
Michigan 90 km ground
Figure 4.1: History of ELF Proposals
(VJo-/€Kbcr
Source: M. Spaven, 'ELF: Surviving the traumas- part 2', lane's Defence Weekly. Vol 4,jll94
Moreover, despite its apparent advantages ELF was not a
programme that initially found much support in SPO. SPO considered the
basic VLF system to be adequately survivable and redundant to ensure
retaliation. The great expense and potential local opposition involved in
constructing an ELF antenna embracing about 40 per cent of the state of
Wisconsin weighed against it.103
Other communications developments were also delayed because of
doctrinal disagreement within the Navy over the role of the FBM force.
Whilst the first part of the FBM communications programme had
concentrated on constructing this basic system, the second was devoted 'to
seek exotic solutions to weaknesses revealed in the basic systems'.104 In
particular it was desired to develop communications systems which were
103. Eliot Marshall, 'ELF Resurrected After Drowning by Navy', Science. Vol. 212 (May 8,
1981), 644-5, at 644 notes early 1960s ELF scheme involving 6000 mile-long antenna that
'would have embraced 41 percent of the state ofWisconsin'. For environmental case against
ELF, see Lowell L.Klessig and Victor L. Strite. The ELF Odyssey: National Security Versus
Environmental Protection (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980); for Navy rebuttals see,
SASC FY 1978, 6677-6756.
104. Sapolsky, 238.
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more survivable and which would provide more prompt message
transmission.105
But in SPO prompt retaliation was not considered necessary for an
'assured destruction' deterrent. The rhetorical question asked was: 'Does
the threat of nuclear destruction deteriorate over time?'106 Others, who
favoured a counterforce role for the FBM force, saw prompt response an
important feature of communications. A delay in receiving the command
to fire might mean the targets (enemy missile silos) would be empty by the
time the Polaris missile reached them. Similarly, limited nuclear war,
bncfly }
counterforce targeting scenarios (such as-^advocated by Secretary of Defence
McNamara in 1962) required communications systems that would remain
operational during a nuclear exchange; they had to be very survivable.
This disagreement over the FBM communications requirements led
to a stalemate in the long range programme investigating the
development of the more exotic concepts. The cumulative cost of the
programme grew whilst little was actually deployed. A 1964 review of the
programme was aptly titled 'Where did the $100 million go?'.107
Eventually FBM communications research was completely separated from
SPO in 1967, and a Special Communications Project Office was
established.108 This was directed to provide 'effective communications at
all times for the National Command Authorities and Commanders in
Chief to the deployed FBM forces ... during and after heavy nuclear and
electronic jamming attack'.109
Eventually deployed in 1969 was a more survivable system which
had been under development since 1962. Known as TACAMO (from 'take
charge and move out') this consisted of twelve EC-130 aircraft equipped
with VLF transmitters using long trailing antennas. By circling tightly the




108. Ibid, 240; also Blair, 169.
109. Quoted in Blair, 169.
110. See A. B. Carter, 'Communications Technologies and Vulnerabilities' in A. B. Carter, J.
D. Steinbruner and C. A. Zraket (eds.), Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 1987), 217-81, at 237; also D. A. Boutacoff, 'New Tacamo Aircraft
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Communications Project Office described TACAMO as 'the only
operational survivable element that the Navy has today and most likely
will have until the latter part of the 1970s'.111 Although intended to
provide at least one aircraft continuously on patrol in both the Atlantic
and Pacific this goal does not seem to have ever been achieved.112
Thinking about the Next Generation
Hardly had development of the A3 been approved in September
1960 then consideration of another generation began. Lockheed, the
missile contractor, began to push the idea of an A4 missile during 1961,
with longer range the main selling point. SPO, apparently, were not
immediately enthusiastic, seeing no pressing need for longer range at that
time.113 However, in response to guidance from the Office of the Chief of
a
Naval Operations SPO put forward in November 1963 a proposal formew
missile, by then known as the Polaris B3, which was to carry either three
larger warheads or one much larger warhead than A3.114
This new missile was to take advantage of increased launch tube
size gained by removing some of the shock protection, which had initially
been over-designed. This possibility of significant increases in missile size
was first pointed up by work done in Westinghouse's systems analysis
group, which were tasked by SPO to consider ways of carrying Polaris
missiles on surface ships and trucks for the proposed NATO Multilateral
Force.115 Truck mounting, with the missile held horizontal, was the
biggest problem. The stowage launch adaptors used in the original Polaris
launcher were unsuitable for holding the missile in an horizontal position
and the sheer weight of the heavy machined launch tube was considered
impracticable.
Being Developed to Support Trident Missile Submarines', Defense Electronics. Vol. 16
(March 1985), 108-11.
111. Quoted in Blair, 170.
112 Blair, 170-71.
113. 'Problems May Cut Polaris A3 Range Goal', Aviation Week & Space Technology, Vol.
75 (September 4, 1961), 31.
114. Interview, ; also D. C. Breasted, 'Navy Seeks Approval For Polaris Follow-on',
Missiles and Rockets (November 4,1963), 18.
115. This section from Interview; also see Robert Lindsey, 'Material Refinement Assists
Poseidon Launcher Designers', Technology Week (June 13,1966), 32-33.
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Westinghouse's group came up with a much lighter approach, in
which the missile would be enclosed in foam padded resin reinforced fibre
glass panels with heavy duty zippers up the sides which would be undone
after the missile was loaded into the launch tube. The foam/fibre glass
combination supported the missile in all orientations and its resilient
flexibility obviated the need for a heavy machined launch tube. The
launch tube itself could also be cushioned by foam rather than the liquid
springs used in the first Polaris launch system, the Mark 17. The need to
cut down on weight also led to consideration of a lighter method of
ejection to replace the compressed air system. Two small solid propellant
rockets fired sequentially were to provide the pressure required to eject the
missile from the launch tube.
Two demonstration trucks were in fact built, but the Multilateral
Force never transpired. Westinghouse, however, informed SPO of these
launch system advances:
We pointed out to the Navy that a design could be produced
to take existing missiles and develop a launching system
with a substantial space saving/16
Thus in 1961 SPO had the choice of revising the design of the remaining
FBM submarines to make them smaller, or to keep them the same size but
squeeze perhaps 20 or 24 missiles into the same size submarines. SPO's
first thought, however, was, 'You mean we could put a bigger missile [in
the submarines]'.117
But with the Polaris A3 development only just started there
appeared little immediate justification for another generation of FBM.
Instead it was decided to incorporate some of the launcher system
improvements into Polaris submarines of the same size and capacity,
while retaining the possibility of backfitting a larger diameter missile in
the future. The new launch system, known as the Mark 21, was first
introduced into the USS James Madison. The major difference was the
use of polyurethane foam to replace the 30 or so liquid springs by which
116. Dr George Mechlin ofWestinghouse quoted in Ibid, 33.
117. Interview.
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the launch tube was suspended in the submarine mount tube. The liquid
springs on which the launch tube rested were retained, as were the
stowage launch adaptors holding the missile in the launch tube. Also,
starting in the USS Nathan Hale, the compressed air ejection system was
replaced by one using solid propellant generated steam.118
However, the Mark 21 still only accommodated a 54 inch diameter
missile. There remained extra space available in the mount tube which
meant that the next generation FBM could be bigger, with longer range or
greater payload or both. But for the next few years its exact design would
be contested, taking even longer to decide than its final name. The only
thing that was not in doubt was the missile's eventual development. As
Stanley Burriss, general manager of Lockheed Missile and Space Company,
put it, 'the question is not "if" it is needed, but "when"'.119 And, he might
have added, "what for".
118. See R. Lindsey, 'Improved Launch System for Polaris', Missiles and Rockets. Vol. 13
(December 2, 1963), 27-28.
119. Quoted in Robert Lindsey, 'B-3 Polaris Expected To Be Operational In '70', Missiles and
Rockets. Vol. 15 (August 24,1964), 28.
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Chapter 5
Poseidon - The 'Interpretative Flexibility' ofMIRY
...most of us saw the role of Poseidon as not different from
the role of its predecessors, namely providing an absolutely
dependable, reliable deterrent, and most of us were
sceptical about the need to dig out hard targets as an
essential element of deterrence. We went along with it to
the degree necessary in order to keep the program. The
nature of democracy ... is that you're constantly making
compromises with conflicting constituencies, and we had to
serve the reigning constituency even if we, sometimes we
felt they were a little nutty.
Admiral WertheimJ
Polaris A3 was generally seen as a logical extension of the FBM role
established by the A1 and A2 missiles - deterrence by the threat of
devastating counter-city retaliation. Although some people had favoured
more emphasis on enhancing counterforce capabilities, the 'Claw' payload
was clearly 'disoptimized' for such a purpose, emphasizing instead ABM
penetration. SPO had taken care to exploit the success of the Polaris
programme and to emphasis continuity and a moderate approach by
retaining the Polaris name for the A3, which was almost entirely a new
missile. As thoughts turned to the next generation, again this was initially
thought of as another Polaris, be it A4, A3A or, as it was later known, B3.
Lockheed, keen to maintain their workload after A3, were first to
suggest another generation of Polaris. Lockheed studies during 1961
suggested that a Polaris A3A or A4 could provide ranges in excess of 3000
nautical miles.2 But a 1962 Navy proposal to fund development of a
Polaris A3A drew the following response from Secretary of Defense
McNamara:
The Navy has proposed the development of a Polaris A-3A
missile. The proposed program would have 368 A-3A
missiles and 288 A-3 missiles in submarines by FY 1969 at an
additional cost of $1.6 billion. The A-3 missile has
L Interview.
2. 'Problems May Cut Polaris A3 Range Goal', Aviation Week and Space Technology. Vol.
75 (September 4,1961), 31.
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approximately 300 lbs. available for decoys; the A-3A has
approximately 920 lbs. available for decoys at the same
ranges. Although I believe that further development of a
more advanced Polaris missile may be desirable, I do not
believe that the extra capabilities offered by the A-3 [sic]
missile, by comparison with the A-3, are worth the cost of
development and procurement. Therefore, I recommend that
the Navy proposal be disapproved.3
However, by early 1963 it was clear that the new missile could offer 'extra
capabilities' by taking advantage of launcher system advances to grow
beyond the 54 inch diameter of its predecessors.4 Accordingly to signify
this growth in its dimensions the new missile was now to be known as
B3.5 It still remained unclear, however, whether increased range or
payload (or both) was desired.
SPO considered there to be no pressing need for another generation
FBM at that time. However, 'in response to guidance and direction from
the Navy's planners' SPO proposed a B3 design to DDR&E Harold Brown
in November 1963.6 The new missile was to be 66 inches in diameter and
would use this extra capacity primarily to increase the payload rather than
the range. SPO Director Rear Admiral Galantin (who succeeded Raborn
on February 26, 1962) noted that: 'The range is not as valuable to the
submarine system as it is to a fixed system, so it's the payload and how we
would slice it...'.7 The main payload options considered were either a
'Claw' design like A3, but carrying 600 kt warheads or a single large
warhead.8 The larger warheads reflected the desire of some Navy planners
to compete with the Air Force by attempting to rival the counterforce role
of ICBMs: 'Suffice is to say that they were doing what a military staff would
3. Draft Presidential Memorandum, Subject: Recommended FY 1964-FY 1968 Strategic
Retaliatory Forces (November 21,1962), 22-23. I am grateful to Lynn Eden for providing me
with copies of the now declassified McNamara DPMs.
4. 'Longer Range is Goal of Polaris B3', Aviation Week and Space Technology. Vol. 78
(March 11, 1963), 145.
3. The nomenclature used by SPO came to indicate missile dimension increases
alphabetically and range increases numerically.
6. Interview.
7. D. C. Breasted, 'Navy Seeks Approval For Polaris Follow-on', Missiles and Rockets. Vol.
13 (November 4,1963), 18.
8 Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making (Cambridge,
Mass: Ballinger, 1975), 33.
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be expected to do - go out and clobber the enemy. The enemy being the Air
Force!'9
But this proposal was turned down by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense because the 66-inch diameter missile envisaged was not
considered to fully take advantage of the extra launch tube space
available.10 DDR&E Harold Brown told SPO that he did not 'want a still
larger missile coming around a few years from now'.11 He also expressed
concern that the new missile should be able to carry 'a payload that was
going to be capable of penetrating any anti-ballistic missile system that
could possibly threaten the effectiveness of the system in its ability to
penetrate to a target'.12
This requirement coincided with the view also held by many within
SPO of the FBM as an invulnerable, last resort deterrent. But by now there
was general agreement that the 'Claw' MRV system used in Polaris A3,
which was designed to counter a Nike-Zeus type ABM would have limited
effectiveness against the Soviet Galosh. The separation provided was
considered to be not large enough to prevent destruction by a single, large
exo-atmospheric interceptor detonation.13 Because of this concern
Lockheed had been investigating other approaches that might provide the
next Polaris with greater assurance of penetration.
Further development of the A3 approach led to one concept in
which multiple re-entry vehicles would be dropped off onto different
trajectories calculated to impact in the same target area. To do this a
manoeuvring platform was required to release the re-entry vehicles at the
desired time and velocity. In this concept, which was known as Antelope,
the platform or 'bus' carried out a pre-programmed operation to release
the re-entry vehicles with no guidance update to improve accuracy once
9. Interview.
10. This rejection seems to have been informal, as McNamara's December 6,1963 Draft
Memorandum for the President does not mention the proposal at all. A key informal link
between SPO and OSD was Captain Robert Wertheim, previously (and latterly) of SPO





this had begun.14 Antelope also involved 'decoys, various kinds of false
targets and various sources of clutter to ABM radars and it was aimed at
penetrating the Moscow ABM system'.15
SPO were, of course, already aware of the possibility of such an
approach in 1963 when they had proposed the B3 missile, carrying either a
single warhead or a 'Claw' design, but with higher yields than A3.16 But
instead of ABM penetration the emphasis of B3 - as intended by its
proponents in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations - was to rival
Air Force counterforce capability. Responding to the rejection of this by
Harold Brown, SPO set about designing a missile that would accommodate
his recommendations, that would gain support within other parts of the
Navy, and that would suit their own preferences. Working closely with
the relevant staff in Brown's office, it was decided that the preferred design
for the next generation FBM should be one that had the flexibility to cope
with developments in ABM technology.17
Brown had also authorized the Air Force to proceed with
development of a new re-entry vehicle in late 1963, with the proviso that
it should be a joint Navy-Air Force development. The re-entry vehicle,
known as the Mkl2, was authorized for development by the Reentry
Systems Division of General Electric Company in March 1964.18 The Mkl2
was designed to carry a warhead of about 200 kilotons, allowing several to
be carried by the next generation FBM.
However, SPO did not want to use this warhead. A joint
development with the Air Force threatened to reduce SPO's control over
the programme, and raised the possibility that the resulting technology
would not be optimized for their requirements. Ever intent on limiting
potential threats to their independence, SPO's leadership seized upon a
suggestion made by two members of the Polaris Steering Task Group, Carl





18. Robert A. Fuhrman, 'The Fleet Ballistic Missile System; Polaris to Trident', journal of
Spacecraft. Vol. 5, No. 5 (Sept-Oct 1978), 281.
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of Lockheed. They proposed using a small warhead design that Livermore
had failed to 'sell' to the Air Force in a multiple warhead arrangement
that unlike Antelope would allow independent targeting of each
warhead.19
Such a MIRV (multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle)
system provided SPO with a design that could allay concern over
penetration of ABM systems (which Antelope could do) whilst also
providing some enhancement of accuracy (which Antelope could not).20 It
thus satisfied OSD's requirements except in so much as it avoided the use
of the Air Force Mkl2 re-entry vehicle, and the possibility of extra accuracy
made it more appealing to those in the Navy who desired a counterforce
FBM.
Indeed within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations there
were some who favoured an explicit shift to a counterforce capability.
Rather than combating potential developments in Soviet ABM defences
they preferred the new missile to provide the FBM force with a significant
hard-target capability and so directly challenge the Air Force's counterforce
monopoly. This viewpoint became centred in the ad hoc 'Great Circle
Group', headed by Rear Admiral George Miller, which Secretary of the
Navy Paul Nitze set up in 1964 as a part of the Navy's Long Range
Objectives Group.21
Most Navy officers, however, were indifferent to the technical
characteristics and strategic mission of the FBM, but highly sceptical of the
need for yet another generation so soon after Polaris A3. It was widely
believed, and with good reason, that Polaris had been paid for out of Navy
funds which otherwise would have gone to the traditional surface fleet.22
19. Greenwood, 45. This small warhead, initially known as the Mark 100, was
recommended for Polaris B3 in the June 1964 Scientific Advisory Board Nuclear Panel report
called 'Review of Advances in Design of Multiple Warhead Possibilities' and in the August
1965 final report of the Pen-X study. See Ibid, 40.
20. Antelope would, however, continue in a different guise as the UK Chevaline
development to enhance Polaris penetration against the Moscow Galosh system.
21. Greenwood, 22.
22. See Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and
Programmatic Success in Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972),
chapter six.
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Along with the indecision over its technical specification and
strategic rationale, this Navy resistance further delayed the initiation of a
new programme. However, the basic concept of the Polaris' B3 was decided
during 1964. In July 1964, Secretary of the Navy, Paul Nitze, noted 'the fact
that the B-3 Polaris missile can give us the option of the same high
accuracy that land-based missile systems have.'23 Although the exact
nature of the payload to be carried remained undecided, SPO was officially
instructed in November 1964 to proceed with a MIRVed Polaris B3 with
guidance improvements to provide greater accuracy.24
In December McNamara's draft memorandum for the President
noted that:
I recommend the inclusion in the FY 1966 budget of $35
million to begin development of a new POLARIS B-3. We
intend to initiate a project definition for this missile during
FY 1965. The B-3 would incorporate improved accuracy and
payload flexibility permitting it to attack a single,
heavily defended urban/industrial target, or a single
hardened point target, or several undefended targets which
might be separated by as much as 75 miles.25
However, the delay had already led SPO to take an unprecedented
step in broadening its scope beyond its single-mission dedication to the
FBM system. In June 1964 SPO accepted responsibility for the Deep
Submergence Systems Project (DSSP), which was instigated in response to
the loss of the nuclear submarine, the^hresher in 1963. As Sapolsky has
noted this served a dual purpose for SPO:
Since the technologies involved in deep ocean research were
somewhat related to the technologies involved in the FBM
system and since some Special Project's Office contractors
and part of its technical staff were interested in exploring
the opportunities such research presented, DSSP provided
both a means to keep the FBM team together until Poseidon
was approved and a possible follow-on to strategic missile
work.2°
23. Navy Magazine (July 1964), 28.
24 Sapolsky, 220.
25. Draft Memorandum for the President, Subject: Recommended FY 1966-1970 Programs for




Poseidon C3 - New Name, Same Difference (of opinion)
On January 18, 1965 President Johnson announced the development
of the next FBM generation, and gave it special emphasis with a new
name. The missile was now to be called Poseidon C3, the change in name
apparently inspired by the President's desire to rebuff criticism that his
administration was failing to develop new strategic systems. The
President's announcement also stated that the new missile would 'double
the payload of the ... Polaris A-3. The increased accuracy and flexibility of
the Poseidon will permit its use effectively against a broader range of
possible targets and give added insurance of penetration of enemy
defenses.'27 The counterforce emphasis was clear as he predicted that 'its
effectiveness against a hardened target will be some eight times greater
than the latest version of Polaris.'28
That Poseidon was to be a MIRVed missile had been decided, but
this one technology meant different things to different people, both in
design and in its implications for nuclear strategy. Whilst its
simultaneous development in the Air Force stressed the ability to hit a
greater number of widely separated military targets, the concept had
developed in the FBM context as a means of defeating Soviet ABM
defences. But there too, hard target kill capability was becoming a central,
and as it turned out, divisive, issue.
As early as 1962 the Chief of Naval Operations had expressed
interest in a hard target capability for the FBM.29 This was a departure
from the Polaris tradition, but SPO was becoming increasingly
incorporated into the formal Naval hierarchy. In 1963 SPO ceased to
report directly to the Secretary of the Navy, instead coming under the aegis
of the Chief of Naval Material, which in turn was subordinated to the
Chief of Naval Operations in 1966.30 Moreover, Defense Secretary
27. Quoted in Greenwood, 6. vW -' *




McNamara's new nuclear strategy - which emphasized the more selective
use of counterforce targeting and the initial withholding of attacks on
cities - could be taken as implying the desirability of a hard target MIRV for
Poseidon.
The hard target issue translated into two tightly related questions:
how accurate should Poseidon be, and how large should its warheads be.
'As accurate as possible' and 'big' were the answers given by proponents of
a hard-target Poseidon. Ultimately, the dispute came to bear on the issue
of accuracy, but at first it was warhead size that was more controversial.
There were three re-entry vehicle candidates for the Poseidon. In
addition to the medium yield Mkl2, there was another Air Force
possibility, the large Mkl7 which was under development to enhance the
hard target kill capability of the Minuteman ICBM force. SPO's favoured
choice was, not surprisingly, a specifically Navy development, the Mk3 re¬
entry vehicle designed to carry the relatively small (50 kiloton) warhead
that the Lawrence Livermore atomic weapons laboratory had proposed to
the Polaris Steering Group during 1964.
Initially the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 'expected to use
the Air Force Mark 12 and agreed with some Navy planners that a Mark 17
option should be available to provide greater counterforce capability'.31
SPO, on the other hand, preferred larger numbers of the smaller Mk 3 as a
way of guaranteeing the retaliation mission, even against improved ABM
defences, and also to avoid using a re-entry vehicle designed for Air Force
use.32
-Hm?
At stake in(disagreement within the Navy was not just the virtues
of counterforce per se, but also the wisdom of a more direct confrontation
with the Air Force, rather than a policy of differentiation:
There were advocates in the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations...who [felt that] anything the Air Force could





This view was centred particularly in the Great Circle Group (in 1967 the
Great Circle Group became the Office of Strategic Offensive and Defensive
Systems).34 The Great Circle Group sought a Navy role in a 'warfighting'
nuclear strategy and advocated the use of the Mkl7 on Poseidon. They
were suspicious of SPO. Ted Greenwood reports that 'one Naval officer
associated with long-range planning for the Polaris force in the middle
1960s even suggested that SP had made a deal with the Air Force not to try
to gain counterforce capability'.35
SPO were put under pressure on accuracy as well as on warhead
yield. This pressure came not only from Great Circle Group counterforce
proponents, but also from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Secretary
McNamara, and his Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Harold
Brown, pushed SPO to increase accuracy. Admiral Levering Smith
recalled this interchange with Brown:
...after agreeing on all the other elements of the system, he
told me, 'Well, it is fine, I can agree with these objectives,
and I think I can get approval of them, but I cannot get
approval of the system unless you put in an accuracy
improvement, I cannot sell it to McNamara.'... Mr
McNamara's general thought in this regard, as was
expressed by Dr Brown to me at the time, was that it would
cost very little more to try to improve the accuracy at the
same time that you are doing all the rest of the
development.36
A key adviser to Secretary McNamara recalls that 'it was certainly intended
to give Poseidon a significant probability of destroying hard targets'.37
This meant improved guidance and more work for the
Instrumentation Laboratory, whose sheer size became a matter of concern
to the MIT authorities in the 1960s. MIT Vice-President James McCormack
investigated whether the Instrumentation Laboratory should be allowed to
34. Greenwood, 22-23; also D. A. Paolucci, 'The Development of Navy Strategic Offensive
and Defensive Systems', United States Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. 96 (1970), 204-23.
35. Greenwood, 55. A view also expressed by one of my interviewees.
36. SASC FY 1975 , Part 6, Research and Development (Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Office, 1974), 3297-8.
37. Letter to author.
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take on the Poseidon contract, and how important their contribution
would be:
Apparently, it was in fact Secretary McNamara who
insisted on extending the program to incorporate the best
that can be had in the guidance system, especially as
regards accuracy... Admiral Smith was most informative
along the following lines:
(1) In the Navy's earlier concept, the requirement for a
longer-range missile could have been satisfied by a lesser
improvement to the guidance system, the development of
which would accordingly have most likely been assigned to
an industrial contractor, as a logical further development of
the Polaris guidance system.
(2) With Mr McNamara's insistence on getting all of the
accuracy possible... the services of the Instrumentation
Laboratory definitely came to be required.38
Why were SPO not intent 'on getting all the accuracy possible'? First, as
with Polaris, Smith and SPO preferred to avoid rigid technical
requirements that had to be met come what may, agreeing instead to goals
which could, if necessary, be traded off against other system characteristics.
Admiral Smith formally could not refuse to accept an accuracy
requirement, but by (perhaps realistically) doubling the development cost
estimate, he ruled out such a choice. In effect, 'the Technical Director of
the Special Projects Office [Levering Smith] agreed to take on the task of
providing increased accuracy for Poseidon only if the specific missile
accuracy desired were treated as a development goal rather than a
development requirement'.39 To accept a stringent accuracy requirement,
and then fail to meet it, would have been very damaging to the reputation
of the FBM programme, a reputation carefully built upon the capacity to
keep promises.40
The second reason for lack of enthusiasm for greatly enhanced
accuracy was, again, 'differentiation' - the conviction that the FBM
programme was best served by having a mission and identity distinct from
38. James McCormack, Memorandum to the Files, subject: the Poseidon Contract, 10
November 1968. MIT Archives and Special Collections, Albert Hill papers, 83-40, box 4.
Vice Admiral Smith's comment on this in 1986 was that he was sure that he would have
said 'that the lesser improvement to the guidance system could have been done by an
industrial contractor rather than that it would have been assigned to an industrial




the Air Force programmes, and a desire to avoid 'copycat' competition
with these. The third reason was a deep commitment to the retaliatory
deterrence, assured destruction strategy. This may originally have been
shaped by the organizational logic of differentiation, but it was now deeply
felt by many in SPO.
By January 1966 the baseline Poseidon characteristics had been
agreed, very much in line with SPO's preferences. The main legitimation
for Poseidon was to be possible Soviet developments in ABM defenses and
not in ASW so the missile's range was to be about the same as Polaris A3.
To counter the ABM 'threat' each missile would carry a large number of
the small Mk3 re-entry vehicles and possibly penetration aids of some sort.
However, by 'off-loading' some of these warheads it was possible to
increase range if Soviet ASW did come to be considered threatening.
'Compatibility' with the Air Force Mkl7 re-entry vehicle was still required
- the only success of the Great Circle Group's campaign. The immediate
question of accuracy, and thus the pressure from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, was resolved by an agreement to aim for about 50% increase
over A3,41 but as a 'goal', not a 'requirement'.
Poseidon Guidance
Initially SPO retained a preference for staying with a modification of
Q guidance, even for delivering multiple warheads to different targets.
Their view, recalls the then head of FBM guidance at the Instrumentation
Laboratory, was that: 'we had a horse that ran right in the proper direction
and why change it?'42 Adapting Q guidance, in a concept referred to as
delta Q guidance, required a separate Digital Differential Analyzer for each
re-entry vehicle. But with the decision to develop a MIRV system that
could deliver many re-entry vehicles over a widely spaced 'footprint', this
looked to be a very inelegant solution. It remained under consideration
until 1966, when it was decided to go to an explicit guidance formulation.43
With this the missile constantly 'knows' its position and velocity and
44. Levering Smith, Robert H. Wertheim, Robert A. Duffy, 'Innovative Engineering in the
Trident Missile Development', The Bridge (National Academy of Engineering), Vol 10, No




recomputes the trajectory required to bring it to its target. Solving the
guidance equations used, however, involved 'horrendous ... calculations'
computed by iteration.44 This required more onboard computational
capability, which Q guidance had deliberately avoided in Polaris, but by the
mid-1960s this was not a limitation. Computational advances also made
the use of strapdown guidance appear feasible and it was considered for
'multi manoeuvrable buses' each carrying a strapdown system slaved to a
main guidance system in the missile.45
This approach was not developed, however, and strapdown was
again not considered suitable for the missile guidance. With a
manoeuvring bus deploying re-entry vehicles onto various trajectories the
amount of reorientation of the system was considered likely to lead to
poor accuracy with strapdown.46 Instead the Poseidon Mk3 guidance
system was a traditional stable platform design, an evolutionary
development from the Mk2.
With the more complex trajectory flown in a MIRVed system, no
one axis would be as dominant as previously, and so the extra difficulties
and expense of retaining one PIGA were judged to be not worthwhile.
Instead three 16-size (1.6 inch diameter) PIPAs were used together with
three 25-size Mod 3 IRIGs. Although similar to their predecessors in basic
principle, these devices incorporated 'evolutionary' improvements
achieved through continuing work at the Instrumentation Laboratory. In
particular the PIPAs were improved by 'orders of magnitude' by reducing
bias and scale factor errors as a result of going to permanent magnet
torquers, and by changing the method of torquing 47
Because of the move to an explicit guidance formulation, the simple
Digital Differential Analyzer type of computer was no longer adequate.
Instead a general purpose computer was used, drawing on the
Instrumentation Laboratory's work on a similar design for the Apollo
44 Ibid.




programme.48 Its integrated circuits were small scale integration (SSI) with
a total gate count of about 5000 (as opposed to 400 for Mkl and 800 for
Mk2).49 100K of Read-Only-Memory (ROM) was used for permanent
storage of certain programs, such as guidance formulations, and a 12K
plated wire Random-Access-Memory (RAM) stored variables that were
read in prior to or during flight.50
Whereas gravity was implicit in Q guidance, explicit guidance
required a gravity model of the earth. A simplified but adequate technique
was developed which used a spherical earth, but with offsets precalculated
for particular trajectories. Like the Q terms in Mkl and Mk2 these offsets
were carried by the submarine fire control system and read in to the
missile computer prior to launch.51 Also for the first time the general
purpose computer provided the capability for in-flight calibration and
error compensation. Reflecting the concern about possible ABM
developments the Mk3 guidance system was 'hardened' against the effects
of radiation.
Stellar Inertial Guidance, Hard Target Kill and the Mk4 Guidance System
Advocates of a hard target kill FBM were not content simply to have
Poseidon designed for 'compatibility' with the Mkl7 re-entry vehicle.
They sought actual deployments of Poseidon equipped with the heavy,
counterforce Mkl7 as well as the light Mk3. SPO resisted, arguing against a
mixed force:
The Mkl7 was going to be expensive, it was going to require
a logistical nightmare ... a specially configured missile
assigned to special targets as opposed to submarines
which could go on patrol with the flexibility to be targeted
from one kind of a target to another without having to
worry about what you had in the tubes 5^
48. Graydon M. Wheaton, 'Electronics Manufacturing for Inertial Guidance Systems' (9 May,






The argument against the 'mixed force' was not, however, the only
resource SPO was able to deploy against the Mkl7 re-entry vehicle, for
warhead choice began to interact with a crucial new issue in guidance
system design. Corporate engineers - outside the existing
SPO/Instrumentation Laboratory circle of guidance specialists - began to
argue for a radical departure from existing guidance system design. Simple
in principle, but with considerable technical and political ramifications,
their idea was to supplement the missile's inertial guidance system with
information derived from star sightings, taken while the missile was in
flight.
This option had not been considered in the early days of US ballistic
missile programmes, and in the early 1960s many continued to deem it
infeasible - an attitude reinforced by the failure of early tests.53 Further
tests, in the Stellar Acquisition Flight Feasibility (STAFF) programme
(which used 'spare' Polaris A1 missiles), were considered successful, but
still led to no production contract from the US Air Force, who supported
the early stellar-inertial work. The proponents of stellar-inertial, located
above all at the Kearfott Division of the General Precision Corporation
(now a division of Singer), thus had to turn to the Navy.
Just as the Air Force work was coming to an end, Kearfott engineers
came up with a refinement to stellar-inertial guidance that was to be of
great significance. It had originally been believed that sightings on two
stars were necessary. Kearfott's new argument - known as the 'Unistar
principle' - led to the conclusion that one 'optimum' star sighting could
give as much relevant information as two. This greatly simplified the
mechanical design of a stellar-inertial system at, apparently, little or no
cost to accuracy.
What Kearfott could offer the Navy, then, was a technique that
promised a considerable increase in missile accuracy. Their argument was
that the star sight could drastically reduce the error sources - uncertainty in
initial position and azimuth - that had seemed to condemn submarine-
53. A fuller account of the history of stellar-inertial guidance will be found in D.
Mackenzie,'Stellar-Inertial Guidance: A Study in the Sociology of Military Technology',
forthcoming in Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook 1988 (Dordrecht: Reidel).
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launched missiles to be inherently less accurate than ones fired from fixed
silos on land.
Initially stellar-inertial guidance met with considerable scepticism,
even hostility. Armed with this 'Unistar' concept, Marvin Stern, then
President of Kearfott (but previously a high level Department of Defense
civilian and still 'well connected'), 'went down ... badgered the people in
the government and ... sold this concept'.54 But, despite 'considerable
encouragement' from Director of Defense Research and Engineering John
Foster,55 SPO were not enthusiastic.56
SPO did not wish to complicate the guidance system to provide extra
accuracy which Poseidon's strategic role, in their view a secure counter-city
retaliatory deterrent, did not require. What accuracy goals they did have
seemed attainable with an all-inertial system. However, the pressure
exerted from the Office of the Secretary of Defense eventually told. Also
I one senior officer, Captain (later Rear Admiral) Robert Wertheim, having
been convinced personally, played an important role in SPO's conversion.
SPO then pressed the Instrumentation Laboratory to consider it for FBM
application.
People there 'were very much opposed to it'.57 A senior figure in
the Instrumentation Laboratory's FBM management recalls the reasons:
First of all... there was a certain degree of the 'not invented
here' aspect of it. But also there was a concern here at the
Lab. that it was an unnecessary complication. ... the
guidance system is enough of a pain in its most simple form
that you really don't want to complicate it. ... then the
other concern that I always had and I still have is that ...
there's a possibility of a nuclear explosion in the
atmosphere making the stellar system inoperable .58
The Instrumentation Laboratory had a great investment in developing







development which seemed threatened by stellar aided guidance. People
there argued that by further refining all-inertial technology one might be
able to match the accuracy of stellar inertial without the necessary
penalties of weight increase and complication involved in the latter:
Dr Draper took the gyro out of his pocket and said if you
have a good enough gyro you wouldn't need a [star-sensor]...
[Draper and the people at the Instrumentation Lab] didn't
think one should girr^ck it by adding these crazy things
called stellar sensors, that's like putting a band-aid on an
inertial system.5°
One engineer at the Instrumentation Laboratory remembers 'having
tunnel vision myself talking with my boss at the time about a star-tracker:
"Well, the system has been pretty good so far. We don't need to improve
it with a star-tracker, necessarily'".60 But eventually the Instrumentation
Laboratory was persuaded ('If the guy with the money says he wants it, you
convince yourself quite easily that you agree with him'.61)
But despite their lack of enthusiasm for hard target capability, SPO
apparently paradoxically began to highlight this potential attribute of
stellar inertial guidance. The reason, it seems, was the continuing battle
against the Mkl7 re-entry vehicle. In 1966 Lockheed, the missile
contractor, did a study for SPO which concluded that with stellar inertial
guidance the small Mk3 warhead would have sufficient hard target
capability to make the large Mkl7 re-entry vehicle unnecessary:
The Mkl7 program ... was made to disappear by the
prospect of still further accuracy improvement which made
it possible to show that even with the small yield
warheads ... you could, potentially at least, threaten
damage to moderately hard targets.6^
Stellar-inertial guidance - even in conceptual form - thus enabled SPO to
solve the 'mixed force' problem, by cutting the ground from under the feet
of the proponents of the Mkl7. It also avoided a substantial loss of market






designed and built by Lockheed, while the competitor Mkl7 was developed
by Avco Corporation.
But having helped 'kill' the Mkl7, stellar-inertial guidance was
allowed to languish. The lingering resistance at the Instrumentation
Laboratory led to various counterproposals over how the concept should
be implemented. For example, the Instrumentation Laboratory favoured
positioning the stellar sensor telescope on the outside of the Inertial
Measurement Unit case, whereas Kearfott had proposed that it be on the
stable member:
... we had a counterproposal - instead of a telescope that
would sit on the stable member inside, we were proposing to
add on the outside a case-mounted stellar tracker.6-^
Because of these disagreements development of a stellar-inertial Mk4
alternative guidance system for Poseidon did not really get under way for a
couple of years,64 while the all-inertial Mk3 guidance system proceeded
apace.
The plan was to fit the first Poseidon missiles with the Mk3
guidance and later ones with the Mk4. The Mk4 was something of 'a
patched-up Mk3 system', with the stellar sensor fitted - as the Draper
Laboratory had wanted - on the outside of the IMU case, connected in effect
to the outer gimbal.65 This could take a star sighting following the boost
phase (after the two rocket stages had burnt out and separated), prior to
deployment of the re-entry vehicles. The image of the star would pass
through a telescope and mirror system to the signal plate of a photoelectric
'vidicon' tube. Comparison of the actual star position with that predicted
(from a star map) provided the information to correct the guidance system
for errors in initial launch position and azimuth knowledge.
Navy testimony to Congress in 1968 clearly refers to the Mk4





During the past year the decision was taken to develop
[deleted] to increase the accuracy of Poseidon. When these
improvements are completed, Poseidon will be effective
both in the assured destruction role and in attacks against
hard targets.66
Then in January 1969 the new Administration of President Nixon took
over. To begin with, that seemed to enhance the Mk4's prospects.
Charged with cutting the defence budget, Nixon's Secretary of Defense,
Melvin Laird, was looking for cheap ways of toughening up the defense
posture. One possibility, suggested to him by stellar-inertial proponent
John Brett of Kearfott, was to speed up the development and deployment
of the Mk4 guidance system.67 Laird liked the idea and presented it to
Congress in March 1969:
The increase of $12.4 million for the development of an
improved guidance system for the Poseidon missile will
advance the initial operating capability (IOC) of that
system by about six months.... This is an important program
since it promises to improve significantly the accuracy of
the Poseidon missile, thus enhancing its effectiveness
against hard targets.68
Paradoxically, though, this success was to backfire on the proponents of
stellar-inertial guidance. As its political visibility increased, stellar-inertial
guidance became openly controversial. The Instrumentation Laboratory's
doubts about whether it really was a 'sweet' technology never surfaced in
the public domain. But Congressional critics, assuming that stellar-inertial
guidance would enhance accuracy, began to question whether this was
actually desirable.
Key figures in the opposition - in effect, the first Congressional
challenge to a 'technical' feature of an FBM system - were Senator Edward
W. Brooke of Massachusetts and his aide, Alton Frye. A moderate, black
Republican, Brooke had campaigned actively for Richard Nixon in 1968,
taking the view that this was the best way to 'maintain influence in a
Nixon Administration'. Until 1973, he enjoyed 'cordial access' to the
66. SASC FY 1969, Part 3, (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1968), 1052.
67. Interview.
68. Quoted in Stockholm International peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook of World
Armaments and Disarmament. 1968/69 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1970), 109.
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President.69 Both through his personal rapport with Nixon, and in the
Senate, Brooke campaigned against hard-target kill capability.
In the climate of the time, in which the public rationale for US
possession of nuclear weapons was dominated by the ideas of mutually
assured destruction, this forced the Administration onto the defensive.
Thus a lengthy letter from Brooke to Nixon on 5 December 1969, seeking
reassurances 'that the United States will not seek a capability to disarm the
Soviet Union', led, after consultations between the White House and
Department of Defense, to a reply from Nixon on 29 December asserting:
'There is no current US program to develop a so-called 'hard-target MIRV
capability'.70 Reality was then brought into line with this assertion by
cancelling the Mk4 stellar-inertial guidance system, and the following
summer John Foster, still Director of Defense Research and Engineering in
the new Administration, probably referred to this when he testified that:
We had a program of investigation along these lines and
last year I canceled it. My purpose was to make it
absolutely clear to the Congress and hopefully to the Soviet
Union, that it is not the policy of the United States to deny
the Soviet Union their deterrent capability.71
The ease with which this Congressional pressure ended the Mk4
programme reflects, as Ted Greenwood notes, the ambivalence about it in
SPO.72 Foster, too, recalls that he personally was influenced by the
argument of SPO Director Levering Smith that too much accuracy in the
FBM force was strategically destabilizing.73 By contrast, the Air Force's
Advanced Ballistic Reentry Systems (ABRES) programme also had
funding for hard-target aspects of it curtailed at the same time, but the Air
Force easily circumvented this restriction.74 SPO seemed to take almost
the opposite view, that the Mk4 was a non-essential programme which
provided them with some buffer funds which could be redirected to more
69. A. Frye, A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1975), 55.
70. Ibid, 69-70.





critical areas if required.75 Current Poseidon missiles still bear testimony
to the seriousness with which the Mk4 star sensor was considered (a 'trap
door' through which the star sighting was to be taken remains). However,
SPO's approach to it was pragmatic and contingent. If the Office of the
Secretary of Defense wanted stellar-inertial guidance (and was prepared to
pay for it), that was fine, especially as it helped to bury the Mkl7 re-entry
vehicle. If then enthusiasm and funding for the Mk4 guidance system
dried up, that was fine too. SPO's programme managers had quite enough
to do meeting their goals with Poseidon as it was. Technologists intrigued
by the new challenge of stellar-inertial guidance, advocates of a hard-target
FBM, and, of course, Kearfott would, however, all have another chance
with the next generation FBM, which was already on the horizon.
Developments in Navigation Technology: The Transit Improvement
Program and the Electrostatically Supported Gyroscope
i
However, while the Mk4 stellar inertial guidance system
programme was canceled in 1968, another programme was being initiated
to provide improvements in FBM submarine navigation. But, in contrast
to the hard-target rationale of the Mk4, the Improved Navigation Program
was justified on the grounds of increasing navigation reset intervals and
availability, and hence submarine survivability, and so did not excite
Congressional opposition to accuracy improvements.
The Improved Navigation Program covered a variety of
developments aimed at enhancing various aspects of FBM navigation.
These included the development of the 'phase-shift' Loran-C transmission
method whereby on-board cesium-beam atomic clocks allow the
synchronization necessary 'to provide range-range operation from two
stations in addition to the normal three-station hyperbolic time-difference
mode'.76 When it became operational in 1974 this provided a large
increase in the geographic availability of Loran-C navigation resets.
75. Interview.
76.iking (fTA^and H, Strell. 'Underwater Navigation' entry in McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia
of Science and Technology (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1982), 399-402,
at 400.
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Another major development was a new generation of Transit
satellites known as TIPS (Transit Improvement Program Satellites). The
first experimental improved satellite (known as TRIAD or TIP-1) was
launched in September 1972.77 The improvements were touted as
providing greater radiation protection and longer useful life in the event
of the loss of ground station control.78 The major innovation was a drag
compensation system (known as DISCOS, for Disturbance Compensation
System), which 'is a device that compensates for the effects of aerodynamic
drag forces and solar radiation pressure which act on the satellite in orbit,
thus permitting the satellite to follow an orbit influenced solely by the
gravitational field of the earth'.79 The concept used is theoretically quite
simple, and had been known for many years. A proof mass unsupported
within the DISCOS unit is shielded by the unit from atmospheric drag and
solar radiation and so experiences only gravitational forces - it follows a
purely gravitational orbit. The DISCOS control system senses the motion
of the proof mass relative to itself and responds to maintain their
separation using Freon 14 cold gas thrusters - thus allowing the satellite to
emulate the gravitational orbit of the proof mass.
DISCOS, along with an onboard general purpose computer to
compensate for predictable drift in the satellite's reference oscillator,
provides the capability to maintain accurate navigational broadcasts for
over a week, as compared with the previous Oscar satellites which require
orbital determination updates every day or so.80 It may also provide
somewhat more accurate navigational fixes as compared to the best offered
by prior Transit satellites, but the primary rationale seemed to be extension
of accuracy following loss of ground stations.
However, although TIP satellites were tested during the 1970s, the
first of the production 'Nova' satellites was not launched until 1981.81
Other Transit improvements were introduced in 1975 when the gravity
77SASC FY1975, Part 6, (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1974), 3280.
78 Ibid, 3278.
79. J. Dassoulas, 'The Triad Spacecraft', APL Technical Dieest. Vol. 12, No. 2 (April-June
1973), 2-13, at 2.
T. A. Stansell, Jr., 'The Many Faces of Transit', Navigation: Journal of The Institute of
Navigation. Vol. 25, No. 1 (Spring 1978), 55-70, at 62.
81. Owen Wilkes and Nils Petter Gleditsch, Loran-C and Omega: A study of the military
importance of radio navigation aids (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1987), 99.
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model used for orbit determination was changed (from the one originally
developed by the Applied Physics Laboratory to the new World Geodetic
System 197282) providing greater accuracy,83 and when a technique was
introduced to allow reduced exposure of the FBM submarine's BRN-3
antenna for navigational fixes.84
However, another of the developments which came to be funded
under the Improved Navigation Program, the electrostatically suspended
gyroscope (ESG), would, like the TIP satellites, only find operational
deployment in the 1980s. The ESG was in many ways directly analogous to
the stellar inertial guidance system. But while decisions about Poseidon
guidance became explicitly political, decisions about SINS technology
remained firmly 'inside the black box', treated as merely technical. Yet the
nature of developments in guidance and navigation technology were
remarkably similar. There too, evolutionary improvement of existing
technology was challenged by a radically different technology whose
proponents promised greatly enhanced accuracy. There too, these
proponents came from outside the traditional circle of suppliers to the
FBM programme. There too, the challenge failed, at least for the time
being.
The challenge was right to the core of existing SINS technology: the
gyroscopes. Because they had to keep the SINS stable platform in
accurately known orientation for far longer than did missile guidance
gyroscopes, these were crucial. Their design had stabilized to a 'paradigm'
involving both flotation of the can containing the rotor in fluid and self-
activating gas bearings for the rotor to spin on. The challenge involved
doing away with conventional bearings altogether. It emerged from work
done in the early 1950s by Professor Arnold Nordsieck of the University of
Illinois. Nordsieck sought to construct the 'ultimate gyroscope' by
supporting the gyro rotor in a vacuum in an electrostatic field.85
82. On WGS 72, see T. O. Seppelin, 'The Department of Defense World Geodetic System
1972', The Canadian Surveyor. Vol. 28, No. 5 (December 1974), 496-506.
83. Stansell, 'Many Faces', 62.
84 SASC FY 1975, 3286.
85. H. W. Knoebel, 'The Electric Vacuum Gyro: Pinpoint for Polaris Launching', Control
Engineering, (February 1964), 70-73.
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In the mid- to late-1950s, SPO supported exploratory studies of
Nordsieck's concept at Honeywell and General Electric, 'with a view to the
possible use of ESGs in Polaris submarines'.86 The potential advantages
were clear. The electrostatically suspended gyroscope was canvassed in the
early 1960s as having drift rates of the order of 0.0001 degrees per hour.87
In that period, a gyro with 0.01 degrees per hour drift was considered good,
and though SINS gyros would certainly have been considerably better than
that, the ESG could be put forward as a major possible improvement.
What was at stake was not simply the technology at the core of the
SINS, but the organization that would supply it. Although Autonetics,
which was consolidating its position as the sole SINS supplier, had begun
studying the ESG in 1959,88 the early running on the technology was made
by Honeywell. Though Honeywell had and has an involvement in the
manufacture of inertial components for ballistic missile guidance systems,
it was an outsider to the SINS programme. As a supplier of inertial
components, but not systems, Honeywell seems to have been concerned to
enlarge its involvement through developing innovative technologies.89
But despite the promise of greater accuracy, the ESG 'for years
seemed destined to remain only a cumbersome laboratory curiosity'.90
Simple and elegant in concept, actually producing ESGs in any quantity
proved to be extremely difficult. A completely spherical ball is best for
purposes of suspension, but difficult to make. The Honeywell ball had to
be machined to within 5 millionths of an inch, and 'during fabrication the
hollow sphere is formed with a slight elongation along its spin axis such
that it will become perfectly spherical when rotating at high speed'.91
86. P. J. Klass, 'New Gyro nears Operational Use', Aviation Week and Space Technology,
(19 June 1972), 50-52.
87. P. J. Klass, 'Navy to Test Electrically Suspended Gyro', Aviation Week and Space
Technology . (6 February 1961), 85-91.
88. B. McKelvie and H. Gait, Jr. 'The Evolution of the Ship's Inertial Navigation System
for the Fleet Ballistic Missile Program', Navigation: Tournal of the Institute of Navigation,
Vol. 25 (Fall 1978), 321.
89. In addition to pushing the ESG, Honeywell also played the key role in the development
of the laser gyroscope, a technology that since the late 1970s has brought the corporation a
major share of the aircraft inertial navigation market.
90. Klass, 'New Gyro', 50.
91. Klass, 'Navy to Test', 87; P. J. Klass, 'Inertial System uses Electrostatic Gyros', Aviation
Week and Space Technology. 30 September 1963, 87-89, at 88..
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Sphericity was not the only problem. Without physical contact
between ball and case, reading out the ball's orientation (which was the
point of the whole exercise) was tricky. The Honeywell gyro, and a
research gyro developed at the University of Illinois in the early 1960s,
used optical sensors to track a special pattern on the surface of the ball.92
And of course there was the fear of what would happen if there was an
interruption of power supplies when the ball was spinning. Without the
supporting electrostatic forces,the ball would 'crash' and disintegrate.
Because the gap between the ball and the walls of the cavity in which it
was spun was tiny (of the order of a hundredth of an inch), sudden shock
or vibration could also cause a catastrophic 'touch down'.
Honeywell never succeeded in getting its ESG adopted by the Navy.
Although advanced in the early 1960s as 'pinpoint for Polaris launching',
neither the Polaris nor Poseidon programmes made use of it. This was not
because it failed to meet accuracy goals in performance terms. One report
from the time noted that:
Such [electrostatically suspended] gyros manufactured by
Honeywell have been undergoing tests aboard the USS
Compass Island for several years with very gratifying
results. Performance specifications have been exceeded ...9^
However, the ESG had to compete with the evolutionary improvements
of the more familiar SINS technology.94 SPO's judgement at the time was
that the ESG performance was 'modestly better' than the projected
92. Klass, 'Navy to Test', 87; Knoebal, 71.
93. R. C. Langford, 'Unconventional Inertial Sensors', paper presented to Second American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 26-29 July 1965,18.
94. The original Mk 2 Mod 0 SINS was improved gradually through a series of changes,
such as a better 'binnacle' to enclose it which reduced errors due to variations in temperature
and air flow. After these modifications the Mk 2 Mod 0 was renamed the Mk 2 Mod 4,
providing good enough performance for the 2500-mile Polaris A3. Autonetics new SINS, the
Mk 2 Mod 2, featured an improved version of the G7A gyro, the G7B, and was installed in
submarines twenty to thirty (the 627-class). This was designed to allow a modification
involving the addition of a fourth monitor gyro which provides compensation for the drift
rates in the other gyros. Thus modified it was known as the Mk 2 Mod 3 and in this form it
was retrofitted to the five 608-class submarines (formerly using the Sperry Mk 3 Mod 0) and
fitted to the final twelve FBM submarines (the 640-class). By the end of the 1960s the 41
Polaris submarines contained a mixture of Mk 2 Mod4 and Mk 2 Mod 3 SINS. A further
modification of the Mk 2 SINS, the Mod 6, was developed and retrofitted into the 31
submarines which were converted to carry Poseidon. See McKelvie and Gait.
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performance of improved SINS. But it 'would cost a lot of bucks' to get
that modest improvement.95 As Poseidon was retrofitted to the FBM
submarines various improvements were made to the navigation systems,
but conventional SINS remained at their heart.
The argument against the ESG was thus not dissimilar to the
argument against stellar-inertial guidance. The proponents of the ESG,
however, do not seem to have been effective 'heterogeneous engineers'
like the proponents of stellar-inertial guidance. Here there was, it seems,
no lobbying of high officials96, no engineer feeling the need to 'join the
power structure' (ie the Department of Defense) to secure the technology's
acceptance, as one key corporate proponent of stellar-inertial guidance
decided was necessary as a result of the failure to get it incorporated in
Poseidon. Quite possibly as a result, the advocates of hard target kill did
not seize on the ESG to push for its early deployment, and Congressional
doves were never caused to oppose it. It remained a 'technical
technology', not a 'political' one.
But it did not die either. Like stellar-inertial guidance, the ESG was
to find success. Interestingly, though, it was to find success in a different
design, and produced by a different corporation. Honeywell, its key
proponent, never secured a place in submarine navigation.
Building Poseidon
The debate over the technical characteristics of Poseidon was centred
on those technologies that were seen as defining its operational capability.
Whether it would continue to be seen as an extension of the counter-city
role attributed to Polaris, or, as some desired, as a counterforce system
came to rest on the twin attributes of warhead size and system accuracy
that traditionally define 'hard target kill capability'. But of the principle
technologies that determine accuracy - guidance and navigation - only one
became openly controversial. Guidance improvements were publicly
touted as a means of enhancing hard target kill and thus attracted
95. Interview.
96. There was lobbying of top Air Force officials to secure the ESG's incorporation in a new
navigator for the B-52 bomber (Interview), but not, as far as we know, of Navy officials.
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criticism. Navigation developments, on the other hand, did not attract the
advocacy of counterforce proponents and continued to be justified on the
widely favoured grounds of improving submarine survivability.
Other subsystems of Poseidon were less contested. The payload was
to be delivered to a range that was nominally the same 2500 nautical miles
as Polaris A3, depending on how many warheads were carried. At the
maximum loading of fourteen warheads the range was about 1800 miles97,
but by offloading this could be increased to almost 4000 miles. Although
some advances were made in structural weight savings and improved
propellent performance, much of the increased payload capability
stemmed simply from Poseidon's larger size. As in Polaris A3, Poseidon
two stages both use fibre glass chambers with the first-stage propellent a
composite type, and that of the second stage double base.
Compared to A3, the Poseidon propulsion development was
considered a conservative technological step.98 In the only significant
compliance by SPO with the new defence procurement regulations
developed under McNamara, the Poseidon propulsion became the first
major FBM subsystem to be competitively tendered.99 Hercules Powder
Co. collaborated with Thiokol Chemical Corp. in a 'joint venture' to
produce both stages, with Hercules responsible for the entire second stage
and the fibre glass casing for the first stage into which Thiokol loaded their
composite propellent. Aerojet, who had built Polaris propulsion systems,
also tendered for both stages, but were squeezed out on cost.
Development of Poseidon propulsion proceeded without any
serious problems, but, later, after deployment began to encounter
unexpected failures. After several years' investigation this was finally
identified as due to age-related cracking of insulator rubber. The transition
from the storage state of the missile in the launch tube to the high
pressure following ignition led to failures which were found to be related
to the missile storage temperature. This was largely eliminated by
increasing the missile launch tube temperature, thus stopping the rubber
97 SASC FY 1977, (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1976), 6553.
98. Fuhrman, 281.
". 'Hercules, Thiokol Win Poseidon Work', Missiles and Rockets (October 25, 1965), 16; also
Sapolsky, 207.
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insulators from becoming so brittle. What made this failure particularly
intriguing, however, was that SPO had two manufacturers of the
insulators, which provided markedly different failure rates:
Both of them made these insulators to the 'identical process'
- I use that in quotations - best we could tell they were
identical, everything we specified they were identical.
Obviously we didn't specify enough. The problem
developed in the one insulator fairly early in its life and
eventually developed in the other one, but a lot, lot later.
And we never could figure out ... what was different about
the two processes as they actually did it that created this
problem.100
Thrust vector control in both stages is provided by single nozzles,
which are controlled by gas generators. With the introduction of the
MIRV bus for deployment of the re-entry vehicles, second stage thrust
termination was again considered necessary. Instead of the prebuilt plugs
used in Polaris A1 and A2 the thrust termination vents in Poseidon were
simply blown out pyrotechnically through the homogeneous fibre glass
chamber.
This thrust termination is intended to leave the 'bus' traveling at
the desired velocity for it to release the individual re-entry vehicles onto
trajectories that will take them to their intended targets. To reorient the
bus so as to drop re-entry vehicles onto different trajectories requires a
propulsion system of some sort. Whereas the Air Force Minuteman III
MIRV system uses liquid fuel rockets for this purpose, the Navy preferred
to avoid liquid propellents for submarine based systems. Instead they
choose to use solid propellents, which are considered safer, but more
difficult to mechanize. Whereas liquid rockets can be turned on and off
and throttled precisely, solids burn at a constant rate once lit and cannot be
easily stopped and started.
The design of the bus for Poseidon thus required a complicated
system of valves to provide the desired manoeuvring during the
deployment phase, whilst the solid rocket system burnt continuously.
This manoeuvring and the release of re-entry vehicles is controlled by the
guidance computer, through a steering implementation developed by
10°. Interview.
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close collaboration (compared to the previous friction) between Lockheed
and the Draper Laboratory.
One unexpected outcome of using a manoeuvring bus which
experienced changes in the direction of acceleration was that loose particles
moving around in the electronics produced excessive unreliability.101
Such a phenomenon had not been apparent under the linear acceleration
that Polaris electronics components were subjected to.
Development of the re-entry vehicles which the bus carried was
even more fraught with difficulties. Like the Polaris Mkl re-entry vehicle
the Poseidon Mk3 was a heatsink design made of beryllium. In addition it
incorporated an ablative graphite nosetip and special outer coating
intended to provide some protection from X-ray deposition caused by
ABM nuclear detonations.102
The initial concern during development was ensuring that the re¬
entry vehicle design would not suffer from the phenomena known as
spin-up and spin-down. Reentry vehicles are spun so that the effects of
atmospheric re-entry are symmetrical, and to limit loss of accuracy.
Spinning is particularly important in ablative designs where uneven
ablation would alter the aerodynamic characteristics of the re-entry vehicle
and so severely reduce its accuracy.
The Poseidon Mk3 is a very small re-entry vehicle and the
asymmetries that occur as it deforms during re-entry are especially
significant.103 In its development phase asymmetry-induced torques
resulted in the occurrence of spin-up and spin-down. As one Lockheed
manager put it: 'It would take a banana shape and that would cause a trim
...[and it] would end up either rolling up or down'.104 This was a serious
concern as spin-up can lead to the destruction of the re-entry vehicle and
spin-down through zero greatly reduces system accuracy.
101. Interview.
102. Interview.
103. For a discussion of the asymmetries which result in re-entry vehicle torques, see, R.W.
Carlson and C.A. Louis III, Introduction to Re-entry Flight Dynamics . LMSC-D050690
(Sunnyvale, Calif.: Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, 15 March 1968),
104. Interview.
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With this problem solved there was still a further upset much later
in the program. The re-entry vehicle carbon nose tips had worked well
during prototype flight testing, but when the program moved into its
production phase apparently identical nose tips started to breakup in flight
tests, especially those conducted over longer ranges:
These graphite nosetips had worked perfectly up
throughout the development of Poseidon without exception.
We never had a failure in a development flight test and we
went into production, we started our testing and ... lo and
behold we started getting failures. A few, not large
numbers, but a small percentage of the nosetips of the re¬
entry vehicles broke up in flight. And this presented a
tremendous challenge to us because what in the world was
going on. Something had changed and we examined the
graphite with great care using every non-destructive test
means we could to find out what was different about the
graphite that had gone into the production nosetips and the
ones that we had used in the development flight testing.
We could find nothing other than the fact that they were
produced in different facilities. It turned out that the
manufacturer, who was Union Carbide, had used an R&D
facility, a small furnace, for graphitizing the nosetips in
the processing and when we'd gone into production, very
much larger numbers, they had shifted to their production
facility and we concluded that the control of the thermal
gradients and the temperatures in the large production
furnaces was just not, could not have been the same. We
couldn't find any other reason for this statistical variation
in quality.105
In 1973 a three-year modification programme was instigated to remedy
the design and replace already deployed re-entry vehicles.106
Deploying Poseidon
Despite the development problems Poseidon was deployed only two
months behind schedule. At the end of March 1971 the USS James
Madison went on patrol, her Polaris A3 missiles replaced by Poseidon
during her first overhaul. Conversion of Polaris submarines to carry
105. Interview.
106. See 'The Poseidon Misadventure', Business Week (Octojber 13, 1973); 'Gradual Poseidon
Modification Planned', Aviation Week & Space Technology ^September 17,1973), 19.
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Poseidon mainly involved changes in the navigation, fire control and
launcher subsystems.
The submarine SINS were improved to provide better performance
with the Mk2 Mod3 upgraded to a Mk2 Mod6 configuration. This used a
redesigned Inductosyn package for heading readout so as to reduce the
transmission error, and the SINS G7B gyroscopes were selected to a higher
standard:
G7B gyros were screened during factory selloff tests. These
tests included the final drift test, self-induced vibration
test, and output axis hysteresis test. If the gyro met
specified performance criteria for these tests, it was
designated a C-3 gyro for use on the MK 2 MOD 6 SINS. If
the gyro exceeded the C-3 criteria, but met a less stringent
set of criteria, it was designated an A-3 gyro for use on the
SINS installed in the submarines still carrying Polaris A-3
missiles.107
Other new hardware included a considerably more powerful computer
based on the Univac CP-890 to replace the NAVDAC, and a new Loran-C
receiver, the AN/BRN-5 to replace the original AN/WPN-3.108 New
calibration techniques were also introduced for the Poseidon navigation
system.109 The Mk-88 fire control system used in the submarines that were
converted to carry Poseidon was simply an evolutionary improvement of
the MK-84 used for Polaris A3.
In the launcher system the developments that had originally
'discovered' the extra tube space that made Poseidon possible were taken
advantage of. The Mark 21 launch system originally installed in the
submarines to hold Polaris A3 missiles had been designed so that modular
replacement allowed for relatively simple upgrading to the Mark 24
system for Poseidon. The heavy launch tube and stowage adaptors used
for Polaris were replaced with a thin launch tube taking up almost all the
107. McKelvie and Gait, 317.
108. See W. N. Dean and D. P. Roth, "The AN/BRN-5 Loran receiver', Navigation - Tournal
of the Institute of Navigation. Vol. 23 (Winter 1976), 287-97.
109. McKelvie and Gait, 317-18.
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space in the submarine's mount tube. Foam padding replaced the stowage
adaptors in holding the missile snug in the launch tube.110
Conflicting Interests: 'Follow-on' and Counterforce
Poseidon was the outcome of a number of influences, some of
which were conflicting. SPO as an organization needed a new missile
development to justify its special status. With the Polaris A3
development due to finish in 1964, there was a danger that a delay in
starting development of another FBM generation would at best lead to the
break up of the expertise that SPO had assembled (both internally and in its
contractors), and at worst might lead to the dissolution of SPO.
But Poseidon cannot be simply explained as the inevitable product
of a follow-on imperative.111 SPO and Lockheed certainly were keen that
there should not be too long a gap between FBM generations, but other
aspects of the FBM programme, such as maintenance of existing systems,
were both considered important at SPO and a source of work for Lockheed.
Moreover, whatever the incentives pushing organizations to ensure rapid
'follow-on', they still need to be sanctioned by Congress and the
Department of Defense. In the case of Poseidon, neither of these were to
simply present SPO with a 'blank cheque' to build what it wanted. Indeed
Poseidon was the first FBM system to be consciously subjected to a
Congressional cut when the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
refused to allow more than two Polaris submarines to be converted to
accept it.112 The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) was supportive of
a new generation, but wanted to ensure that the next FBM would provide
some extra capability. As it was, the delay in authorization of Poseidon
which stemmed from OSD's directed redesign led to SPO taking on the
Deep Submergence Systems Project as 'a means to keep the FBM team
together until Poseidon was approved'.113
110. See Robert Lindsey, 'Material Refinement Assists Poseidon Launcher Designers',
Technology Week (June 13,1966), 32-33.
111. See James R. Kurth, 'Aerospace Production Lines and American Defense Spending', in
Steven Rosen (ed.), Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex (Lexington,




In particular, SPO found the rest of the Navy very unresponsive to
the idea of replacing Polaris with another generation missile. The costly
Polaris programme was widely perceived in the Navy as having used
funds that would otherwise have gone on more traditional missions. To
many these missions seemed rather more pressing than the development
of another generation FBM. Such resistance was only overcome during
1964 when Secretary of the Navy, Paul Nitze persuaded CNO Admiral
McDonald that the Poseidon programme should go ahead.114
The follow-on to Polaris was, then, neither easy nor particularly
swift. Even after a decision to proceed was made, the actual design
remained contested for several years. Many who were supportive of a new
missile, particularly those in the Great Circle Group, continued to press for
technical characteristics orientated towards counterforce. More
importantly counterforce was also seen as (desirable by McNamara's OSD
and accuracy improvements were sought in the FBM for this purpose, as
for some time, was the possibility of carrying larger warheads.
However, although SPO's autonomy was cut back during the 1960s
skilful heterogeneous engineering maintained the programme's
continuity without significant compromises. Accuracy remained only a
goal, and not a requirement. Stellar-inertial guidance was used as a
argument against the Mkl7 heavy warhead, and then itself dropped. In its
final form Poseidon's technology reflected more SPO's concern of ABM
penetration than that of those who desired to rival the counterforce role of
the Air Force. SPO's leadership thus maintained the aspect of the FBM
programme it considered most important, its ability to meet the promised
goals - particularly that of an assured retaliatory deterrent - and therefore
its differentiated role as compared to the Air Force.
The outcome was a weapon system whose accuracy/yield
combination was considered inadequate for the destruction of the
hardened targets, such as missile silos, which began to appear in the Soviet
Union in 1964. But although it never achieved the counterforce capability
that some had desired for it, Poseidon provided more such capability than
Polaris. As well as the traditional FBM targets - large, vulnerable
114 Greenwood, 44.
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urban/industrial areas - Poseidon could now also be directed against a
range of smaller, soft targets, including non-strategic military installations,
R&D centres and other important industrial facilities away from cities.
Indeed the legacy of a forty-one boat fleet, combined with the decisions
over Poseidon's payload, almost demanded such targets be included in the
SIOP. With all but the first ten FBM submarines to be converted to
Poseidon, the increase in targeting depended on how many warheads each
missile carried. To provide extra range Poseidon was initially deployed
carrying considerably less than the maximum fourteen warheads per
missile allowed in SALT - perhaps as few as six per missile - giving a
sixfold increase in targets as compared to the Polaris missiles replaced.115
Some extra could go to providing additional assured destruction - just in
case of Soviet ABM deployments - but lacking effectiveness against hard
targets, the rest provided a capability which 'required* the addition of
many marginal targets to the SIOP.116
I
Poseidon, thus, left a contradictory legacy. Although SPO's
autonomy was much reduced during the 1960s, it nevertheless managed to
avoid serious setbacks to the programme. But Poseidon did leave SPO's
image of technical and managerial competence tarnished. The long,
drawn-out development period, the demanding nature of the MIRV
technology, and increasing limitations on SPO's independence all served
to highlight difficulties. But although there were serious problems which
continued to impair reliability even after Poseidon became officially
operational, these were not unprecedented in the FBM programme. SPO
and its contractors (which remained virtually the same from Polaris to
Poseidon) did not suddenly become poor technologists. What changed,
most crucially, was the world in which they operated. Unlike with Polaris,
SPO could no longer command unlimited funding whilst remaining able
to shift performance goals to meet achievement. SPO became subject to
increasing interference from the Navy's leadership, from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and from Congressional scrutiny. The special powers
115. See 'Poseidon Missiles To Get More RVs - But Not 14', Aerospace Daily (October 30,
1980), 331-32.
116. See D. Ball, 'The Role of Strategic Concepts and Doctrine in US Strategic Nuclear Force
Development' in B. Brodie, M. D. Intriligator and R. Kolkowicz (eds.), National Security
and International Security (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1983), 37-63, at
55.
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granted by Burke to Raborn for Polaris dwindled,117 as SPO no longer came
to be considered 'special' - indeed its name was changed to Strategic
Systems Project Office in 1967.
Developed in the Cold War atmosphere of Sputnik and the 'missile
gap', Polaris was seen as a desperate 'need', and Raborn's skill was to
ensure that no-one forgot that. But for Poseidon, with the USA nuclear
arsenal already well exceeding the Soviet's in the mid 1960s, the 'need'
was unclear (the potential ABM 'threat' never materialized), internally
contested, and difficult to rally public or Congressional enthusiasm for.
SPO no longer commanded priority.118
With SPO's dominance reduced, Poseidon became the first FBM to
be seriously contested, not only within the 'establishment', but also in
public where its MIRV development attracted much criticism. Also, while
SPO was able to avoid a commitment to a hard-target Poseidon, and to
retain the emphasis on assured destruction, the final outcome was a FBM
force which fell a little short of providing the one (hard-target kill), but
exceeded 'requirements' for the other (assured destruction). To many,
especially those within the Navy connected with targeting, this increased
the desire to make any future FBM have 'genuine' hard-target kill
capability. Navy officers assigned to the Joint Strategic Target Planning
Staff (JSTPS) soon tired of Air Force taunts about the Navy's 'firecrackers' -
Poseidon's 40 kiloton warheads.119
But even as Poseidon began to enter service, counterforce advocates
were to have another chance as the next FBM generation was planned.
Preoccupied with rectifying Poseidon's difficulties, SPO would again have







Strat-X, ULMS and Trident I
I considered that we'd better surrender to Rickover so that
we wouldn't have to surrender to the Russians.
Admiral ZumwaltJ
While Poseidon development was still underway, and its final
nature still not completely decided, consideration began of another
generation of fleet ballistic missiles. Paradoxically, the path that leads to
Trident II - the first Fleet Ballistic Missile in which hard-target kill
capability would be a clear requirement - began with a study based on the
criteria of a different era. That study was called Strat-X, and embodied the
cost-effectiveness orientation of the 'systems analysis' of the McNamara
era, and its emphasis on 'assured destruction'.
Strat-X and ULMS
The Strat-X study was a response by Robert McNamara's Deputy
Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Lloyd Wilson, to Air Force
pressures in the mid-1960s for a new, very large ICBM, provisionally called
WS-120A; it may indeed have been initiated precisely to kill the Air Force
missile.2 Starting in late 1966, Strat-X was carried out by the Institute for
Defense Analysis, and was submitted in August 1967. Its task was
specified, in part, as:
Strat-X is to be a technological study to characterize U.S.
alternatives to counter the possible Soviet ABM
deployment and the Soviet potential for reducing the U.S.
assured-destruction-force effectiveness during the 1970's. It
is desired that the U.S. alternatives be considered from a
. Mary Schumacher, Trident: Setting the Requirements (Case Study C15-88-802.0,^--^
Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1987), 10.1 am very gr©atful to
Mary Schumacher for supplying me with her work on Trident and with the Rhodes thesis
(see next footnote).
2. F. Leary, 'ULMS: Strategic Emphasis Shifts Seaward', Space/Aeronautics (June 1970), 24-
33, at 26; also Interview; Edward Rhodes, 'Trident: Bureaucratic Politics and Military
Procurement' (unpublished thesis, Harvard College, March 1980), 12.
132
uniform cost-effectiveness base as well as from solution
sensitivity to various Soviet alternative actions.^
Various strategic nuclear weapons systems were compared using criteria
based on 'assured destruction'. How, it was asked, could the US most cost-
effectively ensure the retaliatory 'delivery' to the Soviet Union of
sufficient 'equivalent megatons'4 to deter it - and do so on the assumption
of possible Soviet developments such as ultra-accurate ICBMs and anti-
ballistic missile defenses?
Both the Navy candidates - one submarine and the other surface-
based - did well in this competition for the most cost-effective 'assured
destruction' weapon system, and the Navy was instructed to continue
studying them, but the Surface-Launched Missile System (SLMS) was
dropped in 1968.5 The submarine concept, known as ULMS or Undersea
Long-range Missile System comprised a large, but not very fast, submarine
carrying up to 24 missiles of 4500 to 6500 mile range held in canisters
external to the pressure hull.6 The use of canisters simplified hull
construction and provided some launching advantages: 'Missiles may be
released from the submarine at all speeds and depths up to the
maximums, and missile firing may be delayed to avoid backtracking of
trajectory so that submarine survivability is not inhibited by missile
launch constraints.'7
An advanced development objective for ULMS was established by
the Chief of Naval Operations on February 1, 1968, with Admiral Smith of
SPO named as the Project Manager in March. Then in July, reflecting the
interest in a possible surface-launched system, Admiral Smith's
responsibility was increased to include all Navy strategic systems (not just
3. Volume I of Strat-X's 20 volumes is unclassified, The Strat-X Report (Arlington, Virginia:
Institute for Defense Analysis, August 1967), 1.
4. For definition of equivalent megatonnage see Chapter 4, footnote 38.
5. Leary, 'ULMS', 26; Captain Dominic A. Paolucci (US Navy, Retd), 'The Development of
Navy Strategic Offensive and Defensive Systems', United States Naval Institute
Proceedings. Vol. 96 (May 1970), 223, also mentions the SLMS.
6. On Strat-X and ULMS, see J. Steinbruner and B. Carter, 'Organizational and Political
Dimensions of the Strategic Posture: the Problems of Reform', Daedalus. Vol. 104 (Summer
1975), 131-54; N. Polmar and T. Allen, Rickover (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982),
chapter 26; also Strat-X, Vol I.
1. Strat-X, 84.
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FBMs) and the Special Projects Office was renamed the Strategic Systems
Project Office (SSPO).8 During 1967-1969 SSPO carried out preliminary
studies to define the ULMS technology based on the concept used in
Strat-X.
In particular, Admiral Smith and SSPO sought to keep research and
development costs low by utilising as much existing technology as
possible. The long range of the missile would be obtained simply by
increasing the volume of propellant used - the missile envisaged was to be
about twice the volume of Poseidon - and the submarine size would grow
accordingly, to about 18,000 tons displacement.9
The reactor envisaged to power the new submarine was an existing
design, already tested in the attack submarine Narwhal. This again would
help to reduce the cost and uncertainty involved in the development of
new technology, especially when responsibility for that development
would lie outside of SSPO's control, in the hands of Admiral Rickover,
head of the Navy's Nuclear Propulsion Directorate. In addition the
Narwhal reactor was a natural circulation design which at low speeds
used convection rather than pumps to circulate the water-coolant. At the
normal cruising speeds of an FBM patrol this was expected to make it
significantly quieter than a conventional forced circulation design. This
too accorded with Admiral Smith's desire to minimize the noise (and
other observable characteristics) of the ULMS submarine so as to enhance
its survivability against developments in Soviet anti-submarine warfare.
However, because the Narwahl was only about a third the size of the
proposed ULMS submarine, its 17,000 shaft horsepower (shp) reactor
would only allow a top speed of about 18-19 knots, making it about four
knots slower than the Polaris/Poseidon submarines.10 But a high top
speed was not considered an important attribute of an FBM submarine in
Strat-X, nor by Admiral Smith.
Instead SSPO's ULMS design reflected the emphasis on cost-
effectiveness and survivability through low observability. It did differ
8. Paolucci, 223.
9. Schumacher, 5; Rhodes, 26.
10. Schumacher, 5.
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from the Strat-X concept in one major respect, however, in that the
missiles were to be carried internally in vertical launch tubes, as in the
Polaris/Poseidon submarines. As usual Admiral Smith also sought to
ensure that SSPO would be able to deliver what it promised on schedule.
The choice of an existing reactor design not only greatly reduced the time
and expense of a new research and development programme, but also
reduced SSPO's reliance on others.
But, in marked contrast to Polaris, the development of the next
generation FBM submarine was to be a divisive and contested battle, the
outcome of which would affect the nature of FBM technology for many
years. In this struggle issues of the 'technical' design of the new
submarine interacted with the strategic role of the FBM and the relative
power of the various organizations and individuals involved.
The Trident Submarine Debate
The submarines that carried Polaris and Poseidon had been
uncontroversial. But ULMS reopened the issue that SPO had successfully
closed with the choice of a modified existing attack submarine design to
carry Polaris - the potentially deeply problematic relationship with
Admiral Rickover, 'father' of nuclear propulsion.
Rickover became aware of the ULMS plans early in 1970 when SSPO
asked his nuclear propulsion directorate for information on the weight
and size of the Narwhal reactor. He immediately objected, arguing that
the ULMS submarine should be able to reach a top speed of at least 24
knots. Above this speed active sonar had failed to operate effectively in
tests, and so even though Soviet attack submarines would be faster (and so
able to outrun a 24-knot submarine), they would be 'blinded' in chasing at
such speeds.11
To meet the 24 knot 'requirement' Rickover instead proposed
powering each submarine with two 30,000 shp reactors of a design that was
still to be tested. Although many remained sceptical of the argument for
speed (the 'blinding' effect was based on limited data) Admiral Smith was
11. Rhodes, 28.
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put under considerable pressure by the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations to reach an agreement that would allow the submarine design
to be settled. With SPO's technical authority already being questioned for
the first time in the Poseidon programme, and with its autonomy much
reduced from the days of Polaris, Admiral Smith chose not to fight a
divisive battle with Rickover which might further delay and endanger the
ULMS programme.
Despite his personal misgivings Admiral Smith was forced to
concede that his area of expertise was the missile system, whereas that of
Rickover 'was basically shipbuilding in its various aspects, particularly
propulsion'.12 This logic compelled Admiral Smith to accept that once he
had set the missile characteristics, and most importantly their weight, then
Rickover should design the submarine. This agreement led, by March
1970, to a 'compromise' which very much favoured Rickover. The ULMS
submarine was to use his favoured twin natural circulation reactors to
give the submarine a top speed of 26-27 knots. To accommodate these
large reactors, as well as the large 6000-mile missiles (in launch tubes
nearly three and a half times the volume of Poseidons) required a huge
submarine with a 50-foot hull diameter and displacing about 30,000 tons.13
But this was far from the end of the matter. When the Deputy
Secretary of Defense David Packard learnt about the proposed submarine
in September 1970 he 'rejected the idea of such a large submarine
emphatically and categorically'.14 It became clear that approval of ULMS
would require some compromise towards Packard's preferences, which
were made clear to the Navy: 'Minimum detectability as well as
minimum cost will be given top priority in OSD reviews'.15
ULMS now became a more pressing concern for the newly
appointed Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt. In October
1970 he revitalized the ULMS Steering Group which worked out a smaller,
12. Smith quoted in Schumacher, 8
13. Schumacher; also Rhodes, 31-32..
14 Rhodes, 33.
15. Conversation with David Packard as recalled by R. W. Cousins (Vice Chief of Naval
Operations), 'Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Material. Subj: ULMS Studies. Ser
00308P31' (November 10,1970), Cited in Rhodes, 128, note 11.
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less expensive ULMS submarine design, basically by scaling down the
Smith/Rickover compromise. Recognising the necessity of maintaining
Rickover's support the new design retained his favoured 30,000 shp
reactor, but used only one rather than two. Although it still had a
displacement over one and half times that of the latest Polaris/Poseidon
submarines, the 640-class, it was dubbed the 'Super-640', apparently in an
attempt to minimize the difference. It also differed significantly from the
Strat-X concept in that the missile tubes were only about ten percent larger
in volume than Poseidon's.16
Zumwalt himself favoured repeating the first Polaris submarine
construction method by simply adapting the latest attack submarine
design, the 688-class, and installing a missile section into it. Since the 688
design was already developed (including the reactor) this option
eliminated much of the research and development costs, and seemed to
offer considerably cheaper submarines, which was Zumwalt's main
concern. However, Zumwalt decided that Rickover's support was the
critical factor in determining the feasibility of the ULMS submarine. What
would be the optimum design in 'technical' and strategic terms was
something over which there was considerable disagreement, but one thing
was for certain - Rickover was a hard reality. Zumwalt needed to enroll
his support for ULMS:
it was clear to me that Rickover would never support
anything that didn't have his huge ... new reactor in it. It
was clear to me that he would have been willing to take
any delay to get it.17
The Super-640 satisfied Rickover, but had the unintended
consequence of undermining the rationale for developing any new
submarine. When faced with the prospect of a submarine which could
only accommodate launch tubes not much bigger than Poseidon's, SSPO
set about investigating whether they could meet Strat-X's range/payload
goals with a smaller missile than previously envisaged. By abandoning
the commit ment to minimize research and development it looked
possible to develop a new missile which could provide longer range.
16. Schumacher, 10.
17. In Schumacher, 10.
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Moreover, it might be possible to develop this so that it would not only fit
the Super-640 tubes, but also those of the existing submarines, currently
carrrying Poseidon. Known as EXPO (extended range Poseidon), this new
proposal offered the prospect of deferring submarine construction
altogether. Retrofitting EXPO to existing submarines would increase their
searoom and thus survivability against any short-term developments in
Soviet anti-submarine warfare capabilities. EXPO gained the support of
Admiral Smith because it obviated the need for the Navy to rush into
development of new submarines based on rushed studies and a possibly
premature assessment of Soviet developments. Rather than the Navy
pushing the development of the ULMS submarine so vigorously, Smith
felt that the impetus for such a major programme should come from
above. If more submarines were needed in the meantime then why not
simply build a few more of the 640-class and equip them with either
Poseidon or EXPO missiles.18
But not surprisingly EXPO found little favour with Rickover or
Zumwalt. Zumwalt's concern over what he called 'the tremendous
growth of the Soviet threat' was the reason why he was prepared to give in
to Rickover over the Super-640. Zumwalt wanted to start construction of a
new submarine as soon as possible. To him the EXPO option was 'just
peeing around', as he put it at a meeting of the ULMS Steering Group on
January 27, 1971.19 Viewing EXPO as 'a way of defeating construction of a
new submarine' he made it quite clear at that meeting that the Super-640
decision was final - OSD was not even to be informed of the EXPO
option.20
In March 1971, apparently in response to a Rickover proposal,
Zumwalt set up a new office to manage the ULMS programme and
appointed Rear Admiral Harvey E. Lyon - considered by many to be a
Rickover protege - as ULMS project manager, or PM-2. Zumwalt felt this
necessary to coordinate ULMS development because 'it was evident that
Levering Smith and Rickover could not talk to each other in a reasonable






subordinated to the role of missile developer. From the highpoint of
SPO's autonomy during the development of Polaris, the office, now SSPO,
had lost much of its control over the development of ULMS.
Following the establishment of PM-2, the Electric Boat Division of
General Dynamics Corporation was awarded an initial contract for
submarine design and the ULMS Ship Acquisition Project was set up to
oversee it. ULMS characteristics were worked out for submission to OSD
with initial operational capability (IOC) to be in 1979 or 1980. Particularly
significant was growth in the size of the missile - by about six inches in
diameter and four to five feet in length - without any change in mission
requirements.22 Unlike the earlier design, which was not that much larger
than EXPO, the new dimensions meant a larger submarine would
certainly be required. Similarly, the reactor size was increased from 30,000
to 35,000 shp, perhaps to help avert any suggestions that an existing 30,000
design (forced, not natural circulation) already deployed in attack
submarines be used to save research and development costs.23
But still Deputy Defense Secretary Packard remained sceptical. On
learning of the EXPO proposal - apparently via a civilian staffer in SSPO
who felt no particular loyalty to or fear of Zumwalt's injunction to
suppress it24 - he began to favour an approach very similar to Admiral
Smith's. He would commit to ULMS development, but on a delayed time-
scale with IOC no sooner than 1984, and in the meantime suggested that
EXPO development - with an IOC of 1978 - would provide interim cover to
ensure FBM submarine survivability.25
of
Packard's proposal formed the basis of one/the options presented in
a twenty-page Development Concept Paper (DCP No. 67) that was prepared
by OSD and the Navy and released on September 7, 1971. It presented five
options 'for maintaining the deterrent effectiveness of our sea based
forces':26
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1. Do nothing (cancel ULMS and extended range Poseidon).
2. Extended range Poseidon, IOC about CY [calendar year]
1977.
3. ULMS, with IOC about CY a) 1979, b) 1980, c) 1981, and
d)1982.
4. ULMS, IOC about 1981, but with a parallel development
of an extended range Poseidon missile to permit the option
of deploying extended range Poseidon in about CY 1977.
5. Extended range Poseidon missile, with IOC about CY
1977, followed by ULMS with a delayed IOC (about CY
1983).
To all concerned options 4 and 5 were considered the only real
alternatives.27 Option 4 would give the Navy (not including SSPO, of
course) what they wanted - a firm commitment to ULMS with only token
reference to EXPO development, but not necessarily deployment. Option 5
embodied the preferences of Packard and Admiral Smith. Attached to the
DCP were recommendations from other interested parties, which ranged
from that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (who favoured the Option 3, ULMS
only approach which gave 'the Navy' what it wanted at the least cost to
the Defense budget) to that of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Systems Analysis (who favoured immediate engineering development of
EXPO, but wished to keep the whole question of ULMS design, and indeed
of whether to choose ULMS at all, under review for several more years).28
A week later on September 14, OSD released a 'Secretary of Defense
Decision' on ULMS, said to have been drafted by Packard.29 This was
presented as approving a modified option 4 from the DCP, but in substance
was nearer to Packard's original choice, option 5. The term EXPO was
diplomatically dropped, but emphasis was given to the development of a
missile with 'a range as near to 4,000 miles as possible while being
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missile, referred to as ULMS I, was to have an IOC of 1977, whereas ULMS
II would be a longer-range 'optimized missile design for deployment in a
new submarine'.31 No exact IOC was set for either ULMS II or the new
submarine, whose characteristics still remained to be defined:
The parameters of the new boat which are affected by the
missile characteristics should not be established until work
on the missile program has established range, performance
and size parameters for the new missile. Development of
subsystem improvements, propulsion, quieting, etc., can and
should proceed in parallel with the new missile
development. The objective of the ULMS program should be
to bring in a new force of reasonable cost in the early
1980s.32
Whereas quietness was to be given 'first priority' in the submarine design,
no mention was made of speed or power requirements.33 Although EXPO
was repackaged as ULMS I, the decision looked to be a blow to Rickover
and Zumwalt and a satisfactory outcome for Admiral Smith and SSPO.
But this decision did not last long as international (and domestic)
politics now came to play a role. In October 1971 Packard and Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird were persuaded by President Nixon that US FBM
force development should be accelerated to allow him some leverage in
the SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union.34 As well as providing a
'bargaining chip' to use against the Soviet Union in SALT (and possibly
later negotations), an initiative in FBM submarine construction was also
considered useful to mollify possible 'hawkish' right-wing and service
opposition to SALT ratification.35
The quickest way to begin increasing US FBM forces was, of course,
either to build more 640-class submarines or to convert attack submarines
31. SASC FY 1973, 2636.
32. Quoted in Schumacher, 15.
33. Schumacher.
34. This was officially confirmed on December 2,1971 when National Security Advisor
Henry Kissinger 'requested Laird to give favourable consideration to "an expanded strategic
submarine program" in a way that was highly visible to the Soviets'. H. Kissinger, The
White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979), 1129. Apparently Paul Nitze had
relayed Soviet concern over US FBM developments from the SALT negotiations during late
1970 and early 1971. See Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. On Watch (New York: Quadrangle, 1976),
154.
35. Steinbruner and Carter, 140.
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already under construction, but these options were known to be
unacceptible to key Navy factions, and especially to Admiral Rickover.
Attempting to impose them on a recalcitrant Navy would be unlikely to
mollify anybody. Instead Packard agreed to reshape his ULMS package.
He first consulted with Rickover, who on October 31 replied
affirmatively to Packard's inquiry about the feasibility of accelerating the
ULMS submarine construction schedule. According to Rickover, the lead
ship could be ready by late 1977, and beginning in 1978 construction could
proceed at the rate of three a year.36 Packard then instigated a Navy study
to compare the options for accelerating FBM submarine construction, and
to provide justification for the one he had already chosen, ULMS
acceleration.37 As recalled by an SSPO source: 'The study was a sham.
Packard had already made up his mind. We were simply going through
the motions. We all knew what the answer was.'38
But OSD was not simply imposing the President's wishes on the
Navy. The FBM acceleration issue also provided an opportunity to strike a
blow against the interference of Kissinger's National Security Council
(NSC) in military matters. Kissinger had set up the Defense Program
Review Committee (DPRC) in the National Security Council in an attempt
to gain some control over the Department of Defense.39 Naturally
Secretary of Defense Laird sought to minimize the role of the DPRC, and
in this case National Security Council staff were unable to obtain details of
the studies that were circulating in the Pentagon.
Thus the favoured approach at the White House - which was
apparently to build more Polaris/Poseidon type submarines - was simply
ignored by OSD. On December 26, without consultation with the
President, Laird ordered ULMS acceleration.40 This was leaked to the press
on January 12, 1972 presenting the President with a fait accompli, which
36. Rhodes, 80.
37. A November 1,1971 memorandum from the Deputy Sec retary of Defense to the
Secretary of the Navy directed the Navy to: 'Initiate a study immediately of the
alternative ways of providing early increases in the deployment level of our sea-based





could not realistically be challenged. To do so would not only involve
public ly contradicting the Secretary of Defense, but also taking on the
powerful factions of the Navy, including Zumwalt and Rickover. The
Navy backed up their claim that ULMS submarines could be ready
virtually as soon as extra Polaris/Poseidon submarines by drastically
shortening the ULMS development time, almost literally overnight. A
staff member of the Trident Ship Acquisition Program Office recalled what
happened over a weekend in early January 1972:
The delivery date on that Monday was December 1977; on
the preceeding Friday it had been December 1981. In that
one fell swoop, they [the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Navy Secretariat] had taken . . . the
program parameters and what have you, and for political
reasons, which were obviously SALT, had [changed]
them.41
Aware that Packard was determined to back an accelerated ULMS
programme, the ULMS Project Office was able to set the design to suit its
priorities. This was announced by Admiral Lyon on November 9, 1971,
and included a missile tube sufficiently larger than the Super-640 version
to make it completely unable to fit an existing or modified
Polaris/Poseidon submarine. The ULMS submarine was to have a 42-foot
hull diameter, would displace 18,700 tons (compared to the Super-640's
14,000), and have a reactor of 35,000 shp (compared to 30,000 in the Super-
640).42 On May 15, 1972 ULMS was renamed Trident.
The number of missiles to be carried by each submarine was twenty-
four or half as many again as in the original FBM submarines. Navy
parametric studies supported the obvious conclusion that the more
missiles per submarine, the cheaper the deployment cost per missile. But,
according to Admiral George Miller (head of Navy strategic planning since
the 'Great Circle Group' was set up and an advisor to Strat-X), the decision
to go for twenty-four was 'arbitrarily made, just to make the expensive sub
look more cost-effective'.43 However, although more missiles per
41. Quoted in M. Schumacher, 'Trident Contracting (A): Drafting the Request for Proposals'
(Kennedy School of Government Case Program, Draft, 1988), 12.
42. Schumacher, 'Trident Contracting (A)', 18.
43. Quoted in M. Mintz, 'Depth Charge: Cost Overruns on New Trident Sub Leave a Muddied
Wake', Washington Post (October 4,1981), reprinted in Dina Rasor (ed.), More Bucks. Less
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submarine was more cost-effective, it also, to some, raised the worry that
the Navy was putting all its eggs in too few baskets, should Soviet anti¬
submarine warfare improve. For example, Admiral Smith of SSPO
'would have favoured a smaller submarine than the Trident - wouldn't
have put as many missiles in it'.44
It was this fiercely contested result of bureaucratic intrigue that was
presented to Congress for funding. There too the FBM programme no
longer commanded unquestioning support. Poseidon had already raised
some doubts, and although the general principle of eventually building
new FBM submarines was not in question, many opposed the
Administration's acceleration plans as being too hasty. Ironically, the
Administration now found it necessary to put pressure on some of the
'hawks' whose expected reaction to SALT it had originally intended to
placate by ULMS acceleration. In both 1972 and 1973 tied Senate votes on
amendments to cut Trident funding were only overturned after intensive
lobbying of key conservatives - John Stennis in 1972 and Barry Goldwater
in 1973 - by the Administration and the Navy.45
Despite the tenuous consensus in support of Trident, funding was
approved. However, some of the recommendations of the Research and
Development Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee
were taken up by the new Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger:
The Secretary of Defense has restructured the program,
consistent with the actions of Congress, but has gone even
further. He has adopted the recommendations made by the
Research and Development Subcommittee last year [1973] to
slow the pace of submarine construction from three to two
per year, and has approved the backfit of Poseidon
submarines with the C-4 missile, beginning in fiscal year
1979, now planned for ten submarines. Previously, this was
approved only as an option for initiation in the early
1980s.46
Bang: how the Pentagon Buys Ineffective Weapons (Washington, DC: Fund for
Constitutional Government, 1983), 211-23, at 214.
44. Interview.
45. See J. W. Canan, The Superwarriors: The Fantastic World of Pentagon Superweapons
(New York: Weybright and Talley, 1975), 184-86; Zumwalt, 158-63.
46. Quoted in Canan, 187.
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This decision to make a firm commitment to backfit the Trident I missile
into existing FBM submarines was very much inspired by the wishes of
Admiral Smith of SSPO, who did not want the deployment of that missile
to be limited by any delays in the Trident submarine construction which
lay beyond his control.47 It turned out to be a very prescient decision.
Building the Trident Submarine
Through the late 1970s the Trident submarine programme was
dogged by delay, cost overruns and litigation. While it was originally
hoped that the first Trident submarine, the USS Ohio, would be delivered
in December 1977, it in fact began sea trials only in June 1981.48 Compared
to the success story of the original Polaris, the Trident submarine
construction was a public relations disaster.
Many of the problems stemmed from the decision to accelerate
Trident construction, that Rickover had assured Packard about in late 1971
and that had led the delivery date to be advanced four years over one
weekend. Although widely disliked within the Navy, Admiral Rickover
was also respected for his technical competence. He not only assured
Congressional doubters that the first Trident submarine could be delivered
within the new schedule - in time for the expiry of the SALT Interim
Agreement in 1977 - but also committed the Navy to unusual costing
arrangements.
First-of-a-kind lead ships, like the first Trident submarine, the USS
Ohio, would normally be built under some kind of cost-plus contract.
With so many uncertainties in the design of a lead ship it was generally
considered unreasonable to insist that a fixed price be met. Typically a cost-
plus contract would provide for all relevant costs to be reimbursed with
the addition of either a fixed fee or an incentive fee dependent on how
nearly a target cost was met.49 Admiral Rickover, however, was a firm
believer in fixed-price contracts which committed the Government to pay
the fixed price agreed on (usually providing greater profit margin to the
47. Interview.
48. Polmar and Allen, 579 and 576.
49. See Schumacher, 'Trident Contracting (A)'; Mintz, 215-17.
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contractor than cost-plus arrangements), but in which the contractor bore
at least some of the financial risk involved.50 He argued that the
Trident submarines would be similar in nature to those built for
Polaris, and so construction would be a fairly straightforward task,
involving little risk.
The Trident acceleration was thus 'sold' to Congress in 1972 on the
understanding that delivery by 1977 was a simple matter, which could be
achieved as cheaply as possible by a competitively-tendered fixed-price
contract. But this view was not held by the only shipyards capable of
building the submarine - General Dynamic's Electric Boat Division at
Groton, Connecticut and Newport News in Virginia. The Navy received
their bids on November 5, 1973 and neither complied with the terms
outlined in the Navy's RFP (request for proposals). Newport News offered
delivery in May 1981 under a cost plus fixed fee contract. Electric Boat were
prepared to attempt delivery for April 1979 and wanted a cost plus
incentive fee contract.51 Neither, of course, were acceptable to the Navy
and Rickover, who had been promising delivery by December 1977 under a
fixed-price contract.
In fact both shipyards already had problems building the Navy's
latest nuclear-powered attack submarines, the 688-class. Newport News
was having great difficulty with the first five 688 boats, and when a second
flight of eleven submarines was tendered in 1973 their bid was considered
too high by the Navy.52 Newport News had other work, including
merchant shipbuilding, and so did not need the financial risk of bidding
low. Electric Boat, however, had only one product, submarines, and only
one customer, the Navy. They too had problems with the 688. The
ambitious new chairman of General Dynamics, David Lewis -after
considerable pressure from Rickover - had already 'undercut' Newport
News on the bid to build the second eleven 688s.53 This was in October
50. Typically fixed-price contracts might have a ceiling price (say, about 30% more than
the agreed cost) up to which the Goevernment and the contractor would share the extra
costs.
51. M. Schumacher, 'Trident Contracting (B): Evaluating the Bids', (Kennedy School of
Government Case Program, Draft, 1988), 7.
52 Ibid, 5-6.
53. Patrick Tyler, Running Critical: The Silent War. Rickover .and General Dynamics (New
York: Harper & Row, 1986), 131-33.
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1973, just before the Trident bids were due, and the shipyard was already
committed to build many submarines at a price and schedule that it would
not be able to meet. Then in December, following their unacceptable cost-
plus Trident bid of November, Rickover persuaded Lewis to resubmit
their bid as a fixed-price contract. The risk of construction uncertainties
causing a large overrun would, Rickover reassured Lewis, be catered for by
simply making the fixed-price sufficiently high.54
After prolonged negotiations between the Navy and Electric Boat it
was agreed to settle on a fixed price contract with a target price for the first
submarine of $285,400,000 but with ceiling price (up to which the Navy
would still pay at least 85% of the overrun) of over half as much again,
$384,000,000.55 Electric Boat also promised to make its 'best efforts' to
deliver by December 1977 and guaranteed delivery by April 1979, but in
neither instance was there to be any penalty for being late.56 Certainly, the
contractor, Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics was less than
candid about its ability to meet the demanding specifications of the new
submarines on schedule.57 The contract, which offered the prospect of
more work than Electric Boat could (literally) cope with, was signed on
July 25,1974.
To save its, and Rickover's, face the Navy had played on the
ambitions of Electric Boat's management to push them into a cosmetic
contract which seemed to meet the fixed-price, competitively-tendered,
December 1977 delivery-date promised to Congress. In reality it met none
of these, and despite repeated attempts to suppress Electric Boat's
difficulties, the non-delivery of the Ohio on the promised schedule
inevitably brought the Trident programme into disrepute. In the late
1970s Electric Boat found itself committed to building too many
submarines, too quickly. Expectations of increased productivity, which
had encouraged lower bids, simply could not be realised. The Ohio was
eventually delivered in October 1981 after the construction schedule had
been officially extended six times.
54. Tyler, 134-35.
55. M. Schumacher, 'Trident Contracting (C): Negotiating the Contract', (Kennedy School of





Admiral Smith's worst fears had come true and had justified his
concern over making the Trident I missile small enough to be back-fitted
into the majority of the existing FBM submarines. Although largely
excluded from the Trident submarine programme, SSPO retained
jurisdiction over maintaining the existing FBM fleet and over missile
development. In line with SSPO's preferences Trident I was to be a
realization of the EXPO concept, providing extra range within the size
constraint presented by the exisiting FBM submarines.
In March 1971 the Navy still apparently viewed the FBM as an
essentially urban-industrial weapon, referring to 'the assured destruction
role that we are building ULMS for at this time.'58 Assured destruction
was the criterion which Strat-X had been based and it was the role which
was considered paramount at SSPO. Others, however, including some in
key positions favoured increasing the counterforce capability of the sea-
based portion of US ballistic missiles.
One of these was John Brett, Under-Secretary for Strategic Systems,
who was responsible for transforming Packard's vague direction into a
more detailed specification for the C4. Brett could not, of course, impose a
specification unilaterally. But he was well-placed to intervene - for he was
a former Kearfott engineer, a protagonist of Kearfott's stellar-inertial
system, who felt that the US badly needed a significant counterforce
capability. He also appreciated - following the cancellation of the stellar-
inertial accuracy enhancement of Poseidon - that Congressional opinion
needed to be taken seriously.
The strength of the anti-counterforce lobby in Congress meant that
it would be unwise to push the C4 as a hard-target killer. The
specifications of C4 could, however, be set in such a way that enhanced
navigation and guidance capability was still required, but on 'assured
destruction' grounds rather than 'counterforce' grounds. A longer range
missile - which provided more sea-room for the submarine to patrol in
58 SASC FY 1972, Part 3, R&D (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1971), 2233.
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and so would alleviate concerns about Soviet anti-submarine warfare
developments - required improved navigation and guidance capability
simply to prevent deterioration in accuracy. Similarly the ASW 'threat'
could be taken as necessitating the capability to operate for much longer
periods of time, up to several weeks, without resort to navigational resets -
again necessitating enhanced navigation and guidance. The navigation
and guidance specifications for the C4 were thus set as follows: system
accuracy of C4 at 4000 nautical miles should be as good as Poseidon at 2000
nautical miles, and submarine navigation should be able to operate for
periods of thirty days without external reset.59 In Brett's opinion, this left
no option but that Trident I would require stellar-inertial guidance.60 It
also meant that under the best possible circumstances, at shorter ranges
and soon after a navigation reset, C4 accuracy would be considerably better
than Poseidon. Up to this point SSPO, whose main concern was longer
range, was considering simply modifying Poseidon's Mk3 guidance
system, even at some loss of accuracy.61
Warhead size, however, raised the hard-target issue in a way that
was harder to 'fudge'. As with Poseidon, the supporters of hard-target
capability in the Offices of the Secretary of Defense and Chief of Naval
Operations wanted a larger-yield warhead than Poseidon Mk3's 'small' 40
kilotons. They were, reportedly, joined by Navy officers from the Joint
Strategic Target Planning Staff, who were tired of Air Force jibes about the
Navy's 'firecrackers'.62 As before, SSPO was unconvinced, seeing little
reason not to use basically the same reentry vehicle and warhead as on
Poseidon.63 This time round SSPO had a powerful 'technical' argument to
mobilize against a very large warhead: the missile design required to get
the longer range from the same size. A third-stage rocket motor was added
for the first time, and instead of it being below the post-boost vehicle





63. In March 1972 testimony to the Ad Hoc Research and Development Subcommittee of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Levering Smith noted that: 'The reentry body
for the ULMSI missile is based on extension of the Poseidon Mk 3 design. The Mk 3 was
limited to a maximum range of [deleted] miles and therefore increased heat protection and
structural strengthening will be required for the reentry body to survive the reentry
environment at ULMS I ranges.' SASC FY1973, Part 5 (USGPO, 1972), 3157.
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third-stage motor went effectively to the top of the missile, with reentry
vehicles and guidance system, etc., arranged round it. Reentry vehicle size
was limited by the size of this annular ring, and this in turn limited the
maximum yield warhead possible with the current state of technology.
SSPO's view was that there was little to be gained from moving to a
slightly larger warhead, especially given the expense. There was also some
argument over whether the Poseidon Mk3 reentry vehicle was suitable for
the longer ranges. Its heatsink design meant that on some trajectories at
the longer range the heating would be excessive, but it was still felt that
adequate trajectories would be available. In the end SSPO went for a
new reentry vehicle and somewhat larger warhead, reportedly because
'they recognized the political benefit of agreeing with OSD'.64 Compared
to the Poseidon's typical loading of ten 40 kiloton warheads, Trident I has a
maximum loading of eight 100 kiloton warheads.65
With the decision to build a new warhead/re-entry vehicle
combination, OSD's hard target advocates now were able to get not only
the (marginally) higher yield, but also a re-entry vehicle with a higher
ballistic co-efficient and hence less accuracy loss due to dispersion.66 To
survive at the ranges desired and also have a high ballistic coefficient
necessitated the choice of an ablative design for the Mk4 re-entry vehicle.
Various alternative designs were tested during 1974 and 1975 using
surplus Atlas and Minuteman missiles. The final choice has 'a tape-
wrapped carbon phenolic (TWCP) heatshield bonded to a thin-wall
aluminium substrate for the shell and a graphite nosetip'.67 With nuclear
hardness less important than in Poseidon it was possible to use a plug type
nose tip which is inherently stronger than the shell type used in the
Mk3.68
64. Interview.
65. T. B. Cochran, W. M. Arkin and M. M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 1: US
Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1983), 142.
66. The ballistic coefficient - the weight-to-drag ratio - of the Trident Mk4 is said to be 1800
lbs/sq. ft., almost as high as the Minuteman III Mkl2A. M. Bunn, Technology of Ballistic
Missile Reentry Vehicles (Cambridge: MIT Program in Science and Technology for
International Security Report No. 11, March 1984), 6-7.
67. L. Smith, R. H. Wertheim, R. A. Duffy, 'Innovative Engineering in the Trident Missile
Development', The Bridge (National Academy of Engineering. Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer
1980), 10-19, at 19.
68. Interview.
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Whereas Poseidon's modest range goal had required only a
relatively conservative approach to propulsion, the perceived need to
provide more sea-room to counter developments in Soviet ASW pushed
the Trident I missile design. Almost twice the range was desired from a
missile of about the same size and weight. The four general ways possible
to do this were followed: decreasing inert weight in the missile; increasing
the volume available for propulsive energy; increasing the usable energy
per unit volume; and increasing the delivered impulse per unit usable
energy.69
This approach led to the development of lighter components
throughout the missile, including the guidance system, electronics, the
post-boost vehicle or 'bus' and the chamber cases. Weight reductions in
the 'bus' stage provide the greatest range increment and led to the choice
of graphite-epoxy composite material, which in 1973 became available in a
suitable form.70 The bus is designed to carry the reentry vehicles and
deploy them onto the trajectories required to bring them to the designated
targets. It contains the equipment section, comprising the guidance and
flight control systems, and the post-boost propulsion system which is
required to vary the attitude and velocity of the 'bus' as it dispenses the
reentry vehicles. In designing the 'bus' some accuracy was traded off
against reduced weight:
In designing for range, the "bus' structure was designed to be
of minimum weight for structural integrity with adequate
margin. The optimized graphite cone structure, as an
outcome, had vibrational modes which added a
statistically bounded, but not exactly predictable on a body-
by-body basis, increment to deployment velocity. This
increment of course translates to an addition to the
CEP...While neither large nor affecting performance
relative to the goal, this deployment inaccuracy was
nevertheless identifiable and could have been traded for
less range.71
Because of the critical effects of weight savings in the 'bus' the type
of propellant it used was the object of some debate. Lockheed suggested
that the savings in weight (though not volume) provided by moving to
69. Smith et al, 12.
70. Ibid, 14.
71. Letter from Captain Steven Cohen to Donald Mackenzie, 2 December 1986.
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liquid propellant, as used in Air Force designs, outwejwed any safety
concerns. SSPO disagreed, placing the highest priority on system safety,
even at some loss of range. Instead a solid propellant system was retained,
though one which allowed a means of 'throttling'. This was 'a solid
propellant gas generator which burns slower at lower pressure when less
thrust is needed as when changing attitude, when no change of velocity
vector is needed, or when making vernier changes, but burns rapidly at a
higher pressure when high thrust is needed to change the vehicle velocity
vector.'72
The bus structure takes the form of a squat cone through which a
third rocket stage profjudes. The addition of this third stage, small though
it is, provides a greater addition to range than simply increasing the
propellant carried in the second stage by the same amount. However,
situating the third stage through the post-boost vehicle made thrust
termination and separation more problematical. Venting the third stage
to provide thrust termination would have been difficult without inflicting
high shock levels on the equipment section, flying it out the front would
expose the vehicle to high heat and force levels, and backing it out looked
to be difficult to test when the third stage could have differing amounts of
fuel left. The solution devised was elegant. With what was called a
General Energy Management System (GEMS), the guidance computer
would shape the missile trajectory to use up all the propellant in the third
stage. This obviated the need for a thrust termination system, eliminating
that potential source of reliability and accuracy reductions, and left a
constant weight third stage motor case. Testability was then designed in:
'By sizing the thrust ejecting the empty third stage from the post vehicle to
accelerate at one g, this new feature could be easily ground tested rather
than depending primarily on flight testing'.73
Another consequence of the third stage positioning, along with the
desire to utilize the launch tube volume to the full, was an unusually
blunt nosed missile. The extra aerodynamic drag experienced during the
boost phase would have reduced the range achieved and this concern led
to the development of an aerospike to reduce drag. Self-contained, to
72. Smith et al, 15.
73. Ibid, 17.
152
avoid interface problems, the aerospike extension is powered by a small
solid propellant gas generator triggered by the acceleration sensed as the
missile is ejected from the submarine.74 The optimum length for the
aerospike was derived from experimental data; indeed, in 1984 there was
'still no theoretical means of predicting spike effects'.75 Constructed of
laminated Sitka spruce the aerospike is said to add 300 nautical miles to
the missile's range.76
Meeting the range goal also required major technical advances in
the first and second stage motors, to increase propulsive impulse whilst
reducing inert weight. Again the joint venture of Hercules and Thiokol
won the competitive tender against rival bids from Aerojet, for the first
two stages, and United Technology Centers, for the third.77 The propellant
cho sen for all three stages was a development of the composite double
base type which permitted a higher level of solids (the fuel and oxidizer),
thus giving both greater density and specific impulse.78 SSPO were
pushing to obtain the greatest range possible, and had an internal range
goal which exceeded the official 4000 nautical miles.79 In doing so they
pushed the motor designs too far.
Particularly alarming was an unexpected and unprecedented second
stage motor detonation during a static test firing in May 1974. For over a
year this became the focus of the development programme, as 'extensive
analysis, laboratory experimentation, and large-scale motor tests were
conducted to gain an understanding of the mechanism involved'.80 The
apparent cause was failure of the motor casing at the high pressures
involved, leading to shear of the propellant away from the chamber wall
and break up of the propellant. This rapid formation of a large propellant
surface area in a confined space then initiated the detonation.81
74 Ibid.
75. J. P. Reding and D. M. Jecmen, 'An Advanced Aerospike to Minimize Nose Drag',
Lockheed Horizons. 15 (1984), 46-54, at 47.
76. Trident Subsystem Tests in Final Phase', Aviation Week & Space Technology Vol, i»3
(November 3, 1975), 34-38, at 37. * "
77. 'Updated Propulsion System Seen Extending Trident Range', Aviation Week & Space
Technology "^Tune 18,1973), 19.
78. Smith et al, 18.
79. Interview
80. Smith et al, 18.
81. Ibid.
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Even with a less than complete understanding of the mechanism,
SSPO set in train corrective measures aimed at generally improving the
uniformity and quality of components, and changing the propellant
formulation to make it less energetic and less friable. In so doing they
gave up some range to ensure the safety of the system. As Admiral
Levering Smith testified to Congress in 1976: 'the solution to the
detonation mechanism that we have identified resulted in our adopting a
somewhat less energetic propellant with some loss of range'.82
But solution of the detonation problem did not end the propulsion
difficulties that were to contibute to the poor public image that the Trident
programme also acquired from the submarine construction delays.
Following deployment of the missile in 1979 there were a number of first
stage motor failures during test flights which led Undersecretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering, Richard DeLauer, to describe their
performance as 'lousy'.83 A defect was identified as causing the failures
and in 1984 a programme to recall 'suspect' motors was begun, and
changes were made in propellant processing and in first stage insulator
thickness. These changes were considered to provide a greater
performance margin against such defects.84
Despite these propulsion difficulties Trident I achieved its range
goal. However, they did make inert weight reductions throughout the
system more critical, as 'the performance loss associated with the use of
less energetic propellants than originally intended increased the need for
greater performance contributions by all other areas.'85 A newly
developed material, Kevlar, was chosen for the chamber cases of the three
rocket motors because of its high strength-to-weight and modulus-to-
weight ratios. Weight reductions were stressed throughout the missile,
including in the guidance system.
82 SASC, FY1977, Part 12, R&D, (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1976), 6617.
83. Quoted in Trident failures "not hitting readiness'", Tane's Defence Weekly (September
1, 1984), 308.
84. See '73 Trident I's Withheld from Fleet due to Defects', Defense Daily. Vol. 135, No. 32
(August 16,1984), 249-50.
85. Smith et al, 18.
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Weight-saving also shaped the design of the missile electronics, as
did compactness, low-power operation, radiation-hardness and reliability.
For example, the relative compactness of electronic components went
from a density of 16 equivalent parts/cubic inch in Poseidon to 480
parts/cubic inch in Trident I (Polaris A3 had 4 parts/cubic inch).86 The
combination of characteristics desired by Lockheed proved to be harder to
manufacture than expected, and some of the intended components were
unavailable for the early test missiles.87 These difficulties with electronics
and propulsion led to delays which caused the Trident I IOC (initial
operating capability) date to be adjusted twice, first by six months, and then
by five.
The Mk5 Guidance System for Trident I C4
As intended by John Brett, the Mk5 guidance system developed for
Trident incorporated a star sensor mounted on the stable platform of the
inertial measurement unit, together with the gyroscopes and
accelerometers. This stable member was held in a four gimbal system
rather than with three as in Poseidon and Polaris. This allowed one
gimbal to be used for optical alignment with the SINS whilst another
could be devoted to elevation of the star sensor through the vertical plane
of the predicted star, something which could not be so simply mechanized
with three gimbals. In general this removed the problem of gimbal lock88
which had to be carefully avoided with a three gimbal system. This gives
the C4 much greater ease of reorientation during MIRVing, when reentry
vehicles are dropped off onto different trajectories.
The proponents of stellar-inertial guidance at Kearfott and
elsewhere certainly saw its adoption as enhancing system accuracy. But it is
important to note that the design of the Mk5 guidance system for Trident
C4 did not unequivocally prioritize accuracy. Thus, the accelerometer
chosen for the Mk5 guidance was essentially the PIPA used in Poseidon's
86. 'Trident Missile Capabilities Advance', Aviation Week & Space Technology. (June 16,
1980), 99.
87. See 'Specified Range Forecast for Trident', Aviation Week & Space Technology. Vol. 102
(May 5,1975), 55.
88. In a three-gimbal system an axis of sensitivity can be 'lost' when two of the gimbals
become parallel, leading to a potentially disastrous failure of platform stabilization.
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Mk3 system with a few modifications, 'largely things that made it more
producible'.89 It was considered by SPO to be good enough to meet the
accuracy goal and light enough to meet the range goal, and so the extra cost
of developing a new accelerometer was judged to be not worthwhile:
... we chose to stay with the accelerometer because we
didn't have to go out and re-invent the thing ... Staying
with the accelerometer certainly simplified the job...
Inertial components ... are always difficult to do whenever
you start to design some new ones. Not just the design and
development, but also getting the production system up to
speed. Start-up costs, start-up problems - they're always
tremendous.9®
Producibility concerns also played a role in the selection of the
gyroscope for the Mk5 guidance system, where Kearfott, whose overall
Unistar stellar-inertial concept had been adopted, also turned out to be
successful. For the first time in the Fleet Ballistic Missile programme,
Draper floated gyroscopes were abandoned, with SPO instead favouring
Kearfott 'dry' timed-rotor gyros. In this, the spinning rotor was supported
on a shaft direct from the motor, in a sort of 'mushroom' or 'umbrella'
set-up. This support is not rigid, and is so designed that at the rotation
speed of the gyro wheel, the 'spring' effect of the support is exactly
counterbalanced by a 'negative spring rate' of the rotor. This 'canceling
out', tuning, effect means an effective decoupling of the gyro wheel from
its support.91
Kearfott and also Litton, the other main supplier of inertial
navigation for the military aircraft market in the United States, both
developed major dry tuned-rotor gyro programmes in the 1960s. The
technology was less labour-intensive than floated gyro technology for a
given level of performance, and thus less expensive, at least at American
wage levels. And because it was analogous to a 'free' gyro rotor, the dry-
tuned device could detect rotations about two axes - it was a 'two degree-of-
freedom' gyro. So only two dry tuned-rotor gyros were needed in an
89. Interview.
90. Ibid.
91. A crucial paper is Edwin W. Howe and Paul H. Savet, 'The Dynamically Tuned Free
Rotor Gyro', Control Engineering, (June 1964) ,67-72.
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inertial system, not three as with the one degree-of-freedom floated
instrument.
Nevertheless, despite their apparent advantages, dry gyros might
well not have been introduced to the FBM programme had it not been for
Kearfott's 'plain flatout aggressive salesmanship'.92 Together SPO
guidance branch SP-23 and the Draper Laboratory considered the trade-offs.
As guidance Design Agent for SPO, Draper Laboratory's conclusion was
that either gyro approach would meet the system goals, and a Draper
design would probably be more expensive though less risky.93
Also in Kearfott's favour was that two of their gyros would be
smaller and lighter than three Draper instruments, an important
consideration in C4, where weight savings were vital to stretch out the
range to almost double that of the same-sized Poseidon. This made room
for the stellar sensor, which because of its ability to compensate for errors
elsewhere in the system, helped undercut the argument that Draper gyros
were more accurate than the dry tuned-rotor design. In the end 'the
Kearfott gyro was selected on the basis of producibility and cost and ...
demonstrable accuracy adequate for the job'.94
The Mk5 guidance computer was an evolutionary development from that
of Mk3, with the addition of a stellar subsystem. The stellar update
computation and corrections had to be made very rapidly at the start of the
post-boost or 'bus' phase, in order to maximize the amount of bus fuel left
for deployment of the reentry vehicles. To do this the computer has
virtually 100% throughput during the stellar update, and so this 'sizes' its
computational power. The Mk5 computer has about 200K of PROM
(programmable read only memory) which stores the guidance equations
and steering laws, and about 48K of plated wire RAM (random access
memory) for parameters read in prior to launch. Components are largely




95. Graydon M. Wheaton, 'Electronics Manufacturing for Inertial Guidance Systems' (9 May,
1986, typescript), 5.
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The Mk5 guidance system never became as controversial in the
formal political system as the cancelled Mk4 stellar-inertial option for
Poseidon. Some funding was apparently cut by Congress from Trident I
stellar inertial guidance funding in 1974 and 1975, but this had little impact
on the programme.96 Whereas Mk4 had been specifically touted as a hard
target kill enhancing technology, the emphasis in Trident I was on longer
time between navigation resets and hence greater submarine security -
features quite compatible with an 'assured destruction' role.
The Mk500 'Evader' Re-entry Vehicle
What did temporarily re-ignite the hard-target controversy was an
alternative reentry vehicle, the Mk500 'Evader'. Unlike all previous FBM
re-entry vehicles this does not simply fly on a ballistic trajectory after being
released by the bus, but can perform preselected manoeuvres once within
the atmosphere. It was developed in response to a request from the Office
of the Secretary of Defense in 1973:
...provide reasonable assurance that a possible later
decision to initiate engineering development for service use
of a maneuvering re-entry vehicle would not require
reengineering of the Trident weapon system. ... include
sufficient flight tests of an advanced development
prototype MARV to demonstrate compatibility with the C4
missile and the Trident weapon system.9''
Some at SSPO considered the Mk500 development an unnecessary waste
of their time, but so long as the funding was readily forthcoming, SSPO's
leadership had few qualms about it. Its official rationale was as a hedge
against possible Soviet ABM developments - particularly the upgrading of
surface-to-air missiles - which were the subject of disputed analyses from
various parts of the intelligence community:
To gain the increased full payload range [with the C4], it
was necessary to give up some of the maximum possible
ABM exchange ratio which would only be of value should
the then proposed ABM treaty be abrogated. As a hedge
96. See D. Shapley, 'Arms Control as a Regulator of Military Technology', Daedalus
(Winter 1980), Vol. 109 (1), 145-157 at 149.
97 DDR&E Memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and
Development, February 8, 1973 quoted in SASC FY1976, Part 10 R&D, (Washington, DC: US
GPO, 1972), 5358.
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against such a contingency, advanced development of a
manoeuvring, evader re-entry vehicle capable of being
carried by the missile was included in the program.98
The Mk500 comprises a bent-nosed re-entry vehicle containing a
simple guidance system. This is a two gimbal design using two Litton dry-
tuned gyroscopes and three Bell accelerometers. Once within the
atmosphere the bent nose causes aerodynamic lift which is controlled by
rolling the vehicle by shifting an internal weight (in fact the electronics
package). This was a relatively rudimentary approach to the task of
developing a manoeuvring re-entry vehicle, best suited for evasion, with
accuracy a secondary consideration. Indeed some loss of accuracy
compared to the baseline Trident Mk4 re-entry vehicle was considered
acceptable, though later studies did suggest ways in which the Mk500 could
be used to improve accuracy. At the time, during the mid-1970s, it was
viewed by some as an attempt to gain hard-target kill capability, and
*• i
provoked some opposition in Congress." But as no attempts were made
to deploy the Mk500, the controversy petered out. f
The Mk500 has been tested eight times, with five utilising
Minuteman I boosters between March 1975 and January 1976.100 All flights
were reported to be successes and the programme now seems to be
completed. It demonstrated the ability to carry an evasive re-entry vehicle
on Trident, though the lead-time to manufacture the technology
for deployment is estimated at three and a half years.101
SINS and the ESG Monitor
The introduction of a star-sensor complicated the relationship
between submarine navigation (the province of the branch of the SPO
known as SP24) and missile guidance (SP23). From a situation of relative
independence, their work became much more closely related. The star-
sensor permitted a degree of posthoc correction of errors in the
information about launch position and heading that the missile guidance
98. Smith et al, 12.
". D. D. Dalgleish and L. Schweikart, Trident (Carbondale, II.: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1984), 91.
10°. SASC FY1977, (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1976), Part 11, 6516; Part 12,6556.
101. SASC FY1981, Part 6, 4099.
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system received from navigation through the fire control system.
'Partitioning' of the task thus became more difficult. It was in any case a
process inevitably affected by 'the realities of budgets and organizations,
politics in the broad sense of the word - I don't mean political politics, [but]
office politics, or budgets or contract capabilities'.102 According to one
account, the introduction of a fully digital link (rather than analogue
'synchros') between navigation and fire control/guidance was delayed
because it was difficult to agree the form of the link. Should the
navigation computer have, to 'broadcast' data several times a second,
whether or not that / was being used, as those responsible for missile
guidance would have liked, or ought the rest of the system, as those
responsible for navigation preferred, have to 'request' data from
navigation, with the answer possibly being delayed?103
The star-sensor's ability to correct for navigation errors reduced the
demands on SINS accuracy, though improvements were still sought here
to achieve longer reset intervals. Despite claims from advocates of the
electrostatically-supported gyroscope that 'preliminary test data indicated a
quantum improvement in performance with a system using ESGs over
one using conventional SINS gyroscopes',104 SSPO proceeded
conservatively. An evolutionary modification of the existing Autonetics
SINS, the Mk2 Mod7, was chosen. However, the ESG did now find a place
in the Trident submarine (and the Poseidon submarines retrofitted with
Trident I missiles), as a 'monitor' overseeing the two SINS. The ESG
Monitor did not directly provide navigational information, but was used
to update the SINS periodically. The same overall accuracy of SINS output
could thus be maintained, while increasing the time intervals between
external resets, and thus decreasing the vulnerability of the submarine to
anti-submarine warfare.
The ESG that went into FBM submarines was, however, not
Honeywell's; the successful device came from Autonetics division of
Rockwell International, the traditional SINS supplier. Two aspects of this
102. Interview.
103. Ibid.
104. B. McKelvie and H. Gait, Jr. 'The Evolution of the Ship's Inertial Navigation System
for the Fleet Ballistic Missile Program', Navigation: Tournal of the Institute of Navigation.
Vol. 25 (Fall 1978), 320.
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are particularly interesting. The first is the difference between the two
designs. Though Honeywell's large, hollow ball was believed by its
proponents to maximize accuracy, the successful Autonetics design
employed a small, solid ball, that was significantly easier to make. So
'producibility' won out over apparent theoretical accuracy. Secondly, it
appears that this was exacerbated by a Honeywell management decision.
At a crucial point, Honeywell shifted ESG production from their
traditional site in Minneapolis to the new facility they were developing in
Florida:
We told the corporation what was going to happen to them
- that they were going to move down there, half of their
people weren't going to go, and this [ESG production] was an
artistic thing ... They could produce them, but it wasn't
something you could put on the production line. You had
people who had techniques, etc... They moved down to
Florida and nothing worked. Half the people didn't move,
wouldn't move, some of them retired, everything we said
happened with spades. Eventually they were in deep
[trouble] ... [Autonetics] persuaded us that since Honeywell
was falling on their face, we ought to give them a chance,
and we decided that we would. And they funded much of
that chance themselves, and the answer is we had a time
when we wanted to see the Honeywell thing on the [USS]
Compass Island [the ship used for testing navigational
equipment], and when that time came Rockwell had the one
there and knew how to run their thing and ... Honeywell
delivered one a few months late and they hadn't the
slightest idea what to do with it...10^
Trident I Deployment
Once the initial development problems - especially in the
propulsion and electronics areas - were overcome, the Trident I flight test
programme, carried out between 1977 and 1979, was considered very
successful.106 So much so that the number of flight tests was reduced from
30 to 25.107 But with the first Trident submarine well behind the
'promised' December 1977 delivery date, the decision to backfit Trident I
into existing FBM submarines seemed to have been proved wise.
105. Interview.
106. Of the eighteen pad launches and seven submarine launches only one (14 February, 1978)
is not recorded as successful in Strategic Systems Program Office, FBM Facts/Chronology -
Polaris. Poseidon. Trident (Washington, DC: Navy Department, 1986),, 47-53.
107. Ibid, 51.
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In retrospect it seems that many, including some at SSPO, would
now question the urgency of Trident I deployment.108 The potential
advances in Soviet anti-submarine warfare do not seem to have been
realized, and the extra sea-room allowed the submarines by Trident I's
range increase over Poseidon has been a hedge that was not needed. At
the time, however, SSPO's leadership clearly believed that Trident I
deployment was an urgent matter. Although the Trident submarine
programme was out of SSPO's control, the backfitting of Trident I
remained its responsibility.
Because of the problems that the main shipyards were experiencing
with Trident and 688 attack submarine construction, SSPO decided to take
the precaution of arranging to backfit some Trident Is by alternate means.
Six existing FBM submarines - following the normal procedure - were
backfitted from Poseidon to Trident I during their scheduled second
overhaul, starting in March 1979 with the USS Simon Bolivar at
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.109 However, the other six of the submarines
to be backfitted were done under 'emergency' conditions, with shifts
working 24 hours to complete the backfitting at temporary pierside
installations.110 Accommodating the Trident I missiles - with their blunter
noses and increased weight - required the development of a new launcher
system, largely based on that used for Poseidon.111
Navigation was also updated with the modifed SINS (now
designated Mk2 Mod7) augmented by an electrostatically suspended
gyroscope monitor (ESGM). This provided a way of achieving the desired
increase in reset intervals whilst maintaining the reliability of the well-
108. Interview.
109. The submarines backfitted at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard during scheduled overhauls
were Simon Bolivar (SSBN 641), Benjamin Franklin (640), George Bancroft (643), Casimir
Pulaski (633), Von Steuben (632) and James Madison (627). See 'FBM Facts/Chronology', 14-
15.
110. These were the Daniel Boone (629), John C. Calhoun (630), Stonewall Jackson (634),
Henry L. Stimson (655), Francis Scott Key (657), and Mariano G. Vallejo (658).
111. C. A. Robinson, Jr. 'New Propellant Evaluated for Trident Second Stage', Aviation
Week & Space Technology (October 13,1975), 17; also SASC FY 1977, 6553.
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tried traditional SINS and avoiding any delays due to problems with the
ESGM112:
The role of the ESGM is to act as a source of position fix
data, internal to the submarine, that can be used to
periodically reset the SINS, thereby imparting its
performance capability to the SINS and in so doing,
achieve the objective extension in the time interval
between resets using external position fix information.113
Fire control was also updated with the General Electric Mk. 88
replaced by a Mk. 88 Mod2 version. This development included a new
computer (known as the Trident digital control computer) to calculate the
presets necessary for the missile's stellar update, but the earth gravity
model used by the missile guidance system remained, as in Poseidon,
based on a spherical simplification, with offsets. The last of the twelve
backfitted submarines, the USS Casmir Pulaski, went on patrol in June
1983.
Trident I and Nuclear Strategy
With its emphasis on longer range and extended submarine
navigation reset interval it would seem that Trident I simply reflected
traditional concerns with maintaining the potency of the 'assured
destruction' threat. But, of course, there was never a consensus that this
was the only role that the US FBM force should be capable of. Just as with
previous systems there were advocates of greater counterforce capability,
even against hard targets. On the other hand, SSPO itself and Congress,
and particularly the Senate Armed Services Committee ad hoc
Subcommittee on Research and Development, were still sceptical of efforts
to increase the hard target kill capability of US strategic forces.
Still, advocates of greater counterforce capability were not without
influence, both within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and within
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. C4's larger warheads were
largely an outcome of their pressure for greater flexibility to hit harder
112. According to testimony from Admiral Lyon in May 1973: There is a medium schedule
risk associated with the ESGM, however, the navigation system is configured so that it can
function without the ESGM.' SASC FY 1974, 3706.
113. McKelvie and Gait, 320.
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targets than Poseidon could. Similarly OSD's accuracy goal, whilst not a
strict requirement, pushed SSPO towards stellar inertial guidance and
accuracy greater than SSPO might otherwise have deemed necessary. As
originally conceived in Strat-X, ULMS emphasized cost-effective delivery
of equivalent megatonnage in the face of a Soviet first strike and Soviet
ABM defenses. But as ULMS evolved into Trident I its counterforce utility
became enhanced.
Just how far this could go was limited, however, by the size
constraint which had been strongly advocated by Admiral Smith. By
insisting that Trident I should be small enough to be back-fitted into the
existing FBM submarines, he effectively ruled out the use of very large
warheads. With the missile volume available the range goal made a third
stage seem unavoidable and this then left an annular space for reentry
vehicles too small for the very large warheads that some would have liked
to see deployed on FBMs. With regard to accuracy improvements,
Admiral Smith was again cautious, claiming that it still was not possible to
promise to meet a requirement for high accuracy. High accuracy could not
simply be bought by building a stellar inertial guidance system. It required
considerable investments in instrumentation and modeling to understand
and validate what was happening, as well as very expensive
improvements in other aspects of the system, such as submarine velocity
knowledge and gravity and sea-bed terrain mapping.
Nevertheless, C4 appears to have turned out much more accurate
than the original goal. A 1984 report claimed that 'during 1983, the Navy's
tests achieved consistent 750-foot CEPs with Trident I, twice as good as the
1500-foot goal'.114 This makes Trident I a significant threat to all but the
hardest Soviet targets. But to many this intermediate capability seemed of
limited value:
There was no point in going to intermediate accuracy
because it wouldn't do any good. That was the C4. The C4
got intermediate accuracy and we built a new warhead and
so what? It didn't provide a capability that bridged a new
set of targets. It was still only useful against soft targets
114. W. M. Arkin, 'Sleight of Hand with Trident II', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(December 1984), Vol. 40, 5-6. Many interviewees also confirmed that C4's accuracy
performance had exceeded that requested.
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and pretty useless against hard targets. And it turns out
that there are soft targets, then there's a small number that
are slightly hard, 50 to 100 psi, and then you start going
thousands of psi - bunkers, command bunkers and silos - and
there's very little in the middle. You just don't waste
money building systems tailored to these intermediate
targets and that's what happened. C4 ended up being
useful against a set of these intermediate targets that don't
exist in any significant numbers. ... if you want to use it
against a hard target, you've got to use several, and when
you use several you have terrible targeting problems.115
But by the time C4 was deployed, the pendulum would have finally swung
all the way towards hard target counterforce. It would have become
offically-stated US policy and an Improved Accuracy Progam, set up in
1974 at Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's instigation, would have
undermined SSPO's arguments against committing themselves to a high
accuracy requirement. The next FBM, Trident II, would be specifically and




The Improved Accuracy Program and Trident II
... if the TRIDENT submarine is now seen asjvehicle to sell
a larger payload missile, rather than as a vehicle to assure
the invulnerability of the sea-based offensive force, we
will have lost a great deal of credibility ...
Admiral Smith.1
The ULMS 'decisions' of the early 1970s, and particularly the final
design of the submarine, made the development of Trident II almost
inevitable at some point. Although other factors - particularly Rickover's
desire to build new large reactors and 'the Navy's' desire to justify new
FBM submarines - drove the larger size of the Trident submarines, they
were justified on the basis of the need to carry the large Trident II, which
itself was characterized as a continuation of the Strat-X missile concept.2
There was little doubt that a Trident II would make full use of the extra
launch tube volume, but what remained to be decided was exactly when,
and what capabilities the missile would possess. In the original ULMS
conceived in Strat-X, long range had been considered an important
attribute and originally Trident II was to have a 6000-mile range, as
opposed to the 4000 miles of Trident I.3 In the late 1960s and early 1970s
extra range provided an uncontroversial way of justifying the new missile.
However, by the time it came to be developed, the emphasis would have
shifted from enhancing range to enhancing accuracy, an attribute which
1. Memo for OP-21, (21 March 1974), quoted in 'Admirals' Admirable Quotes: An Incomplete
Collection', (October 1981, typescript). My thanks to RADM Robert Wertheim for
providing me with this - presumably an in-house SSPO production.
2. Thus Admiral Isaac C Kidd Jr. (former chief of Naval Material Command) would claim
that: 'The missile sized the submarine'. M. Mintz, 'Depth Charge: Cost Overruns on New
Trident Sub Leave a Muddied Wake', Washington Post (October 4,1981), reprinted in Dina
Rasor (ed.), More Bucks. Less Bang: how the Pentagon Buys Ineffective Weapons
(Washington, DC: Fund for Constitutional Government, 1983), 211-23, at 213. However, in
testimony on May 22, 1973 (following the Trident submarine design definition)A dmiral
Kaufman would 'emphasize that this missile [Trident II] has not been defined'. SASC FY
1974, Part 5, R&D, (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1973), 3597.
3. Strategic Systems Program Office, A Programmatic History of Trident II (Washington,
DC: SSPO, November 1982), 1.
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was earlier considered not especially important by many, and even
destabilizing by some.
The Improved Accuracy Program
Through the 1960s SPO had resisted pressure to meet increased
accuracy 'requirements' for the FBM force. Requests from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
met a standard response, which embodied a distinction that epitomized
Admiral Smith's approach. SPO would attempt to meet accuracy 'goals',
but measurement and understanding of FBM inaccuracy was not good
enough to promise to meet 'requirements'.
Following a 1972 request from Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Zumwalt, SSPO Director Levering Smith estimated that he would need
$1V2 billion to assure an improvement in FBM accuracy.4 This led to SSPO
asking Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory to develop a
new error model to allow better understanding of FBM test results. Then
in late 1973 the new Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, 'asked the
Chief of Naval Operations for a presentation on possible improvements of
accuracy of the sea-based strategic system'.5
Schlesinger, like Robert McNamara in the previous decade, was an
activist Secretary. An economist by training, Schlesinger had headed the
strategic studies division of the RAND Corporation, and there had come to
favour 'limited nuclear options' - relatively small-scale, selective nuclear
targeting, designed to exert political leverage. This was also the main
thrust of a review of nuclear strategy which had been conducted during
1972 and 1973, and which Schlesinger then adopted and promoted.
Known as National Security Decision Memorandum 242, and signed by
President Nixon in January 1974, the resultant new policy marked a radical
departure from the previous declared policy of assured destruction. In
fact, the Single Integrated Operational Plan for targeting nuclear forces did
allow some relatively limited options during the 1960s, but NSDM 242
4 SASC FY 1975 (Washington, DC GPO, 1974), 3298.
5 Ibid, 3292.
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went much further in providing preplanned options for small-scale
nuclear strikes against military targets.6
Although Schlesinger argued that the flexibility of NSDM 242 could
be achieved with the existing arsenal, he considered greater accuracy, and
greater confidence in accuracy figures, to be desirable. He 'just kept
pushing for improved accuracy' in the fleet ballistic missile programme.7
As before, SSPO's leadership was unwilling to commit itself to a stringent
accuracy requirement 'because they still had essentially no ability to correct
for excess errors if tests of the developed system showed that the
requirements had not been met. They lacked the ability to measure the
magnitude of error contributions and the understanding to extrapolate
errors to other than test conditions'.8 Schlesinger was impatient with this,
as Admiral Smith recalls:
I remember a couple of sessions with him personally when I
was hying to show that we were unable to explain the fall
of shot. He rolled up his sleeves and said "OK, I'll explain
it for you". And we sat down with the raw data a couple of
hours each time.9
The Improved Accuracy Program emerged from these discussions.
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's Posture Statement of March 4, 1974
noted that:
We plan to undertake an advanced development program
which will define our capability to improve and measure
the accuracy of our SLBMs and which, if implemented by
retrofit, could lead to improved accuracy in the future.10
SSPO again avoided any strict requirement for accuracy improvement in
Trident I, but committed itself to undertake a programme involving three
broad areas of development: accuracy error model analysis,
instrumentation, and component development. In January 1975 SSPO
6. See D. Ball, Deia Vu: The Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration
(California: Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 1974); Interview.
7. Interview.
8. Letter from VADM Levering Smith to Donald MacKenzie (13 October 1986).
9. Interview.
10. SASC FY 1975,3288.
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received further direction from the Director of Defense Research &
Engineering to:
Restructure the accuracy improvement program to
accommodate funding adjustments and to be compatible
with providing an improved accuracy capability for the
Trident II missile with IOC in FY [deleted]. Incremental
accuracy improvements in the Trident I missile should be
pursued when cost effective.11
Whilst explaining the IAP in Congressional testimony Admiral Smith
outlined the inadequacies of previous FBM accuracy assessment methods:
Those methods are influenced by the fact that in the current
weapons system, C-3 and C-4, accuracy is a goal. It is not
stated as a requirement. We did not propose in the C-3, and
we have not to this point proposed as a part of the Trident
C-4 program, the funding of a high confidence assessment
method.
The accuracy assessment is approached basically by
the direct or splash assessment, the limited subsystem error
assessment, and limited modeling techniques.
This has resulted in low statistical confidence
because of the small number of test flights, the limited
variety of operational conditions available to us, and the
limited subsystem error measurement capability.12
The basic objectives of the IAP were to:
Gain an understanding of SLBM error sources and their
relationships. Based on this understanding, assess the
accuracy improvement potential of:
improved components
advanced system concepts
Conduct advanced development of promising:
improved components
advanced system concepts.13
n. SASC FY 1976, 5317.
12 SASC FY 1975, 3289-90.
13 SASC FY 1977 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), 6640.
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A major part of the IAP was the development of new
instrumentation methods to provide more information about the sources
of error both in the submarine position and velocity prior to launch and
during the missile flight. Bottom mounted transponders in the ocean
areas used for test launches provided more accurate data on the
submarine's position and velocity at launch. For determining missile
position and velocity during flight radar improvements at the Eastern Test
Range were supplemented by a satellite tracking system, known as Satrack.
Satrack emerged from the 1973 accuracy evaluation study done by the
Applied Physics Laboratory for SSPO, which 'indicated that a satellite-based
system could meet the major objectives of SLBM accuracy evaluation at
the system flight test level'.14 This was based on the Navstar Global
Positioning System satellites, and used a similar principle - comparing
time delays of signals sent to the missile from various satellites and a test
ship and then retransmitted back (at a different frequency). Satrack was
available in mid-1978 for the final Trident I development missile launches
from Cape Canaveral and for the submarine-launched tests beginning in
early 1979.
Instrumentation was accommodated on-board Trident I test missiles
in the space left by replacing the warheads. When the Trident I flight tests
began they were used to validate improved accuracy error models which
had been developed meanwhile. At the same time, in addition to
developing more sophisticated error modelling and investigating
improved components, there was also consideration of a range of different
ways of improving accuracy.
Three main ways of improving accuracy were considered. One was
to take advantage of the emerging satellite navigation system, the Global
Positioning System, which offered extremely accurate position fixes, by
placing GPS receivers on missiles. However, GPS suffered from concerns
about its vulnerability, both operationally in a nuclear war, and
programmatically, in the battle for funding. Although all the services
expected to benefit from GPS, none were especially keen to provide the
14. See T. Thompson, 'Performance of the Satrack/Global Positioning System Trident I
Missile Tracking System', Proceedings of IEEE 1980, Position Location & Navigation
Symposium, 445-49, at 445.
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funding for it and the resultant lack of a firm commitment to the system
has allowed 'technical' problems to cause delays in deployment of a full
satellite 'constellation'. Mid-flight updates from GPS were considered
likely to provide accuracy as good as improvements to a stellar inertial
system, but the potential vulnerability to countermeasures, and to the
availability of GPS counted against it.15
The second approach to accuracy improvement was to move to
'homing' re-entry vehicles, which would use some method of
electromagnetic recognition to take a precise 'fix' in the target area. This
offered the 'highest accuracy potential', but it too was susceptible to
countermeasures and was the 'least developed technology' of the three. A
particular objection concerned its 'testability', 'our ability to conduct flight
tests over land'.16 For obvious legal and political reasons, US ballistic
missile tests are conducted primarily over water, and impact is by 'splash
down' in areas such as Kwajalein Atoll. A homing re-entry vehicle would
have to 'recognize' terrain features, and there was thus a major question
mark over whether it could be adequately tested without politically
difficult overland testing.
The third way was further development of the stellar-inertial
guidance technology used in C4. Generally incremental improvements
there offered 'a rather significant improvement potential in accuracy on
the order of [deleted] feet, CEP at the 4,000 nautical mile range. ...in order to
achieve this kind of system accuracy, we are going to have to improve
accuracy essentially across the board in almost all areas of the system,
navigation, fire control, guidance, geodesy, and the like...'17 Of these, the
two biggest errors identified in the IAP were in submarine velocity and in
the stellar sensor system.18
The Improved Accuracy Program ran from 1974 to 1982, and cost of the
order of $600 million over the period.19 It provided the means by which
15. See the testimony of Rear Admiral Robert H. Wertheim, SASC FY 1979, Part 9,
Research and Development (Washington, DC: GPO, 1978), 6683.
16 Ibid, 6684.
17 SASC FY 1979, 6683.
18 SASC FY 1978, 6564.
19. Interview.
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the various options to improve accuracy could be assessed. Most of the
funding went towards development of the stellar-inertial guidance
technology - basically improving the techniques and components used in
the Trident I Mk5 guidance system. Work on mid-course and terminal
updates was largely restricted to 'paper studies and investigation'.20 It was
not surprising, then, that with the next FBM system, Trident II D5, it was
decided to stay with stellar-inertial guidance. As so often before SSPO
preferred, if possible, to deal with familiar technology and familiar
organizational relationships.
Trident II D5 - Decisions
Given the survival of the Trident submarine programme, it was
difficult to envisage the C4 as other than an interim missile. The much
bigger submarine made possible much bigger missiles, and from the
inception of the programme a second, big missile, a Trident II, was
projected. During the 1970s the date for Trident II IOC was shifted around,
from as early as FY 1982 to FY 1987.21 After denying funding for Trident II
initial studies in 1975 and 1976, Congress finally gave the go-ahead in 1977.
The issue then was what to do with the extra volume available in a
Trident submarine missile tube.
Various options were considered through the mid 1970s: C4 with
better accuracy; a long C4 with a new first stage to give increased range
(thus known as C5); a 'stepped' missile using an 83-inch first stage with 74-
inch upper stages that retained some commonality with C4; a D5 missile
with third stage protruding through the re-entry vehicles (as in C4); or a
'clear deck' D5 reverting to two stages to provide more space for the
payload.22 Out of these options the three-stage D5 was chosen to fully use
the tube space available in the Trident submarines, but of all the technical
characteristics, accuracy was to be paramount. For the first time hard-target
kill capability became an unequivocal driver of US FBM technology
development.
20. SASC FY 1978, 6544.
21. SSPO, 'Programmatic History', 2-6.
SASC FY 1978, 6681-2; also Programmatic History, 3.
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But initially, in the early 1970s, SSPO's tentative accuracy goal for
Trident II was 'to achieve at 6000 nm the CEP of POSEIDON at 2000 nm'.23
Then came the pressures from other branches of the Navy - including PM-
2 (the Trident Project Office) and OP-21 - and from the Office of Secretary of
Defense which culminated in the Improved Accuracy Program.
Increasingly improved accuracy came to be seen as important to provide
higher counterforce capability for the FBM. In a May 1976 Memorandum
to the Secretary of the Navy, Deputy Secretary of Defense, W. P. Clements,
Jr., referred to 'the ability of the FBM forces to respond to the guidance
provided by NSDM 242 and the NUWEP'. Along with the relative
invulnerability of the submarine, he noted:
the potential for increased throw weight in a follow-on to
the Trident I missile, encourages consideration of options to
expand our SLBM capability against the full spectrum of
the target system. Towards this objective, improvements in
communications and in payload, including [deleted] and
weapon system accuracy in a follow-on to the Trident I
missile would enhance the utility of the FBM weapon
system. ... It is therefore requested that the Navy develop
an overall plan, including a plan for the development of a
Trident II missile with an IOC in the 1980s, for increasing
the utility of the FBM weapon system. Increasing SLBM
throw weight should not be pursued as an objective
independent of substantial accuracy improvement.24
Such pressure for accuracy improvements in the FBM system was
not new, of course. Since at least the early 1960s there had been pressure
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to increase FBM hard-target
capability via accuracy improvements. But such pressure had only
produced a grudging response. Accuracy improvements were made, but
did not receive the highest priority, and hard-target capability did not
increase significantly. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the FBM force
remained differentiated from the Air Force ICBMs, in both perceived
capability and in doctrinal attitudes. Whereas counterforce was the
byword of Air Force planning, the Navy remained wedded to deterrence by
retaliation. But by 1976 things were beginning to change - future FBM
needs were now considered to include the ability to 'strike hard targets to
hedge against dependence on ICBM's'.25
23 Ibid, 2.
24 Quoted in SASC FY 1978, 6570.
25. SASC FY 1977, 6532.
173
This represented a significant change. Not only would hard-target
kill capability come to be a central feature of FBM design, but it would do
so as a clearly perceived substitute for Air Force ICBM hard-target kill
capability. But this did not, it seems, come about due to the efforts of those
Navy strategic planners who had long wanted to challenge Air Force
dominance of the counterforce missions, nor simply because the
technology was now available. Indeed Trident II came to be seen as a
substitute for the Air Force MX ICBM by default, because of difficulties
which threatened that programme, rather than because of advocacy by the
Navy.
What happened was that the various strands of US nuclear policy
came together to form a powerful consensus around the desirability of US
possession of significant hard-target kill capability, but during the same
period in the late 1970s it became evident to many that MX might not be
able to satisfy this 'requirement*. The reasons for this highlight just how
broadly 'technical' issues must be understood.
The Shift to Counterforce
Counterforce, and the targeting of 'hard' targets, are not recent
themes in the nuclear arms race. Since at least the start of the 1950s a
significant portion of US nuclear weapons were assigned to 'the
destruction of known targets affecting the Soviet capability to deliver
atomic bombs', which initially were designated as Bravo (for blunting)
targets.26 With the advent of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, despite their
initially poor accuracy, the theme continued. In 1957 such targets were
above ground and only considered able to withstand 100 pounds per
square inch overpressure. Comparing the prospective US missile force,
the Pentagon's Weapon System Evaluation Group concluded that: 'The
numbers of successful missiles required to achieve 50 per cent probability
of destruction of such a target are 80 ICBMs, 26 POLARIS's, 13 THOR's, and
2 JUPITER's.'27 The study seemed intended to show that ballistic missiles
26. Quoted in D. A. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American
Strategy, 1945-1960', International Security. (1983), 3-71, at 17.
27. Weapon System Evaluation Group Report No. 23, 'The Relative Military Advantages of
Missiles and Manned Aircraft' (May 6,1957), 27 and 22.
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were not suitable for counterforce missions (thus supporting continued
reliance on bombers)28, and did not consider Polaris 'suited for
employment against 100 psi targets'. But it was not to be long before the
Air Force would come to emphasize counterforce in its ICBMs too (starting
with Titan II and Minuteman II), and pressure would develop for the
Navy to compete over the role.
Yet pressure for a counterforce FBM remained localized until the
1970s. Although initially drawn to counterforce for damage-limitation,
Secretary of Defense MacNamara soon switched his public, declaratory
stance towards 'assured destruction'. Although the targeting plan, the
SIOP, remained based on the earlier counterforce doctrine,29 nuclear policy
Op
came to be publicly justified, and 'sold' to Congress, on the basis^retaliation
against urban-industrial targets. Early attempts to fund accuracy
enhancements explicitly to provide hard-target kill capability were not
then well-received.
But as the Soviet Union achieved rough numerical parity in
strategic forces with the US, a parity enshrined in the 1972 SALT Treaty,
attention shifted increasingly to the quality of the two arsenals. Although
defence liberals continued to argue that US counterforce capability reduced
US security (by potentially placing the Soviet Union in a 'lose 'em or use
'em' situation), hawks pointed to the daunting counterforce capability
possessed by the Soviet Union's 'heavy' ICBMs. True, the Soviet Union
could not hope completely to disarm the United States, but what would
happen if it could successfully destroy the only US counterforce-capable
missiles, the ICBMs? Would a US President not then be forced to
surrender, given no option other than a suicidal attack on Soviet cities?30
This 'second-strike counterforce' argument undercut opposition to
counterforce without violating the liberal sentiment that the US should
never be, and should never even threaten to be, the nuclear aggressor. To
the right of it, however, was to be found a more explicitly hawkish
analysis, that suggested that numerical parity should not dissuade the US
28. See Chapter 3 of forthcoming book by Donald Mackenzie,
29. See D. Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper #185, 1983), Vol ^
30. P. Nitze, 'Deterring our Deterrent', Foreign Policy (Winter 1976/1977),
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from the pursuit of 'nuclear superiority' and the political leverage that
might follow from it.31
All this added up to a climate gradually pushing US official nuclear
strategy ('stated posture') towards counterforce. Schlesinger's NSDM 242
of 1974 stopped short of clearly calling for enhanced counterforce
capability, but it started a trend. President Carter's 1980 'Presidential
Directive 59' demonstrated how far the domestic and international
political climate - especially the Presidential challenge from Reagan - could
push towards counterforce a President whose original inclinations were
strongly towards a minimum deterrent 'assured destruction' strategy.32
Under Reagan, of course, Executive sympathies turned entirely against
assured destruction, and towards both counterforce and active anti-missile
defences.
This shift in public position certainly had its consequences, for
example undercutting the possibilities for Congressional opponents of
counterforce to argue - as they had been able to before 1974 - that hard
target kill capability was incompatible with US national strategy. Yet the
significance of this shift should not be overstated. 'Stated posture' is only
one 'level' of nuclear policy: targeting practice, and acquisitions policy, by
no means always follow stated posture. During the heyday of 'assured
destruction' there was always a strong lobby, especially in the the Air
Force, for counterforce. Counterforce capability was an important
determinant of the design of the second two of the three generations of the
Minuteman ICBM force, and counterforce targets received high priority in
the targeting plan for nuclear war, the SIOP (Single Integrated Operational
Plan).33
The MX Relationship
Here, however, the second aspect of the 'environment' of Trident
D5 development becomes important, its relationship to the proposed new
Air Force ICBM, MX. MX's Air Force proponents saw its main virtue as
3h See, for example^Colin Gray, 'Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory',
International Security ' /(Summer 1979),
32. See Thomas Powers, 'Choosing a Strategy for World War III',Atlantic (November 1982), 82-no.
33. Ball, 'Targeting'.
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being its dramatic enhancement of US counterforce capability. But - in
part at least because of Congressional sentiments - the MX programme was
not put forward primarily on these grounds. Instead the main public
argument for MX was what became known as the 'window of
vulnerability' argument: that growing Soviet counterforce capability
threatened the Minuteman force in its fixed silos.
This argument proved to be a double-edged sword. While it
increased the acceptability of MX in a climate only gradually moving
towards approval of the overt pursuit of hard-target kill capability, it gave
high salience to finding a basing mode for MX that would be seen as
invulnerable. This proved the Achilles heel of the MX programme.
Successive proposals ran into both 'political' and' technical' difficulties,
and the repeated failure to find an acceptable basing mode began to
threaten the MX programme as a whole.34 Paradoxically, this built support
for a 'hard-target' Trident on both the 'right' and the 'left'. Advocates of
increasing US hard-target kill capability realized the importance of Trident
II as a hedge against non-deployment of MX. Dr Seymour Zeiberg, Deputy
Undersecretary of Defense for Strategic and Space Systems in the Carter
Administration, and a proponent of MX, noted the relationship:
If we move out with a vigorous MPS [Multiple Protective
Shelter basing mode for MX] program and we buy a new
strategic capability which has high accuracy and has the
potential to cope with counterforce missions, certainly the
urgency to move out with the Trident II for that reason
diminishes ... If we don't have an accelerated MX program
of that sort, we would endorse the very accelerated Trident
II program.35
For this reason, Zeiberg pushed SSPO to see if they could achieve accuracy
in Trident II that was comparable with that forecast for the MX.36
Congressional 'doves', on the other hand, saw MX as the main
enemy. Although many opposed it because of its increased counterforce
capability, they made a tactical decision to fight it on the basing issue,
34. J. Edwards, Superweapon: The Making of MX (New York: Norton, 1982); H. Scoville, Jr.,
MX: Prescription for Disaster (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981).
35. Quoted in J. S. Wit, 'American SLBM: Counterforce Options and Strategic Implications',
Survival Vol. 24 (1982), 163-74 at 168.
3^. Interview.
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where opposition was greatest. This then undercut opposition to Trident
II which was 'sold' on its invulnerability. Because of this, and the FBM's
enduring image as a retaliatory deterrent, many defense liberals saw
Trident as the lesser of two evils at a time when it was politically difficult
to oppose both outright.
So as the design decisions for the D5 were being made in the late
1970s and early 1980s (funding for development of the D5 was announced
by the Reagan Administration in October 1981, and full-scale engineering
started in 1983, although key decisions were effectively made well before
that), the programme's wider environment was such as to make any
internal opposition to counterforce difficult. Furthermore, Admiral
Levering Smith, seen by many as a formidable opponent of counterforce,
retired as SSPO Director in November 1977.
With MX in trouble, the need for careful 'differentiation' of the
FBM's nature and mission from those of ICBMs diminished. The
'bureaucratic' logic for opposition to counterforce disappeared. It was still
seen as prudent not to present Trident II as a complete alternative to MX -
if only because the slowness of communications with submerged
submarines limited the extent to which Trident could be used in a 'first
strike' or sophisticated 'war fighting' mode - but direct comparisons
between the two appeared for the first time. In 1983, for example, Chief of
Naval Operations Admiral James Watkins testified that:
Design for Counterforce
Counterforce capability thus became an overt requirement in the
design process of Trident D5. Nowhere was this change in roles, and
changed relationship to Air Force programmes, more marked than in
warhead design. Originally the Navy had considered using a modification
37. Quoted in W. M. Arkin, 'Sleight of Hand with Trident II', Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 5.
By 1991, we believe you could have four to five D-5
equipped Trident submarines, which is more than the
equivalent of an MX field in terms of hard target kill
capability.37
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of the Air Force Minuteman III Mkl2A re-entry vehicle with its 335
kiloton W78 warhead. This is essentially what the Mk21 re-entry vehicle
and W87 warhead, chosen for the MX, are. The Air Force had intended to
use a 500 kiloton warhead for MX, but 'lack of oralloy [enriched uranium]
... forced the Pentagon to opt for a warhead that uses less oralloy but which
only had a yield of 300 kilotons'.38 Air Force disappointment turned to
annoyance when the Department of Defense then persuaded the Navy
that Trident II should have a larger warhead to give it greater hard target
kill capability and 'added $88 million to the Navy's Fiscal 1984 budget
request to develop a new ballistic re-entry vehicle' for the D5.39 The new
re-entry vehicle, the Mk5, would carry a higher yield version of the MX
W87 warhead, boosted to 475 kilotons by adding more oralloy. For the first
time, a Navy missile was to carry larger yield warheads than its Air Force
counterpart:
Questions are being raised by the [Air Force] over why the
Navy will be allowed to deploy the higher yield device
requiring more oralloy in short supply in the inventory.40
In addition the new Mk5 re-entry vehicle - like the Mk4 an ablative
design - incorporates a shape stable nose tip intended to reduce dispersion
caused by uneven erosion. The carbon-carbon weave is supplemented by
metal filaments running along the axis of symmetry which make the
shape caused by ablation more predictable, and thus more amenable to
compensation.41 This provides more assurance that unfavourable local
weather conditions, such as rain or snow, will not greatly reduce accuracy.
38. 'Administration official' quoted in Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.,'Congress Questioning
Viability of MX ICBM', Aviation Week and Space Technology (March 22, 1982), 18-20 at
19. Highly enriched uranium (at least 93.5% U-235) acquired the codename Oak Ridge
Alloy or Oralloy during the Manhatten Project. The stockpile of oralloy has remained
roughly constant since the early 1960s when production was stopped as more efficient
weapons design and smaller warheads reduced demand. The recent trend to larger
warheads and the large numbers of planned cruise missile warheads has again led to a
perceived scarcity. Yield can be boosted in modern warheads by replacing other materials,
such as the depleted uranium casing, with oralloy. See T. B. Cochran, W.M. Arkin, Robert
S. Norris and M. M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook Vol. II. US Nuclear Warhead
Production (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger,1987).
39. Anon., 'Navy to Develop New Trident Warhead', Aviation Week and Space Technology Vol. UP




The Mk5 is being manufactured by GEC, making it the first FBM re-entry
vehicle not to be manufactured by Lockheed.42
Both the design of the re-entry vehicle and the yield of the warhead
reflect the emphasis placed on hard target kill capability in Trident II.
However, in the belief that only a part of the Navy's warheads would be
allocated to hard targets, SSPO also has retained the 'flexibility' to carry the
C4's 100 kiloton Mk4 re-entry vehicle, and so D5 is designed to be
compatible with both. Trident II design specifications also required the
'bus' to be compatible with a future Large Accurate Evader warhead,
though no such system has been developed.
The Mk6 Guidance System for Trident II D5
The push for hard-target kill capability was the central factor
affecting design of the Mk6 guidance system for the Trident D5. For the
first time, a particular level of accuracy was not simply a 'goal' (which
could implicitly be 'traded-off against other goals) but a 'requirement' that
had to be met. And it was a demanding requirement:
They went from 3 PIGAs to 1 PIGA to 0 PIGAs as they went
through the early generations, and then of course, now they
decided, 'hey, we're going to go for broke', and now they're
back talking PIGAs again.4-*
The accuracy requirement was considered by those involved to be close to
the limits of the possible using an evolutionary development of the C4
system:
In our case, case of D5, I'd say we have ... an objective, a
requirement in this case ... such that I'm doing just about
everything I know how to do with that technology. Cost
hasn't been a major consideration. ...With the basic
42. GEC manufactured the Mkl2A for Minuteman III and had hoped this would be chosen for
MX. When instead Avco were chosen to develop the Advanced Ballistic Re-entry Vehicle
(ABRV), which was the forerunner of the chosen Mk21, it looked like GEC might be
squeezed out of re-entry vehicle work. This may be what Richard DeLauer, Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, meant when he referred to 'a problem
with the industrial base' with respect to re-entry vehicles. Aerospace Daily (June 18, 1982),
268. Also Interview. Apparently the solution was to give GEC the Trident II Mk5 as
Lockheed would still retain Mk4 production.
4*. Interview.
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technology right now I'm not sure I'd know what else to do
...44
The lessons learnt from the Improved Accuracy Program were put to use
in the design of Trident D5 guidance: indeed it was that program that gave
SSPO leadership the confidence to take on an explicit and demanding
accuracy requirement. The Program had led to a sophisticated and largely,
though not entirely, consensual understanding of the sources of FBM
inaccuracy.
It was, for example, agreed that absolute accuracy in the gyroscopes
was not per se crucial. Sophisticated computer programs along with the
star-sighting could compensate for gyro drift. One possible challenger to
the existing Mk5 system's two degree-of-freedom dry tuned-rotor gyro was
the laser gyroscope. However, these looked to be larger than the dry
tuned-rotor design and more difficult to integrate with the stellar sensor.
So it was decided to go for a two degree-of-freedom dry tuned-rotor
instrument, either built by Kearfott or Litton. Kearfott's experience with
the gyroscopes for the C4 missile probably decided the issue in their
favour.45
With the accelerometers, on the other hand, the Improved Accuracy
Program was understood to have shown that acceleration sensing errors
were important contributors to inaccuracy. Two candidates appeared to
offer the required high performance. One was the vibrating beam
accelerometer whose simplicity promised small size, easy manufacture
and cheapness. However, at the time it was considered difficult to harden
against the effects of radiation, and so SPO reverted to the type of
accelerometer used in the original Polaris, the PIGA, believed at the Draper
Laboratory to be the most highly accurate accelerometer design.46
Although not used in the Mk3 and Mk5 FBM guidance systems, the
Draper Laboratory had continued to develop PIGAs, culminating in the 16-





47. On the Mk6 accelerometer decision, see Anon., Trident Missile Capabilities Advance',
Aviation Week and Space Technology "fl6 June 1980), 91-100, at 99.
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The other main area of change in guidance components was the
stellar sensor, and here 'trade-offs' continued longest into Trident II
development.48 Some argued that the vidicon technology was obsolete
and that better performance could be achieved by moving to a solid state
sensor, either a charge coupled device (CCD) or charge injection device
(CID). Others felt these new technologies too premature for incorporation
into the baseline system, and it was even felt that the reason for shifting
away from the vidicon, where Kearfott had formidable expertise, was that
it would allow the Draper Laboratory to regain design authority lost with
the decision to move from inertial to stellar-inertial.49 In the end CCD was
selected.
Perhaps most thorough-going was the change in the guidance
computer and electronics. In the chosen 'all-digital architecture' direct
digital read-off from the inertial components is obtained. This provides
more information about their performance and is believed to allow greater
compensation for drift. Computer capacity has risen to 1 megabyte of
PROM and 200 kilobyte plated wire RAM, with widespread use of VLSI
(very large scale integration) components and microprocessors.50
Trident Navigation
All this, however, was understood as not enough to meet the
accuracy requirement without improvements in navigation. With a
stellar sensor believed capable of correcting for initial position and
azimuth errors, two other aspects of launch condition were identified in
the IAP as prominent error contributors. First, errors in knowledge of
initial velocity were understood as not correctable by star sighting and so
measuring the submarine's velocity was seen as critical. Various
approaches to this problem were considered and a Doppler Sonar system
was chosen to measure velocity from ocean bottom reflections.
48. Interview.
49. Interview. For the 'politics' of the shift to CCDs in another context, see Robert W.
Smith and Joseph N. Tatarewicz, 'Replacing a Technology: the Large Space Telescope and
CCDs'. Proceedings of the IEEE Vol. 73 (1985). 1221-35.
50. Graydon M. Wheaton, 'Electronics Manufacturing for Inertial Guidance Systems' (9 May,
1986, typescript), 5, 15.
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The other concern was initial misalignment in the vertically of the
missile guidance platform due to local gravity anomalies. Since an inertial
component cannot distinguish inertial from gravitational acceleration, the
accuracy of inertial navigation depends on the accuracy of the gravity
model used. For the level of accuracy desired in D5, local gravity variation
could introduce significant errors into the inertial measurements. One
way to reduce this error source was to develop an on-board gravity sensor
system (GSS) for the submarine. This consists of 'a stabilized platform
containing a gravity gradiometer and a gravimeter. The gradiometer
measures the spatial rate of change of the gravity vector, and the
gravimeter measures its magnitude'.51 By constantly monitoring local
gravity anomalies the GSS can help to reduce many errors which would
otherwise accumulate in the navigation system and be transferred to the
missile guidance system.
Another approach to the gravity problem was more accurate
geodetic mapping, both by satellite and by survey ship. Gravitational data
provided by previous satellites, initially Transit and then the more
sophisticated GEOS III and Seasat systems was judged insufficient for
Trident n and a new Geosat satellite was developed for 1983 launching:
The Navy believes the improved Earth gravity models
expected from the Geosat spacecraft will provide up to a
10% improvement in circular error target accuracy for
certain Trident 2 launch areas. The Geosat data will be
most useful for Trident submarine patrol areas in the
southern hemisphere and parts of the Northern Pacific
where gravitational survey data are limited.52
51. T. A. King and H. Strell, 'Underwater Navigation' entry in McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia
of Science and Technology ,(New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1982), 399-402,
at 401. A key role in developing the gradiometer as an adjunct to inertial navigation was
played by Milton Trageser at the Instrumentation Laboratory. From 1966 onwards work at
the Laboratory was funded first by the Air Force, and then from about 1977 by SSPO.
However, the gradiometer actually selected for Trident is not Trageser's spherical floated
design. That was perceived as a 'gold plated' device - literally as well as metaphorically,
in this case, since it incorporated silver-filled proof masses, gold electrodes and 'gold
plating is used extensively to minimize radiant heat transfer'. See M. B. Trageser, 'Floated
Gravity Gradiometer', IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems .Vol. 20
(1984), 417-19, at 419. Instead a completely different design built by Bell Aerospace Textron
in Buffalo was chosen, basically because it was cheaper and easier to produce.
52. Anon., 'Geosat Data to Aid Trident 2 Accuracy', Aviation Week and Space Technology
(19 July 1982), 26.
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A new ship surveying program was also initiated, similar to that carried
out for Polaris navigation, but mapping not only sea-bed terrain features,
but also local gravity. Where available these surveys provide the most
accurate method of updating the navigation system whilst avoiding the
need to approach the surface. However, such surveying is very expensive
and time-consuming, and so it was seen as impossible to survey all the
potential patrol areas for a missile with the physical range of D5. SSPO
thus accepted the accuracy requirement for the D5 only for a restricted
range. Although D5 is capable of considerably longer range than C4 its
accuracy specification was thus set for the same nominal range of 4000
nautical miles.53
The other main change in navigation for submarines carrying
Trident II missiles will be the replacement of the traditional SINS with
electrostatically-suspended gyroscope systems, no longer merely as
'monitors', but as the full navigators. However, receivers for the
traditional external navigation updates, Loran-C and Transit, will be
retained. Although offering potentially greater accuracy than Transit,
Global Positioning System receivers will only be 'incorporated into the
Trident II weapon system after GPS has demonstrated continuous,
worldwide capability equal to or better than Transit'.54
Missile and Launcher Technology
Given the large volume available in the Trident submarine launch
tube and diminishing returns of range above about 4000-miles, there was
not as much pressure to improve propulsion technology in D5 as there
had been in C4. Instead D5 missile design was considered 'conservative'
with the emphasis on dependability and improving 'producability' to
'reduce repetitive production cost'.55 The propellant used is Nitrate Ester
Plasticized Polyethylene Glycol which took advantage of work done in the
back-up investigation studies initiated because of the Trident I
detonations.
53. Interview.
54. Anon., 'Navstar offers "little improvement" in SLBM accuracy', Aerospace Daily Vol.
123, No. 33 (19 October 1983), 257.
55. Interview.
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Those problems also stimulated a change in the missile case
material on all but the third stage, which remained Kevlar-based. For the
first and second stages, it was decided to move to graphite epoxy cases:
The decision to go graphite case ... was strongly influenced
by our Trident I experience and the knowledge that
graphite cases at the same specific strength level degrade
more gracefully than Kevlar cases.5^
Again the 'joint venture' of Hercules and Morton-Thiokol won the major
part of the propulsion work - becoming subcontractors for the first and
second stage. This time, however, the third stage went to United
Technologies Corporation who had unsuccessfully competed for the same
work for C4. After their lack of success in the competition for C3 and C4
work, Aerojet - the propellant subcontractor for the first Polaris - did not
even bother to tender for D5. Other aspects of missile construction, such as
the nozzle design and the use of the Generalized Energy Management
System (GEMS) to avoid thrust termination, were based on the C4
technology.
Changes in missile electronics in D5 also drew on the C4 experience,
as well as utilizing the latest generation of large scale integrated (LSI) chips.
Without the strict space and weight constraints of C4 it was decided to
abandon some of the more specialized electronics developed for C4 so as to
reduce the potential supply difficulties involved.57
Launcher technology is also largely based on that used in previous
systems, but obviously on a larger scale. The particular combination of
D5's large size and its blunt nose design has, however, resulted in one
significant change. All previous launcher systems have used fixed energy
ejection systems, based on either compressed air or solid propellant gas
generators, which were considered satisfactory for the desired launch
depth band. At the shallow end of this band the missile emerged from the
water surface faster than at the deep end, but both extremes were within




considered such that a fixed energy eject system would not provide the
same launch depth band as previously without overly stressing the missile
during launch. In particular, if there was to be sufficient energy to launch
at the deep end of the launch band then the missile would come out too
quickly at the shallow end.58
The solution was to devise a variable energy eject system in which
the energy imparted to the missile was adjusted according to the depth of
launch by correspondingly varying the amount of water added in the
stand-pipe. Thus by adjusting the amount of energy used in vaporizing
water it is possible to impart different amounts of energy to the missile
from a fixed energy solid propellant gas generator. This means some
variation in the temperature of the steam/gas mixture, but this is kept
within the tolerance of the missile. It also means that the Trident II
launch system is the first to require a sophisticated computer, in order to
adjust the amount of water released into the stand-pipe.
A 'Non-Controversial' Programme?
The first Trident II test flight was on January 15, 1987 from a Cape
Canaveral launch pad. Deployment is scheduled for 1989 on the ninth
Trident submarine. It is also planned that the first eight Trident
submarines - currently equipped with C4 missiles - will eventually be
converted to D5. At present a total of at least twenty Trident submarines
are expected to be built.
Trident II is expected to meet its stringent accuracy requirement - to
be almost as good as MX and 'at least twice as accurate as the Trident I'.59
Although with the flexibility to cover a 'full target spectrum', D5 is a
system optimized at considerable expense for attacking hardened military
targets, such as missile silos.
58. Interview. The potential problem that caused concern with shallow launching was
cavitation around the missile nose, that is the formation of air bubbles which on breaking
down could impose excessive stress on the missile at the launch velocities inevitable with a
fixed energy system.
59 SASC FY 1985 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 3426.
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Because of the shift in the political climate in the US, the peculiar
relationship of Trident to MX, and of the FBM system's traditional
reputation as a 'good' deterrent, this change in the nature of the FBM
programme has been achieved remarkably smoothly. With MX still
bogged down - now by a 'scandal' surrounding guidance system
production as well as by its other handicaps - and the other Air Force
ballistic missile programme, the Small ICBM, threatened with
cancellation, Trident II was selected by Congress in November 1987 as a
'non-controversial' programme that could receive, instead of the usual
annual funding, a five-year authorization.60 The 4,000 protesters who
demonstrated at Cape Canaveral in Florida in January 1987 against the first
flight-test of the D5, or the 700 still demonstrating in October 1987, would
not have agreed.61 But unlike the case of MX - where relatively local
'environmental' protest in Utah and Nevada became a major cause of the
programme's troubles - Trident's opponents have so far had little impact.
Even the December 1987 summit meeting caused only a one day delay in
the D5's test programme, as a scheduled flight-test was postponed to avoid
the period when Gorbachev was in the US. Trident II seems set to enter
the US nuclear arsenal as planned in 1989.
The opposition to Trident II - though limited and belated in nature -
stems especially from its central characteristic as a system designed to
provide a high probability of destroying hardened targets. Although most
opposition to hard-target counterforce systems focused on the more
vulnerable MX (land-basing making it more vulnerable to both Soviet
warheads and domestic opposition), Trident II also provoked similar
concerns.62 Opposition to Trident II became more focused in the early
1980s as the implications of the system became more widely understood.63
60. Michael Mecham, 'Congress Favours.Conventional Defense, Production Efficiency',
Aviation Week and Space Technologv ffih November 1987), 23. ^
61. Anon., 'Seven Arrested at Trident Protest', Aviation Week and Space Technology i(2
November 1987), 27. h
62. An important campaigner against Trident II is the former Lockheed FBM engineer Robert
C. Aldridge, author of First Strike! The Pentagon's Strategy for NuclearWar (London:
Pluto Press, 1983). The organization which campaigned most actively against Trident II
was the Washington-based Coalition For a New Foreign and Military Policy.
63. See Philip M. Boffey, 'Trident's Technology May Make It a Potent Rival to Land-Based
Missiles', New York Times (13 July 1982), C-l. Senator William Proxmire had the article
reprinted in the Congressional Record on the same day.
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Opposition to Trident II in the formal political system centred on
Representative Thomas Markey - initially opposing Trident II outright,
and then, when it became clear that the programme would go ahead,
opposing the larger W88 warhead. The underlying rationale of this
opposition was that Trident II was a 'first strike' weapon, which,
irrespective of US intentions, would engender Soviet fear of pre-emption
and so increase the risk of nuclear war starting in times of extreme
international tension. Thus in proposing an amendment of the Defense
authorization bill that would delete W88 funding, Markey argued:
... do we really want to deploy this missile with a highly
destabilizing first-strike capability, or do we basically
want it to be a retaliatory weapon?
If we were to deploy the D-5 with the lower yield
warhead, it would still be able to destroy a wide range of
Soviet military and industrial targets, but it would not be
able to threaten a disarming first strike.
Since we all know that there is no point in
destroying empty Soviet silos, acquiring such a capability
is useless unless we intend to strike first.
And it is against U.S. policy to strike first.
I say that if we are going to go ahead with the D-5,
we should return the missile to its original purpose -
increasing the range, and therefore the survivability, of
the U.S. sea-based missile force.
We should not deploy it as a silobuster.64
Despite the endorsement of efforts to enhance 'strategic stability' in the
1983 Report of the Scowcroft Commission on Strategic Forces, the
opposition to Trident II was ineffectual. Deep in the conservative Reagan
years, and with Soviet-American relations at a low ebb, it proved
impossible to rally opposition to both MX and Trident n. Not only did the
MX suffer from 'basing mode' vulnerability, but it also seemed more
directly orientated to 'first strike'.
It could thus be argued that Trident II is much less destabilizing that
MX because it is much less vulnerable.65 In addition there is a marked
contrast between the rapidity of communications of land-based and
64. Congressional Record (July 11,1985), Extension of Remarks, E 3227-28. In the event
Markey was unable to offer the amendment 'due to the press for adjournment for the 4th of
July recess'! In following years a similar amendment was defeated.
65. See Theodore A Postol, 'The Trident and Strategic Stability', Oceanus [(Summer 1985),
45-53.
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submarine-based missiles. Many associated with the FBM programme
dispute the notion that Trident II can be characterized as 'first strike', not
only because they deny^that is its intended purpose, but also because they
claim that the communications systems are inadequate for such a purpose.
ELF might provide greater assurance than higher frequency systems that
all submarines would receive their intended emergency action messages
(EAMs), but it is still doubtful that pre-emptive strikes could be
contemplated without effective, prompt, two-way communications. With
such high stakes it would be crucial to know the availability of every
missile prior to launch. Blue-green laser submarine communications
technology has been under development for some time and has been
claimed to herald the eventual availability of rapid, two-way
communications.66
At present, however, the mission of the FBM force appears
ambivalent. Trident II is designed to provide hard-target kill capability
and has provoked concerns about its destabilizing, first strike potential.
Indeed there were people working in the FBM programme who said they
would never work on a hard-target FBM, and of those, some left with the
advent of Trident II.67 But if the communications are as slow and patchy
as some say, then for all its accuracy and explosive yield, Trident II may not
provide the capability it was intended to. Dr Seymour Zeiberg, a key
advocate of Trident II in the Carter Administration, argued the case for a
hard-target FBM in the warfighting language which was codified as
national policy in PD-59:
There are many targets in the Soviet Union that need to be
attacked on a short time scale because they represent
critical Soviet assets . . . We need to stress . . our ability to
take out time-urgent Soviet targets.68
But whether FBM communications are responsive and flexible enough to
enable Trident II to used in such a warfighting role during a nuclear
conflict would seem to be open to question.
66. See, for example, R. J. Starkey, 'The Renaissance in Submarine Communications - Part V:
Blue-Green Laser/Satellite Technology: The Search for the Rainbow', Military
Eleetronics/Countermeasures (March 1981), 48-54.
67. Interview.
68. Quoted in Edgar Ulsamer, 'Toward a New World Strategy', Air Force Magazine (January
1979), 60-65, at 61.
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Thus although Trident II looks set to be a successful programme, the
change in mission leaves the FBM programme with potential
vulnerabilities. The FBM's traditional role, that of a survivable, last-resort
retaliatory deterrent, was easy to understand, plausible in implementation,
and widely and bipartisanly supported. In contrast the hard-target, time-
urgent 'warfighting' role of Trident II is both difficult to understand and to
implement. Even those who fully comprehend the rationale behind
recent US nuclear strategy would admit it is esoteric; though others find it
misguided and dangerous. Moreover, the ability to implement such a
doctrine is not easily obtained, requiring more than simply high accuracy
and yield. In this sense, Trident II not only marks a shift away from the
traditional FBM mission, but also the end of an era for the SPO/SSPO.
Lacking the autonomy of earlier years, SSPO must now find its way in a
world of shifting nuclear hyperbole, with SDI the latest distraction. The
only certainties in the years to come, at least until the next century, will be
the size of the Trident submarine mount tubes and the limits they impose
on 'the next generation'.
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Chapter 8
Understanding Technical Change in Weaponry
A central question in the study of technology - and one that has
particular urgency in the case of nuclear weapons technology - is how to
explain change. Understanding the processes of technical change may
have general utility in aiding our ability to shape technology to maximize
human well-being. In most cases, of course, such a formulation is nai've -
all too often one person's well-being is at the expense of another's1 - but
with nuclear weapons the issue seems quite clear-cut. Preventing nuclear
war is an all-important goal for the human race, and one towards which
studies of nuclear weapons technology should be able to contribute.
The threat of nuclear war deserves this central focus because of the
expected enormity and widespread nature of its consequences. But
understanding nuclear weapons technology also has everyday importance,
though of a less unique nature. The opportunity costs of developing and
building nuclear weapons are considerable, whatever the possible
alternative uses of resources. Understanding how weapons technology
'decisions' come about, and how resources come to be allocated is thus of
ho
interest, both to those /wish to improve defence procurement efficiency
and to those who would rather devote the resources elsewhere.
As already outlined in Chapter 1, technical change has been
characterized in various ways that form a continuum ranging from the
'hard' technological determinism of 'technology-out-of-control' at one
extreme to simple tool-use metaphors of 'politics-in-command' at the
other. The validity of these various positions can be examined by
considering their utility for explaining the development of FBM
technology.
The first position, 'technology-out-of-control', considers 'hard'
technological determinism - the idea that technology has an internal
T Some of the problems with maximising the public good - in the context of science policy -
are discussed in B. Barnes, About Science (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 124-32.
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momentum and that it in turn shapes society. Each following viewpoint
then casts a wider net, progressively incorporating the social world into
'internal' explanations of weapons development. First, 'soft' versions of
technological determinism - such as 'technology creep' - are assessed.
Then the idea that it is not the technology as such, but rather the
technologists that are out-of-control. The last set of possible causes of a
'technological imperative' considers a still wider set of domestic actors,
looking at the possibility that such an apparent effect might be due to an
institutionalized 'internal' arms race or to the vested interests of a
Military-Industrial complex. Then, at the opposite end of the spectrum of
views, explanations based on 'politics-in-command' are examined. Here
weapons developments are considered to be the result of 'external' factors,
such as the Soviet 'threat', which are rationally analysed to produce a
response - a classic case being known as the 'action-reaction' phenomenon.
The role of nuclear strategy - both declared doctrine and the operational
targeting plan - as a determinant of technology is also considered. Finally,
there is the 'bureaucratic politics' approach - a 'middle' position in the
spectrum of views, which seems to allow the combination of 'internal'
and 'external' explanations, and to provide a more realistic model of
'decision' making.
Technology-out-of-control?
It has long been argued that nuclear weapons technology advances
because of some internal momentum. Many authors have claimed, as
Ralph Lapp argues, that there is a 'technological imperative - when
technology beckons, men are helpless'.2 Thus, according to the UN
Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons :
It is widely believed . . . that new weapon systems emerge
not because of any military or security considerations but
because technology by its own impetus often takes the lead
over policy, creating weapons for which needs have to be
invented and deployment theories have to be readjusted.3
2. Ralph E. Lapp, Arms Beyond Doubt: The Tyranny of Weapons Technology (New York:
Cowles Book Co., 1970), 178.
3. United Nations, Report of the Secretary General, Comprehensive Study on Nuclear
Weapons (United Nations, New York, 1981), para 67, cited in Marek Thee, Military
Technology. Military Strategy and the Arms Race (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 47;
emphasis added.
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In its most extreme form such technological determinism portrays
the development of technology as though it were simply the inevitable
application of science which itself can be seen unproblematically as the
'real world' revealed. Scientific discoveries are seen as being applied in
technology which then has 'effects'. Such an interpretation of technical
change seems, however, to rest on two dubious premises - that the content
of scientific knowledge is simply and 'naturally' determined by the
physical world, and that the science-technology relationship is one-way
and causal.
In practical terms this would seem to imply that technical
application would always trail scientific understanding. But thoughout
the FBM programme there are many examples, in major areas of
technology, where this has not been the case. The widely perceived
advances in technology - in, for example, inertial guidance, re-entry
vehicle design, and solid propellants - have come about, not because of
advances in scientific understanding, but rather in spite of the lack of
them. In each of these fields advances have relied on 'trial-and-error',
'rules-of-thumb', and all the other processes (including some input from
'science') that go to make up the eclectic craft of technologists.
Indeed technological change in these areas has itself been a major
factor in furthering scientific understanding, rather than the reverse.
However, while a major concern of scientists is theoretical - to produce a
way of understanding the world that 'works', that of technologists is
practical - to make an artefact that 'works'. What it means to work is, of
course, in both cases decided by socially-mediated criteria. But it is
certainly not the case that 'working' science is either sufficient or necessary
to produce 'working' technology. The craft or 'black art' required to
produce inertial components, solid propellants and re-entry vehicle nose-
tips cannot be adequately documented in algorithms and formulae. Wise
programme managers appreciate this - that the tacit knowledge involved
in many technical skills is a key factor in success and that people transfer
such skill much more fully than even the most exhaustive
documentation.
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Technology cannot, then, be seen as simply applied science,
following a 'natural' pathway determined by the 'discovery' of the real
world. Even if the production of scientific knowledge were itself such an
unproblem atic process, it still could not be considered the sole, or
probably even the most important, factor in technological change. The
creation of technology and of scientific knowledge are related processes,
but the relationship is by no means one-way.4
But, setting aside the relationship with science, could technological
developments still be seen as the inevitable consequences of
'manipulating' the physical world? Even if technical developments do not
directly arise out of the 'laws of physics' does a physical reality still
determine the pathways taken by technology? Can technological
development be explained in terms of 'natural trajectories'? For example,
is the progression from Polaris to Trident II the inevitable result of
technological change in which advances in technology provided better
accuracy, which in turn led to a change in targeting strategy? In 1973 it was
predicted that: 'Just as MIRV was inevitable from the point of view of
being a natural accumulating of technical knowledge, hard-target MIRVs
also will be irresjtible, policy statements to the contrary notwithstanding'.5
A prediction which has been proven correct, even in the traditionally
'assured destruction' orientated FBM system. But can 'technology' be seen
as the cause?
Based on the present study it cannot. The history of FBM
technology cannot be seen as an inexorable, out-of-control, determinate
and determining, path of technological development. The physical world
does not, for example, naturally facilitate the development of high quality
inertial components. On the contrary, this is achieved only with great
difficulty and at great expense. Where high accuracy was not seen as
required, such as in civilian and most military aircraft applications,
inertial technology has followed a different course -emphasizing lowering
4. B. Barnes, 'The Science-Technology Relationship: A Model and a Query', Social Studies
of Science. Vol. 12 (1982), 166-73.
5. R. L. Tammen, MIRV and the Arms Race: An Interpretation of Defense Strategy (New
York: Praeger, 1973), 126.
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life time costs, developing 'sweet' technologies, but of a different kind to
those found in missile guidance.6
Trident ITs expected high counterforce capability is, in any case, in
no sense the unintended result of technical change. Such a capability
(relative to the target hardness of the time) has always interested some
people. As is clear from the Pentagon's Weapon System Evaluation
Group Report of 1957, counterforce capability was even then considered an
important criterion by which to judge the performance of ballistic
missiles.7
But, whilst counterforce was enthusiastically taken up by the Air
Force, the pressure for a counterforce FBM remained localized until the
1970s. Initially, at least, 'technical' differences based on the physical world
made counterforce appear more difficult for FBM's (at least when
comparing a mobile FBM to a fixed-silo ICBM), but this 'physical'
distinction was a 'sotial' one too, as differentiation was deliberately chosen
within the Navy. SPO's interest in projecting the image of the FBM as a
counter-city deterrent, and a declared national strategy of assured
destruction, held at bay the strategists who desired hard target kill and the
technologists who felt they could provide it.
Moreover, even project managers wholly infatuated with
technology cannot do everything that seems technically possible, or even
everything that seems technically 'sweet'. Typically, there are choices to be
made between different technical pathways. Sometimes these detailed
trade-offs have only minor significance for the overall characteristics of
the system; sometimes these little details may turn out to be highly
significant.
Thus there was a choice between staying with pure inertial guidance
or moving to stellar-inertial. Here the wider political context played a role
in augmenting technical doubts which delayed the introduction of stellar
6. See D. MacKenzie, W. Riidig and G. Spinardi, 'Social Research on Technology and the
Policy Agenda: An Example from the Strategic Arms Race', in Brian Elliott (ed.),
Technology and Social Process (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1988), 152-80.
7. Though it seems likely that this report was written by people concerned to play down the
utility of ballistic missiles for counterforce missions.
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inertial guidance till Trident I. In another case technological
developments (especially in computer capabilities) could have led to a
switch from a stable platform guidance system to a strapdown one - but did
not. Similarly there were choices over the type of accelerometer used - the
larger, more expensive, and more accurate PIGAs (Pendulous Integrating
Gyro Accelerometers) or the more economical PIPAs (Pulsed Integrating
Pendulous Accelerometers) - and the size and numbers of warheads
carried.
The technical choices made in the Special Projects Office involved
explicit trade-offs between performance and cost, as well as debate about
what were the correct goals and what were the best ways to achieve them.
For example, the choice of warhead size and configuration in the Poseidon
missile was heavily influenced by both strategic and bureaucratic factors,
and was directly related to system accuracy. Technical choices were thus
influenced by the 'macropolitics' of US defence policy, by the
organizational politics of the Navy and its relationship with the Air Force,
also by the 'micropolitics' of the technical community. Whether a star-
tracker was needed to supplement pure inertial guidance was doubted by
dominant opinion at the Instrumentation Laboratory, where there was a
strong commitment to the achievement of ultimate accuracy by
refinement of unsupplemented inertial sensors. The stellar-inertial
option was pushed by outside industry - the Kearfott Division of Singer.
So there are many instances of 'technical choices' made in the Fleet
Ballistic Missile programme, and good evidence of a range of 'political'
and institutional factors shaping these choices. But 'the social' does not
simply operate at the level of preferences between pre-defined technical
options. It also shapes the options that are available, and may on occasion
actually eliminate the possibility of explicit choice.8 The social can enter
into the definition of what is possible.
8. See T. J. Pinch and W. E. Bijker, 'The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: or How
the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology might Benefit Each Other', Social
Studies of Science. Vol. 14 (1984), 399-441; S. Russell, 'The Social Construction of Artefacts:
A Response to Pinch and Bijker', Social Studies of Science. Vol. 16 (1986), 331-46; T. Pinch
and W. Bijker, 'Science, Relativism and the New Sociology of Technology', Social Studies
of Science. Vol. 16 (1986), 347-60.
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One example of this concerns homing reentry vehicles, a possibility
ruled out in the late 1970s in part because adequate testing of the
technology was deemed infeasible. To date US strategic ballistic missiles
have been tested over water, usually impacting either in broad ocean areas
or in the Marshall Islands, where indigenous Islanders have so far been
unable to bring significant legal or political pressure to bear. So the
political power of citizens of the mainland US by comparison with Pacific
Islanders is a cause of adequately-tested homing reentry vehicles, which
would require overland testing, being seen as infeasible.
'Soft' Determinism - Enablement and Constraint
Clearly, then, a 'hard' form of technological determinism -in which
artefacts are seen as the result of 'applied science' or as following
inevitably from their predecessors due to natural trajectories, or in which
the nature of programmes is determined by available component
technologies - cannot be sustained. At the same time 'technology' is not
simply a dependent variable either. 'Technology' can sometimes be
important as an enabling capability or a limiting constraint.
Technology as enablement amounts to a very 'soft' form of
determinism, if it can be so termed at all. Basic technologies and sciences
may feed back into specific developments, both allowing and perhaps
stimulating technological advances. Thus work in computing, inertial
instruments, geophysics and geodesy has enabled missile accuracy to be
greatly improved. Schroeer's claim that computing capabilities have
driven missile accuracy might seem a case in point.9 However, increased
computer capabilities could just as reasonably have led to strap-down
guidance systems (had cost and ease of maintenance been more important
than accuracy) rather than better performance of stable platform designs.
Enabling technologies merely provide possibilities, they do not determine
the course actually followed. Rather than Schroeer's 'technological
imperative' a more suitable term might be Shapley's 'technology creep'.10
9. Dietrich Schroeer, 'Quantifying Technological Imperatives in the Arms Race', in D.
Carlton and C. Schaerf, Reassessing Arms Control (Macmillan, 1985), 60-71.
10. D. Shapley, 'Technology Creep and the Arms Race: ICBM Problem a Sleeper' Science.
Vol. 201 (September 22,1978), 1102-05.
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Furthermore, advances in some basic technologies and sciences,
such as inertial instruments, geophysics and geodesy, have to a large extent
been driven by military requirements for more accurate guidance systems.
Even where technological and scientific advances on a broader front feed
back into specific military technology, as computers seem to have in this
case, it is important not to forget how those advances come about, and are
themselves socially shaped. Widely applicable developments need not be
unstoppable if no-one has a particular interest in pursuing them because,
paradoxically, everyone may leave it to some one else to pick up the costs.
Thus the development of the US Global Positioning System of navigation
satellites may have been slowed because all of the armed forces expected to
get access to it, but none especially wanted to pay for it.
The development of specific enabling technologies may also be
slowed, or stopped, if social conditions are not right. The very high quality
inertial components used in strategic missile guidance have few other
perceived uses. Recently even advocates of counterforce accuracy in
strategic missiles have begun to doubt whether further improvements in
inertial sensors would provide much gain in overall system accuracy.
Funds for this form of development of the enabling technology have thus
been proving hard to find, and the Draper Laboratory's efforts to develop
'fourth generation' inertial instruments significantly more accurate than
the 'third generation' instruments of MX and D5 have not found sources
of external support.11 The 'technical trajectory' of further refining Draper
floated instruments may no longer be socially viable.
But 'technology creep' not only increases the availability of
tempting new technologies, it can also lead to the non-availability of
satisfactory old ones. In some areas of the FBM programme, such as the
launcher subsystem, the 'latest' technology has often been only grudgingly
introduced. For example, the launch system initiator which had remained
the same design up until Trident II:
One other new element that's just been introduced for
Trident II, we're just introducing it now, we haven't finished
developing it, is what we call EBWTBI, electronic bridge
wire through bulk head initiator, its a new device to
11. See MacKenzie, Riidig and Spinardi, 168-69.
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initiate the burn in the gas generator, the device that we
have used up until now is an initiator that was designed for
use in Polaris missiles and did initiate some of the motors in
Polaris, we used it for our purposes but it is now a very
ancient design, the manufacturer is no longer making it and
it did not seem feasible to go back and start that up again ..
. often times we are forced into changes not because in and of
itself our program dictates the changes, but rather %the
market place dictates the changes, something is no longer
available because no-one else uses it. For whatever reason
other usages have disappeared, they've gone to other
technologies, so that although we may not need ourselves to
go to another technology, if everyone else has and no longer
do we have a suitable source of supply, then we may have
to look at this new technology too in order to widen our
source of supply. That's what's happened in this initiator,
the old initiator is simply out-of-date as far as the rest of
the world is concerned so that although I'd be happy to
continue to use it, I can't.12
Thus to some extent the 'market* not only enables, but also
constrains by determining the technology that is available, at least at a
reasonable price.13 But 'technology' may also prove a limiting constraint
in other ways. Most obviously, in a complex weapons system such as the
Navy ballistic missiles, design interfaces need to be fixed and adhered to.
From that point on subsystem technology is constrained by the need to
'fit'. Design decisions may thus have an enduring physical legacy
restricting future technology. For example, the physical size of submarine
missile mount tubes (which is of course itself limited by the size of the
submarine) limits the size of missile possible. All the US Polaris class
submarines built in the 1960s had the same size mount tubes. Once some
initial extra space had been accounted for, when Poseidon missiles were
installed, there remained no space for further expansion. When the
Trident I missiles were designed to fit the same submarines, but also to
provide about a third more range, this proved a severe constraint, which
required much ingenuity to overcome.14 Moreover, had it not been
decided to enhance crew comfort by enlarging the Polaris submarine
12. Interview.
13. Obviously it is usually possible to continue producing a technology that is considered
obsolescent if one is prepared to pay enough, as indeed the UK did when its Polaris A3
required the renovation of its solid-fuel motors.
14. See L. Smith, R. H. Wertheim and R. A. Duffy, 'Innovative Engineering in the Trident
Missile Development', Bridge (National Academy of Engineering), Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer
1980), 10-19.
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design after the first ten, then sufficient buoyancy would not have been
available to allow the back-fitting of the Poseidon and Trident I missiles.
But such technical constraints may also be understood as social or
political. In the debate over Trident, the 'technical' argument for a larger
missile was deployed by those in the Navy who favoured building a new,
much larger class of submarine. In particular, Admiral Rickover, the
'father' of nuclear propulsion, argued strongly in favour of a large
submarine because it would require a new nuclear propulsion system.
SPO, on the other hand, were sceptical of the idea of putting more, larger
missiles into a bigger submarine. A particular concern was that this meant
-fewer targets for Soviet anti-submarine warfare, but the question of size was
also connected to disputes over the division of responsibility between
Special Projects and Admiral Rickover. SPO would have preferred to live
with the 'technical constraint' of missile tube size - at least for a few more
years - if this had at the same time constrained Rickover's influence on the
FBM programme by weakening the 'technical' argument for a new
propulsion reactor.
Technologists-out-of-control?
Technological development thus has the potential to follow a
number of different courses, rather than one single predetermined
pathway. It provides capabilities and sets some constraints, but is
profoundly shaped by the social world. Most immediately, of course, it is
shaped by the technologists who develop it, and who have a considerable
interest in promoting it. Personal preferences and institutional interests
mean that many technologists like to push technologies as far as they can
in particular directions. With regard to improving the accuracy of
Poseidon by using a star-sensor, one Special Projects engineer's attitude
was: "I could provide it, so I should provide it".15 But as we have seen this
stellar-inertial system was not incorporated into Poseidon. Indeed Special
Projects' Director, Vice Admiral Levering Smith built up a considerable
reputation for not choosing technologies simply because they were 'sweet':
15. Interview.
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'Smith's strength was to know that if you could do it, it didn't necessarily
mean you ought to'.16
Such attitudes are important and Admiral Smith's personal style
shaped the character of FBM technology. But just how important depends
on various social relations. In the late 1950s Raborn and Smith had
considerable freedom and resources with which to shape the FBM
programme as they desired. But by the 1980s SSPO's leadership had to
cope with a much more interfering 'outside world' as well with a history
of organizational relations that limits their behaviour.
But what evidence is there that technologists are, as Lord
Zuckerman amongst others has suggested, manipulating the strategic and
political environment so as to create a market for their favoured
technology?17 Certainly in the Navy ballistic missile programme crucial
technological advances were developed externally and before any
'requirement' had been formulated for them. The initial breakthrough of
small high-yield warheads, the introduction of stellar inertial guidance,
and the gravity gradiometer installed in Trident submarines are all such
cases. However, none found automatic acceptance without careful
scrutiny as to how they would affect the goals and interests of the
programme. Only if technologists could transform these goals and
interests so that they then fitted their preferred technology would the
technologists-out-of-control thesis have significance.
Undoubtedly they have tried. For example, Charles Stark Draper
clearly perceived that he was trying to engineer people's attitudes as well
as guidance systems:
...I had always been interested in people that I had to deal
with and their mental attitudes and why they had these
mental attitudes and choosing something that the people in
charge had to have.1®
16. Interview.
17. Lord Zuckerman, 'Science Advisers and Scientific Advisers', Proceedings of the American
Philosophical SocietVjVol. 124 (1980), 124-55.
1®. Interview.
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Not 'wanted', but 'had to have'. There are indeed several instances in the
history of the Navy ballistic missile programme where technologists
sought to persuade 'the people in charge' that they had to have something
they had not originally wanted. But these are generally cases where the
technologists convinced 'the people in charge' that their existing goals
could be better fulfilled by a new device, not where they changed these
goals to further a preferred technology.
One candidate case of this is Draper's attempt to persuade the Navy
to rival ICBM accuracy.19 But this was a failed attempt. The only case
which might be classed as a success was the attempt to 'sell' stellar-inertial
guidance by reorientating the FBM from assured destruction to
counterforce. But even this is not clearcut. The attempt failed in the case
of Poseidon. It suceeded with Trident C4, but only as part of a
'repackaging' that emphasized stellar-inertial guidance's compatibility
with assured destruction.
So the goals of the programme managers have by no means been
putty in the hands of ambitious technological enthusiasts. Indeed FBM
programme managers have been actively aware of the threat that over-
zealous technologists can pose to their programme's success. A former
Director of SSPO recalled that:
. . . there's always going to be a technologist somewhere
who doesn't feel comfortable until you've applied all the
technology you could possibly apply. And the problem of
the program manager, of course, is to try to take all this and
balance it and make a prudent choice of what he thinks can
be done and can be done within a program cost and schedule
that he can predict and is good enough to meet the need. ...
You simply can't afford to put all the technologies into a
system that the technologists can promise.2®
19. See page 80.
20. Interview.
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Weapons Succession, the Military-Industrial Complex and 'Internal' Arms
Races
Neither 'technology' itself nor the technologists that develop it
would then seem to have determining roles in technological
developments. That it not to say, of course, that previous technology and
the preferences of technologists are not very important. They are - in both
setting historical constraints on technology which builds on that of the
past (both literally, as in the physical constraints of, say, a submarine
missile mount tube, and culturally, in the ideas and paradigms that
provide the intellectual basis that technologists draw on) and in shaping
the interests of the technical community.21
It is possible, however, to have a wider analysis which goes beyond
such a narrow definition of the interests of the technical community, but
which still argues that a kind of 'technological imperative' exists. Thus,
for example, Mary Kaldor has argued that the nature of military R&D
organizations, particularly in the USA, determines the type of technology
developed.22 In the USA this technology is typically 'baroque' - produced
through the continuing 'improvement' of several performance
parameters, such as speed, accuracy, range, but in which the
'"improvements" become less and less relevant to modern warfare, while
cost and complexity become military handicaps'.23 Baroque technology,
Kaldor argues, is produced by sovereign R&D establishments which are
nevertheless heavily dependent on government contracts - that is, defence
orientated corporations such as Lockheed. Preoccupied with maintaining
full capacity employment they emphasize the continual 'improvement' of
weapons along conservative, already-established lines - 'normal' rather
than radical technology:
These large firms emphasize risk minimization and thus
tend not to push new ideas or applications. Research is
more likely to be done on increasing the performance of a
device, rather than developing some totally new device.
21. Which in the case of the nuclear weapons laboratories has lead to very active lobbying
against nuclear test ban treaties.
22. Mary Kaldor, 'Military R&D: Cause or Consequence of the Arms Race?', International
Social Science Tournal. Vol. 35, No. 1 (1983), 25-45.
23. Mary Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal (London: Andre Deutsch, 1982), 5.
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This 'evolutionary' R&D tends to match the forms and
objectives of the firms and the DoD and even to address the
questions these firms are willing to ask. (More far-reaching
questions would pose a threat to existing organizations - an
airplane manufacturer would not want the usefulness of
airplanes questioned, nor would a military pilot.)24
The succession of FBM generations would at first sight seem a
classic instance of baroque improvement. Once established as the missile
contractor for Polaris, Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. has received non¬
competitive contracts for suceeding generations of ever more elaborate
missiles. However, a more detailed look at the FBM history suggests that
the 'baroque' explanation of weapons succession has only general utility.
Organizational interests will generally tend to exclude radical new
technologies (especially if 'not-invented-here'). Everyone, whether
private corporation, government-sponsored non-profit organization (such
as the Draper Laboratory and Johns Hopkin's Applied Physics Laboratory),
or military (such as SSPO), prefers continuity. Radical technological
developments can threaten such continuity, whereas 'evolutionary'
technical change reinforces it. But that alone does not explain which
parameters should be chosen for incremental 'improvement', why in the
FBM programme first range should be considered critical (from Polaris A1
to A2 to A3), then ABM penetration (in Poseidon), then range again (in
Trident I), and finally accuracy (in Trident II). Nor does it explain how
radical innovations were introduced, such as MRV in Polaris A3, MIRV in
Poseidon, stellar-inertial guidance in Trident I or the gravity gradiometer
for Trident n. These are not just more of the same, incremental changes.
Moreover, thoughout the FBM development, reliability has remained a
central attribute which increasing cost and complexity do not appear to
have compromized. In some areas of the system, such as the launcher
subsystem, much of the technology remained unchanged whilst the
Polaris submarines were updated to carry first the Poseidon and then the
Trident I missiles. Often indeed such technology would only be replaced
by a new one because the original was too 'obsolescent' for replacements to
be obtained at a reasonable price.25
24. Jacques S. Gansler, The Defense Industry (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980), 101.
25. Interview.
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Nor does the Trident submarine development - which in many
ways appears to be a classic example of 'baroque' technology - exactly fit an
explanation based on corporate determination to maintain (and if possible
expand) its operations. Although Electric Boat's corporate interests played
a role, it was mainly driven by the technical preferences of Admiral
Rickover of the Navy's Nuclear Propulsion Directorate. But as a state-
financed, government-dependent organization this should, in Kaldor's
classification be a source of 'conservative' technical change.26
What this suggests is that although Kaldor's distinctions between
the differing styles of different R&D organizations may be useful, they
cannot alone explain the nature of technical change. 'Baroque' technology
is a symptom of recent US weapons developments because continuity is in
the interest of most of the organizations involved. But it is not just the
nature of the organizations that matters, but also their interactions with
others. The Draper Laboratory has been continually improving its
paradigmatic floated gyroscope since the 1940s27 - its most baroque
manifestation is the MX gyroscope. But under pressure from the Navy
they did eventually agree to incorporate a steller sensor into their guidance
systems, knowing, of course, that this would tend to undercut future
arguments for further gyroscope improvement. An explanation of
technical change in weaponry must take into account such organizational
interactions.
A further variant of the role of organizational interactions in
stimulating technical change suggests that it is the product of an 'internal'
arms race. For example, Ernest Yanarella suggests that a 'technological
imperative' was institutionalized in the USA at the end of the 1950s and
the beginning of the 1960s.28 Organizations set up to help the Office of the
Secretary of Defense manage advances in military technology - most
notably the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
(DDR&E) and the Advanced Projects Research Agency (ARPA) - provided
26. Kaldor, 'Military R&D', 42.
27. See Donald MacKenzie, 'Missile Accuracy: A Case Study in the Social Processes of
Technological Change', in Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes and Trevor Pinch, The Social
Construction of Technological Systems. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), 208-09.
28. Ernest J. Yanarella, 'The "Technological Imperative" and the Strategic Arms Race',
Peace & Change. Vol. Ill, No. 1 (Spring 1975), 3-16.
205
a focus for the assessment and encouragement of change in miltary
technology, and, Yanarella argues, 'institutionalized new sources of
dynamism into defense planning at the pinnacle of the administration'.29
This was followed by the further centralization of weapons technology
decision-making - at an unprecedented level of technical detail - into OSD
during McNamara's tenure as Secretary of Defense, and by doctrinal
reassessments of nuclear strategy:30
Centralized in the executive agency of the Defense
Department and guided by the most advanced techniques of
administration and analysis, military R&D in strategic
weaponry was institutionalized and pursued during the
McNamara years in an organizational framework
characterized by the mutual interaction of military R&D in
offensive technology with military R&D in defensive
technology. . . the "technological imperative" took on
nearly all the features of an "internal arms race" pitting,
within the same agencies, American scientists and
technicians in offensive R&D against their counterparts in
defensive R&D.31
A classic example of the 'mirror imaging' consequent of such an
'internal arms race' can be found in the FBM programme. The
configuration of the Polaris A3 payload was designed to defeat the then
proposed US ABM system, the Nike Zeus, and turned out to have little
capability against the Soviet Galosh:
The penetration aid designs done originally for the Polaris
A2 and also for the Polaris A3 were built around the notion
of an antiballistic missile which looked very like
America's Nike Zeus which was our design for an ABM
system. Since we didn't know what the Soviets were doing
we assumed that they were being smart people, were doing
exactly what we were doing.32
That such 'mirror imaging' is an important factor is not in doubt, but to
what extent does it constitute a technological imperative, and to what
extent did the period in question mark a distinctive change? Was it really
29. Ibid, 6.
30. Notably, the (admittedly somewhat arbitrary) quantification of 'assured destruction'
and of the counterforce and 'damage-limiting' funcions of strategic nuclear forces. See Alain
C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith. How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program.




the case that 'this technological planning process . . . increasingly adopted
the features of a closed system where interest in the character of the Soviet
threat, Soviet perceptions of specific weapons programs, and other
"external" data were of secondary importance to "internal" requirements
of the system'?33
In fact, of course, 'mirror imaging' was not a new phenomenon in
military planning - as can be seen by looking back at the previous decade.
McNamara's OSD may have brought a more analytical emphasis to
assessing and justifying weapons requirements - and made explicit, for
example, how much 'assured destruction' was enough - but the basic
processes remained the same. Only previously each service would
produce its own distinctive analysis of the threat and of their requirements
to counter it. Indeed in a 1961 briefing to the Secretary of Defense the
Navy was still justifying a figure of 45 FBM submarines without
mentioning the nuclear forces of the other services:
The briefing began with a list of targets to be destroyed, a
calculation as to how many missiles should be programmed
per target, how many were needed on station, how many
were needed in the total force to maintain that number on
station, and thus why a force of 45 Polaris submarines was
required. In the entire briefing, there was not one reference
to the existence of the Air Force or its weapons systems,
despite the fact that most of our nuclear firepower was then
in Air Force bombers.34
What each service 'required' depended primarily on their dominant
technological and organizational traditions, and on what looked likely to
enhance their portion of the defence budget. Radically new technologies,
such as ballistic missiles, were thus not 'required' as much as the more
traditional weapons, such as bombers and aircraft carriers. Moreover,
throughout the 1950s the size and nature of forces remained largely up to
the services within the constraint of their budget allocation. In so much as
weapons acquisition required justification each service constructed its own
rationales based on its own interpretation of intelligence data. Thus
during the 1950s the Air Force acquired huge numbers of nuclear bombs -
33. Yanarella, 9.
34. Enthoven and Smith, 171.
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and a large bomber force to carry them - by 'finding' ever more Soviet
targets to attack.35
Lacking any coherent, consensual, systematic way of analysing the
utility of nuclear forces, the main focus of the 'internal arms race' during
the 1950s was inter-service rivalry. Technological developments were no
less sought than in the 1960s, they were simply less channeled towards
specific, explicitly defined national missions. Indeed weapon systems
development proliferated during the 1950s so that by the end of the decade
the Air Force alone was engaged in programmes for three ICBMs (Titan,
Atlas and Minuteman), an IRBM (Thor), an air-launched ballistic missile
(Skybolt), several cruise missiles (Snark, Matador, Mace, and Hound Dog),
three conventional bombers (B52, B58 and B70) and a nuclear-powered
bomber. This last programme, known as the ANP (for aircraft nuclear
propulsion), involved a curious example of 'rhetorical' mirror-imaging.
Under development since just after World War II the ANP programme
came under particularly critical examination in the late 1950s as its
feasibility and utility were questioned.36 Coincidentally proponents of the
ANP suddenly revealed that the Soviet Union was flight testing a similar
aircraft and the journal Aviation Week even published sketches of it.37
The ANP was eventually cancelled by the Kennedy Administration, and
with it, its Soviet mirror-image vanished too.
It was as a response to this uncoordinated technological
proliferation of the 1950s that the offices of DDR&E and ARPA were
formed, and McNamara's more centralized managerial methods, such as
the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, introduced.38 By explicitly
defining the purposes of nuclear forces - using criteria such as 'assured
destruction' - these changes did certainly channel technological change in
particular directions. At the same time, however, they also provided OSD
with the 'tools' that allowed many other programmes, including Skybolt,
Snark, the B-70 and ANP, to be cancelled. The changes institutionalized in
35. See D. A. Rosenberg, 'The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy,
1945-1960', International Security. (1983), 50.
36. See Herbert York, Race to Oblivion: A Participants View of the Arms Race (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1970), chapter 4.
37. Aviation Week (December 1, 1958), 28.
38. See Enthoven and Smith.
208
OSD were as much a check on technological developments as a part of
their stimulus.
In any case the 'technological imperative' of the 'internal arms race'
is neither completely impervious to 'external' events (no matter how
much intelligence of Soviet behaviour is mediated by inevitable
judgemental interpretation), nor a strong determinant of the nature of
technical change. An 'internal arms race' between offence and defence
would be expected to stimulate the development of ABM technologies to
destroy incoming missiles, on the one hand, and penetration aids to
maintain 'assured destruction', on the other. This might appear to have
been the case in Poseidon where large numbers of small warheads were
chosen to enhance penetration against the possibility of widespread
deployment of Galosh-type ABMs (which, of course, drew at least partly on
knowledge of what the Soviets were doing). It would not explain,
however, why at the same time the Air Force Minuteman MIRV placed so
much more emphasis on the ability to attack hard targets rather than
penetration, or why subsequent developments in Trident I and II would
increasingly emphasise counterforce capability with no significant
penetration aids produced.
In fact, the notion of an 'internal arms race', important though it
might be as a stimulus for R&D, cannot account for the importance of the
growing mutual disillusionment with ABM defences during the 1960s that
eventually led the USA and USSR to sign the ABM Treaty in 1972, nor for
the interest in counterforce (and its differing attraction for the Air Force
and the Navy). The closed system of an 'internal arms race' fails to
account for the importance of these broader influences in shaping
technological change.
Similar problems also occur when attempting to explain weapons
procurement as the result of a yet still more encompassing domestic
influence - that which has come to be known as the Military-Industrial
Complex.39 Briefly characterized, this viewpoint explains high levels of
military spending in the USA as the result of the 'vested interests' of the
39. For a useful collection of essays, see Steven Rosen (ed.), Testing the Theory of the
Military-Industrial Complex (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973).
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military, defence corporations, governmental and legislative elites,
defence-related scientists and technologists, and other pressure groups
(such as right-wing 'think-tanks' and veterans associations).
Weapons procurement and defence R&D provide the links by
which corporate, scientific-technical and military interests mutually
benefit. As a corollary of this it would not be surprising to find that these
groups are mutually supportive, nor that they would be actively
encouraged by regional legislators who would appear likely to gain
political benefit from any creation (or retention) of jobs in their locality.
Given the levels of funding which go to defence R&D and procurement in
the USA this 'network' of interests is likely to form a powerful force
pushing technology.40 But to what extent can it seen as a determinant of
weapons technology?
For example, can the apparent phenomenon of the 'follow-on
imperative'41 - whereby defence corporations are kept in business through
the awarding of contracts for successor weapons systems - be explained as
the result of the machinations of the Military-Industrial Complex? The
history of FBM technology, with each suceeding generation non-
compejtively awarded to Lockheed, would appear to be a classic case of such
a 'follow-on imperative'. Flowever, what has been called the 'weapons
succession process' cannot be explained simply in terms of corporate profit
(or survival).
Such economic arguments for weapons succession fail to explain
technical change. If the sole factor were maintaining corporate profitability
or survival then this might be achieved by continued production of the
same technology, with technical innovation restricted to improving the
process not the product. But, in fact, the opposite is typically the case -
technical innovation focuses on product, not process. As already noted,
the weapons succession process is characterized by its emphasis on product
innovation, producing 'gold-plated', 'baroque' technology.
40. A prime example, perhaps, of what Langdon Winner sees as the corporate basis of
technological momentum. See Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-control as a Theme
in Political Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977).
41. See James R. Kurth, 'American Production Lines and American Defense Spending', in
Rosen (ed.), 135-56.
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Indeed it would seem a general failing of Military-Industrial
Complex theories that whilst they may account for the scale of resources
allocated to military technology, they provide little explanation for the
nature of technical change. A variety of 'vested interests' may share a
common interest in, and gain mutual benefit from, high levels of
spending on the development and production of weapons technology, but
they are unlikely to exhibit such unanimity on exactly which projects
should benefit. The Military-Industrial Complex may be an identifiable
and powerful alliance of interests, but it is not without internal divisions.
An instance in the FBM programme which might seem to typify the
workings of the Military-Industrial Complex was the introduction of
stellar-inertial guidance. Here two Kearfott Presidents (Marvin Stern and
John Brett) passed through the 'revolving door' between Government and
the defence industry- one joining Kearfott after working in the Defense
Department, the other temporarily leaving Kearfott to work in OSD. Both
were to be influential advocates of stellar-inertial guidance, playing
important roles in getting it adopted initially for the Poseidon Mk4
guidance system, and then actually deployed in Trident I. In this they were
clearly heterogeneous engineers, attempting to build a network of interests
to support their favoured technology. In Poseidon their success was
shortlived, when it seems a tactical mistake was made in attempting to
promote the acceleration of the introduction of stellar-inertial guidance by
reference to overt counterforce capability. The lesson was learned, and for
Trident I John Brett was influential in shaping the system's goals in ways
which would favour the attributes of stellar-inertial whilst staying within
the context of 'assured destruction'.
As already noted, the managers of weapons programmes are
confronted with many such 'salesmen', pushing their various
technologies. But only a few are successful. Given these competing
interests (between the Air Force and the Navy, say, or the Draper
Laboratory and Kearfott) what actually decides the nature of technology?
Are the final arbitrators the politicians, in the Administration and
Congress, who ultimately are 'in charge'?
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Politics-in-Command?
Explanations which assert the primacy of political control over
weapons procurement can be separated into two kinds. Firstly, there is the
importance of the electoral process as a determinant of weapons
technology or the 'democratic explanation'.42 For example, a persuasive
case has been made for the broad effect of Democrat politicians boosting
military spending because of over-reaction to 'hawkish' criticism.43 Thusof
President Kennedy, having 'milked' full electoral value out/the 'missile
gap', sought a quick acceleration of the Polaris programme. Similarly, (but
with a Republican), on taking office Nixon instructed Defense Secretary
Laird to bolster the defence posture in a visible, but cheap way - one result
being the acceleration of the stellar-inertial option for Poseidon. But
though persuasive, this version of 'politics-in-command' is not
analytically far-reaching: it can indeed be seen as simply an adjunct to the
'bureaucratic politics' position reviewed below. Of much greater analytical
importance is the second version of politics-in-command, in which
weapons procurement is seen simply as the result of rational decision¬
making by unitary actors in response to military and political
requirements determined by the 'threat'.
Thus, in his famous San Francisco speech announcing his (clearly
3°
reluctant) intention to/ahead with a 'thin' ABM system purportedly to
defend against Chinese nuclear weapons, Secretary of Defense McNamara
enunciated an 'action-reaction' theory of the arms race:
What is essential to understand here is that the
Soviet Union and United States mutually influence one
another's strategic plans. Whatever their intentions,
whatever be our intentions, actions - or even realistically
potential actions - on either side relating to the build-up of
nuclear forces, be they either offensive or defensive
weapons, necessarily trigger reactions on the other side. It
is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an
arms race.44
42 Ibid, 136.
43. Alan Wolfe, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Threat: Domestic Sources of the Cold War
Consensus (Boston: South End Press, 1984).
44. Quoted in Thee, 112.
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As such the 'action-reaction phenomenon' focuses on 'external'
determinants of weapons technology. The technology was a response to
what the other side - the Soviets (or even the Chinese) - was doing. Thus,
for example, Poseidon's MIRV design is said to have been a response to
the appearance of the Gal osh ABM. The problem with the action-
reaction phenomenon in practice is that the reaction has often been
premature, excessive or even completely inappropriate.
The reasons for this would seem, at root, to be 'internal' in two
ways. Firstly, what the 'external' world consists of is not unambiguous,
and what it will look in, say, five years must be speculative. No matter
how 'technically' proficient intelligence collecting methods are, the data
collected still need to be analysed and interpreted. Secondly, even when a
consensus is reached about what the 'external' world looks like, it still
remains to be decided what is to be done about it. So although 'external'
actions are an important input they would by no means seem to
determine what the output - the reactions - will be.
And even once such 'decisions' as to the most appropriate reaction
were reached there remains the question of whether technical change is
something that can simply be directed by political elites. Just how
powerful are the President, the Secretary of Defense and Congress (to name
the major actors)? On the face of it, there is much evidence which suggests
that these political elites can be very important in 'deciding' important
attributes of weapons technology.
For example, pressure from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
was important in the improvement of missile accuracy. Most obviously
Secretary Schlesinger's 1974 review of nuclear strategy towards more
flexible Limited Nuclear Options and his pressure for an Improved
Accuracy Program were especially significant. However, it is clear from
this example that this was not a question of command in the archetypal
military sense. 'Pressure' is indeed the appropriate term here as political
leaders sought to obtain greater accuracy from the Navy missiles. For two
reasons it was simply not possible to command the technology into being.
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First of all there is a general limitation to command. Technological
change simply does not possess either the transparency or the predictability
that would be required for straightforward command to be possible.
Dominant social groups, whether these be political, business or military
elites, are typically in no position to shape technological change in the
conscious, literal sense that we can imagine an artist moulding clay. If
they choose between given technological options, then those who present
those options to them have an opportunity both to set the agenda
(deciding which options to present) and to influence the decision in the
way they portray the advantages and disadvantages of different options. If
they seek to create a new technology, then they may well need advice as to
feasibility - for what they desire may be physically impossible, or hopelessly
expensive, or whatever. Sometimes, indeed, an elite group may simply be
unsure precisely what its interests and goals are, at least in the area in
question.
Secondly, and more specifically, politics-in-command fails to
provide an adequate explanation in the US political context. Here a
combination of democratic political system and complex and overlapping
jurisdictions creates a situation where political leaders such as a President
or Secretary of Defense have to engage in a process more akin to
bargaining than to giving orders.
Clearly, however, there are certain positions in the formal political
system which can be very important influences on weapons technology.
Depending on their personal interests, the President, Secretary of Defense,
Secretary of State, National Security Advisor, head of the CIA, and Chairs
of key Congressional committess can all wield considerable influence.
Ultimately a Presidential decision (such as that by President Reagan to
advocate strategic defenses) can be a powerful event. But no matter how
persuasive an advocate the President is, and regardless of his formal
position as commander-in-chief, his power can be formally limited by
Congress, informally limited by obdurate bureaucracies, and eventually
limited by a maximum tenure of eight years.
Typically the Administration and Congress have played a mainly
passive role in managing the development of weaponry. Within funding
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limits and a general post-war consensus on 'national security' the fine
detail of weapons characteristics, numbers and operational strategy have
been largely left to the services. An exception, of course, was during
McNamara's term as Secretary of Defense when many such issues came
under close scrutiny by OSD. Since then, though not to its former extent,
defence 'decision-making' has become decentralized again. Most of the
time Congress and the Secretary of Defense will 'rubber stamp' the services
recommendations - at least on issues considered to be 'technical' - so long
as they accord with the overall defence policy.
\
This policy is itself (to a large extent) institutionally ingrained. It is
embedded both in doctrinal and operational documents such as the
Nuclear Weapons Employment Plan (NUWEP) and SIOP, and also in
unwritten organizational 'culture'. That is not to say that it is static, of
course, that it is not contested amongst the various actors involved, or
even that it is internally consistant. But a new administration certainly
does not start with a clean slate on which it can enscribe its preferences.
President Carter's initial interest in changing US nuclear posture to
dependence on only a few FBM submarines so as to provide 'assured
destruction' retaliation provides an illustrative example.45 Such a
proposal, naive as it no doubt appeared to insiders, was not inconsistant
with the bulk of US declaratory statements about strategic deterrence made
over the previous decade. These seemed to indicate that the potential for
'assured destruction' of a substantial part of Soviet urban-industrial areas
(that is, cities) was the central plank of deterrence. So why not simply rely
on a few of the apparently invulnerable Poseidon-carrying submarines?
The answer was, of course, that 'assured destruction' was only the
declaratory rationale for nuclear weapons, it was not the 'real' reason why
most defence insiders supported a large, diversified 'triad' of nuclear
weapons with varying capabilities, including some (such as high accuracy
ICBMs) which made little sense simply for assured destruction.
As President Carter would come to learn, these reasons included not
only rational (if somewhat esoteric) arguments about the political utility of
counterforce and the symbolic need to match (or exceed) Soviet
45. See T. Powers, 'Choosing a Strategy for World War IIP, The Atlantic Monthly
(November 1982),
215
capabilities, but also domestic politics such as interservice rivalry. Carter
was persuaded to drop his radical proposals as he came to view the world
through the eyes of the 'defence establishment', attuned not only to the
Soviet 'threat', but also to the political need to pander to various domestic
constituencies. Moreover, even his decision to cancel the B-l bomber,
which 'required' concessions elsewhere, would provide only a temporary
hiatus for that programme.
Perhaps instead of focusing on the individual leaders it might
instead be possible to explain weapons developments as the logical
fulfilment of doctrinal requirements embodied in various national
security docu ments, such as the SIOP and NUWEP? These, along with
unwritten organizational traditions, might be the things that really guide
weapons procurement and provide consistency from one administration
to another. Is there evidence to suggest that it is in fact nuclear doctrine
that determines the nature of weapons technology?
The answer would seem to be only up to a point, for two reasons.
First of all, assuming there was a coherent doctrine formulated to guide
weapons developments, this would only say what the technology was
required to do. For example, high accuracy could arguably be obtained by
improved inertial guidance, stellar-inertial guidance, mid-course Global
Positioning System updates or terminal homing guidance. The second
difficulty with the notion of 'doctrine-in-command' is that it by no means
seems the case that the coherent formation of doctrine necessarily precedes
and directs developments in weapons technology.
Since its first incarnation in 1960 the targeting warplan, the SIOP,
has always been a capabilities plan, utilising whatever forces were
available (although with increasingly more flexible options in recent
versions). Following its revision in 1962 the SIOP remained unchanged
for over a decade, during which time 'assured destruction' rose to
prominence as the public face of deterrence. But although the 'damage
limiting' counterforce mission was eventually disavowed, counterforce
accuracy remained doctrinally justified by the need 'to follow a policy of
limiting our retaliatory strikes to the enemy's military targets and not
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attacking his cities if he refrained from attacking ours'.46 Along with the
continuing emphasis on 'assured destruction' nuclear doctrine thus
provided a generalized rationale for high accuracy ICBMs and lower
accuracy (but less vulnerable) FBMs.
For much of the time the doctrine relating to nuclear weapons has
consisted of disparate and conflicting elements. A public emphasis on
'assured destruction' has obscured a SIOP which contained a substantial
counterforce element. Arms control policy seemed to say that it was
important not to threaten the ability of either side to retaliate (as codified
in the 1972 ABM Treaty), but procurement policy encouraged the
development of hard target capable MIRVed ICBMs which did exactly that.
It was only under Carter that nuclear doctrine came to favour
counterforce, both explicitly and publicly. At last declaratory doctrine was
^ be brought into line with procurement policy, which, at least in the Air
Force, had devoted considerable resources to the development of
counterforce capability.
Even then nuclear doctrine does not so much appear to 'direct'
technical change as to go hand in hand with it. Key figures in an
administration will often be involved in questions of technical and
doctrinal innovation at the same time. Thus Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger was involved in publicising the change in nuclear doctrine
towards 'Limited Nuclear Options' (which was codified in the Nuclear
Weapons Employment Plan or NUWEP in 1975 and introduced into a
new version of the SIOP in January 1976) at the same time as he was
pushing the Navy to provide more accuracy in its FBM system. But at
least publicly he stressed that 'Limited Nuclear Options' did not depend
on increased accuracy.47 Similarly the thinking in the Carter
administration that eventually lead to the promulgation of Presidential
46. Draft Memorandum for the President. Subject: Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces
(Revised January 15,1968), 9.
47. Thus in testimony before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and
Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, March 4, 1974,
reprinted in Robert J. Pranger and Roger P. Labrie (eds.), Nuclear Strategy and National
Security: Points of View (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1977), 104-17, at 105-06 Schlesinger says that: "The change in targeting doctrine
does not require new capabilities.... We are asking money in this budget for... some
improvements in accuracy, but the change in targeting doctrine does not depend for its
efficiency upon getting this money'.
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Directive 59 involved people who were also pushing for accuracy in
Trident II and MX. One such figure recalled how this new
pronouncement about national strategy from the top served to crystallize
changes that were already happening:
Doctrine is thus related to weapons development, though
declaratory doctrine may not tally with operational plans, and neither may
be entirely compatible with procurement policy. Indeed these various
aspects of doctrine are, like the weapons technology itself, the outcomes of
many relationships between a variety of actors. They are inter-related, but
none can be seen as the direct result of another.
Bureaucratic Politics
The limitations on the power of top political authorities have been
thoroughly documented by what has perhaps been the dominant strand of
political science studies of weapons programmes, dominant at least at the
'case study' level. This is the 'bureaucratic politics' approach. These
studies emphasize that states are not unitary actors. They are complex
ensembles of often sharply divided organizations. Policy is not decision,
with that term's connotation of the formulation of goals and then rational
choice of the means to fulfil those goals, but outcome, the often internally
contradictory result of multiple and repeated contest.49
A bureaucratic politics explanation accords well with much of the
history of FBM technology. Throughout there has been the pervasive
significance for the FBM programme of conflict between the Navy and the
Air Force (or, to be more exact, of the studious avoidance of such conflict).
It is clear that 'the Navy' itself is not unitary, and that conflicts within it
48. Interview.
49. A classic account is G. T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile
Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971). For its application to weapons development, see
G. T. Allison and F. A. Morris, 'Armaments and Arms Control: Exploring the Determinants of
Military Weapons', Daedalus. Vol. 104 99-129.
With the PD-59 story having been pulled together that
provided everybody with the theological framework
around which you could rally and say we need it
[counterforce] because of the following. It's national
policy, it's no longer intuitive judgement and whimsy...48
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(e.g. between SPO and Rickover, or SPO and the Great Circle Group) have
influenced FBM programmes. Furthermore, sub-units such as SPO can
themselves be disaggregated, and found to contain technologically-
important tensions, for example those between SP-23 (Guidance and Fire
Control) and SP-24 (Navigation). Further disaggregation is no doubt
possible, but since we are here dealing with sub-sub-units with staff
numbering in the dozens rather than hundreds we are already close to the
level of individuals.
One example from the history of FBM technology is the October
1971 'decision' by President Nixon to accelerate FBM submarine
construction as a 'bargaining chip' for SALT. What at first sight might
seem a rational decision based on international politics was in fact the
outcome of the interactions of the various parts of 'the bureaucracy'.
Initially the idea came from Paul Nitze, the Secretary of Defense's
representative at the SALT negotiations. Nitze - always of a somewhat
'hawkish' disposition - was becoming increasingly annoyed at the way
Kissinger manipulated Presidential access, and worried about what he saw
as Kissinger's tendency to make concessions in order to get a deal.50 On
noting that the Soviets delegates at SALT seemed especially concerned
about US plans to replace Polaris, Nitze reported back to Secretary of
Defense Laird and his deputy Packard that a decision to proceed with FBM
submarine construction 'would give the United States considerable
leverage at the talks'.51 Nixon, it seems, was persuaded of this 'bargaining
chip' rationale, but White House staff generally favoured building more of
the existing FBM submarine design rather than accelerating the
development of the proposed ULMS submarine. To Kissinger, however,
the bargaining chip was something to be used straightaway, not against the
Soviet Union, but against Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. The SALT talks were stalemated on the issue of limits for FBM
submarines, which Kissinger was willing to concede the Soviet Union
should be allowed more of because of their lesser capability (particularly
compared to the MIRVed Poseidon). To make this palatable to Admiral
50. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. On Watch (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), 490.
51. Ibid, 154.
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Moorer and gain service support Kissinger agreed to accelerate US
submarine construction at the same time.52
But then Packard worked with factions within the Navy (such as
Admiral Rickover's office) to exclude Kissinger from the final choice. To
avoid the possibility of simply constructing more submarines of the
existing type (which some White House staff were known to favour), OSD
carried out studies which were prepared so as to show that ULMS
acceleration was the best choice.53 The White House was not consulted
and when Secretary of Defense Laird announced the decision to accelerate
ULMS it was, it seems, without President Nixon's explicit agreement.
This was a satisfactory result for many parts of the Navy (but not SPO, of
course) and for people in OSD who were sick of the interference of the
Kissinger-instigated Defense Program Review Committee. The outcome,
however, was felt by many to be of dubious value as a bargaining chip, and
to also be questionable as the best choice for the future of the FBM force.
Moreover the decision to agree to the accelerated schedule (in order to
make the ULMS option appear competitive with building more Poseidon-
type FBM submarines or converting existing attack submarines) was to
cause the programme great embarr^sment in the future.
It would be hard to explain this episode without reference to the
organizational wranglings of 'bureaucratic polities'. However, particular
formulations of the bureaucratic politics approach have been rightly
criticized.54 It is clearly without foundation, empirical or theoretical, to
treat organizations as unitary. If 'America' must be disaggregated, so must
'the Navy'. Nor are particular individuals the predictable products of
their organizational location. Formal hierarchical authority, that of the
Secretary of Defense or President, is not unimportant, even though it is
only one political resource amongst several. Private corporations, as well
as state bodies, are important - for example the important role in FBM
guidance decisions played by the activities of Kearfott, and the influence of
Lockheed as missile contractor for every generation of FBM is obviously
52. John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1973), 246.
53. See page 142.
54. See M. R. Sidrow, 'Politics and Military Weapons Acquisition: The Limits of
Bureaucratic Political Theory' (PhD Thesis, University of California, Riverside, 1983).
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important, though hard to assess precisely. The external world - what The
Russians actually do'- is not irrelevant, however important are the
bureaucratic processes by which crucial data, such as in this case that about
Soviet anti-submarine warfare and anti-ballistic missile capabilities, are
processed.
Graeme Allison's classic study of the Cuban Missile Crisis - in
attempting to demonstrate the model for a very 'hard' case - has come in
for particular criticism.55 These critiques argue that organizational process
and bureaucratic politics56 are often of only peripheral interest, and that
real decision-making happens at a higher level. Thus in the case-studies
of Allison (Cuban Missile Crisis) or Halperin57 (ABM decision) it is clear
that the President was a very important figure, (that the behaviour of many
key actors could not be explained in terms of their organizational
affiliations. Allison's popular aphorism - 'Where you sit is where you
stand' - seemed frequently to be wrong.58
Nonetheless, the essential insights of the bureaucratic politics
approach - that policy and weapons procurement should be viewed as the
outcome of social interactions in which rational argument is only one
factor - are confirmed by this study. Most of the 'criticisms' -justified as
this case also shows them to be - apply more to later, unimaginative and
over-rigid versions than to the approach's theoretical foundations in the
work, for example, of Simon on 'bounded rationality'.59
Moreover, a distinction should also be made between the
development of policy and that of technology. An important policy
55. D. J. Ball, 'The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Critique of Bureaucratic Politics Theory',
Australian Outlook. Vol. 28 (1974), 71-92: S. D. Krasner, 'Are Bureaucracies important? (Or
Allison Wonderland)', Foreign Policv^Summer 1972), 159-79.
56. Allison discusses these separately as two different models to contrast with the rational
actor one, but clearly they can be combined as in G. T. Allison and M. H. Halperin,
'Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implication', World Politics. Vol. 24
(Spring 1972), 40-79.
57. M. H. Halperin, 'The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics
in the Johnson Administraion', World Politics. Vol. 25 (October 1972), 62-95.
58 See Ball, 77 & 83.
59. See, for example, H. Simon, 'A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', Quarterly Tournal
of Economics Vol. 69 (1955), 99-118. One application of Simon's insights to a weapons
programme is J. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1974).
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decision can be made overnight, and is thus much more susceptible to
'top-down' command. A group of individual leaders - such as the
members of the US Executive Committee in the Cuban Missile Crisis - can
reach decisions which go against their organizational affiliations (if they
indeed have any). When it comes to implementation the policy must
(except in very exceptional cases) pass through the relevant bureaucracies,
and then organizational interests and preferences may take affect. If the
policy demands instant action then there will limited scope for alteration,
but if it sets in motion a long-term process bureaucratic politics inevitably
becomes more influential. Modern weapons technology, of course, may
take a decade or more to develop and during this time will be repeatedly
subjected to the influence of bureaucratic interactions.
And, of course, the weapons procurement process is to a large extent
the realm of military organizations, in which the uniformed military
provide an unusual degree of consistency. Here doctrinal uniformity and
organizational loyalty do tend to produce predictable allegiances. Whilst
politicians and civilian appointees may be less the product of their
bureucratic affiliation, they are also likely to be less important in shaping a
weapons technology over the full term of its development. They are not,
as this study shows, unimportant, but they must operate in an
environment shaped by the exigencies of bureaucratic interactions.
But does this mean that politics really is in command, albeit
bureaucratic politics rather than 'high' politics? The difficulty with that
conclusion is that just as bureaucratic politics shapes technology, so
technological change shapes bureaucratic politics. The most striking
instance of this concerns the military services' changing strategic
preferences. The correlation we have noticed - the Air Force being pro
counterforce, the Navy pro assured destruction - was in fact fairly new. In
an earlier dispute in the^940s the positions adopted had been opposite:
In urging the procurement of the new long-range B-36
bomber, which would necessarily have limited bombing
accuracy, the Air Force was advocating a policy of using
nuclear weapons against large urban areas in time of war.
The Navy challenged both the effectiveness and morality
of this strategy and offered as an alternative increased
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reliance on carrier-based aircraft to pinpoint and deliver
nuclear and conventional weapons to military targets.60
What brought about the change, from the Navy side, was most centrally
Polaris. It was not, as we have seen, that a strategy - national or
bureaucratic - was chosen and then Polaris created to fulfil its
requirements. Rather, the Polaris programme was embarked on for
reasons not much more specific than that missiles were the coming thing
and that a coalition of interests came to support the idea that the Navy had
to have one. Only as Polaris took shape did the realization evolve that
'assured destruction' was the strategy that best justified it.
Technology and Politics - 'The Seamless Web'
It would seem, then, that analysis which begins with 'technology',
leads towards 'polities'; and that which starts with 'polities', leads to
'technology'. Often, indeed, it becomes difficult to distinguish the two. Is
the diameter of a missile launch tube, for example, a 'political' or a
'technological' matter?
The actors involved, it turns out, can answer that question: they, in
their interviews, routinely distinguished 'technical' decisons about
technology from 'political' decisions about technology. However, that
dichotomy does not capture at all well what they do , as distinct from what
they say about what they do. In their activity, for example in the design
decisions they take, 'technology' and 'politics' are interwoven. These
engineers are indeed heterogeneous engineers.61 Further, they do not
always apply the 'technical'/'political' dichotomy consensually. One
person's 'technical' decision is another's 'political' one. This is in large
part because one major criterion of distinction they use is whether or not
they agree with the decision. A good decision is typically regarded as
'technical'; a bad one as 'political'. Thus the decision to move from the
C4's vidicon to the D5's charge-coupled device was described as 'political'
(intended to enhance the authority of the Draper Laboratory within the
60. Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic
Success in Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 5-6.
61. J. Law, 'Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The Case of Portuguese Expansion',
in Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 111-34.
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design process) by an interviewee who disagreed with it. That
characterization would, of course, be challenged by someone who agreed
with the decision.
The historical or sociological analyst cannot take sides in this kind
of dispute. It is not simply that we are incompetent to classify such
decisions as right or wrong. More importantly, satisfactory explanation
requires impartiality and symmetry in this respect.62 We need to seek
equivalent explanations of 'good' and 'bad' decisions and not, as is very
common in the social science literature on technology, seek 'political'
explanations only for bad decisions. So the actors' distinction between 'the
technical' and 'the political' is one the analyst cannot adopt.
The literature of the 'new' sociology of technology - and indeed
most recent history of technology - has, however, a simple answer to the
apparent problem. The distinction is quite unnecessary, it argues. There is
a 'seamless web' in which 'the technical', 'the social', 'the economic', 'the
political' are inextricably interwoven.63
This conclusion is wholly in line with the findings of this study. It
shows that the polar 'technology-out-of-control' and 'politics-in-
command' views fail; that 'technology' and 'politics' interact; indeed that
'interact' is too weak a word for their labyrinthine interconnections and
intermingling. In this respect the social construction of technology (SCOT)
approach advocated by Pinch and Bijker seems to be inadequate.64
Technology cannot be considered simply the product of social relations, as
that approach implies. Technology is a part of social relations.
It should not be surprising then that attempts to understand
technical developments in monocausal terms are doomed to failure. Such
attempts deny the complexity of the seamless web. At the same time of
course such a conclusion has only limited value. It serves as a reminder
that technology should not be considered simplistically as either product
or cause alone, and that the best methodological approach to technology
62. See Pinch and Bijker,.
63. T. P. Hughes, 'The Seamless Web: Technology, Science, Etcetera, Etcetera', Social
Studies of Sciences/oh 16 (1986), 281-92.
64. Pinch and Bijker.
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studies may be that of the thorough historian. Rather than attempting to
constrain empirical case studies to fit particular theories, it may be more
fruitful 'to follow the actors' - both human and non-human - so as not to
mask the rich tapestry in which the 'social' and 'technical' mingle.
Such studies can be useful in two ways. They can provide insight
into the specific technology studied (such as FBM technology in this case)
and they can perhaps allow more general patterns to be understood. Thus
it is clear that the seamless web is not shapeless. There are patterns which
can be usefully recognized, such as in the nature of weapons programmes.
Here it is clear why 'technology' and 'politics' are so hard to distinguish -
any successful programme obviously must 'work' both technically and
politically. It also suggests that a characterization of 'programmes' would
help us understand the patterns in the seamless web.
Inside the Black Box
One important such characterization is the degree of 'black-boxing'
of programmes. A black-box programme is one that reaves input
(money, time, people, instructions) from its environment and reliably
processes these into output that is acceptable (a 'working' weapon system),
without actors in that environment needing, or perhaps being able, to
enquire into or tinker with the internal contents of the programme.
From its very inception the managers of the Fleet Ballistic Missile
programme were aware of the significance of building a black box around
their technology. That is to say, almost tautologically, that it is the degree
of black-boxing itself which defines what is technical and what is political.
In the 1950s weapons technologies were generally regarded as black boxes,
which the government paid for, but did not interfere in. SPO, however,
were unusually successful in keeping the FBM programme a black box, the
contents of which were 'technical' and therefore of no concern to
politicians. By limiting interference with its internal behaviour SPO was
thus able not only to meet goals, but also (to a considerable degree) to set
the goals themselves.65 Thus technical difficulties were far greater than
65. In this context black-boxing and programme success seem to be intimately connected, but
this is probably not a universal connection - early post-1945 Soviet weapons programmes
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the FBM's reputation would suggest (as, for example, most of the early
FBM warheads had considerable reliability problems). But these
difficulties were kept inside the black box.
The decisions of FBM managers, 'technical' and 'political' alike,
have been shaped by the perceived exigencies of black-boxing. FBM
programme managers have known that the worst thing they could do
would be to take on a performance requirement and then be seen to fail to
meet it. So for Polaris they made sure, as Sapolsky puts it, that:
'Performance was a manipulatable variable'66 - so increasing the chances
of success by keeping at least a degree of control within the black box over
the criteria of what was to count as a 'working' system. Gradually they
have been pushed towards formal requirements, especially for accuracy,
but they have taken these on only as their confidence in meeting them has
grown. They have thus avoided dangerous 'overcompliance' with the
demands of their environment, while simultaneously avoiding too overt
'undercompliance'. Where necessary they have compromised, as with the
selection of the C4 warhead which they believed to be an unnecessary
expense. Great attention has been given to avoiding generating
Congressional or bureaucratic enemies who might seek to open the black
box. So the C4's specification was in part shaped to avoid giving offence
within Congress, while relations to the Air Force have been the subtext of
much of the history of FBM accuracy - accuracy being deprioritized when
its pursuit might have sparked interservice rivalry, and being prioritized
when the troubles of the Air Force's MX made a counterforce Trident
seem widely desirable.
Successful black-boxing has important consequences. A black-boxed
programme creates a boundary between 'technology' and 'polities'. This,
along with the criterion of agreement or disagreement, is another way that
the culture we have been studying distinguishes the 'technical' from the
'political'. What is inside the black box is 'technical'; what is outside is
'political'. Separate spheres of responsibility are thereby created. So long
were far from black boxes as far as Party leaders were concerned, but were remarkably
successful nonetheless. See David Holloway, 'Innovation in the Defence Sector:
Battletanks and ICBMs", in R. Amann and J. Cooper (ed.), Industrial Innovation in the
Soviet Union (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), 368-414.
66. Sapolsky, 141.
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as the desired output is smoothly produced, programme managers, their
contractors and advisors, make decisions within the black box. The formal
political system - the Secretary of Defense, President, Congress - are then
presented with appropriately simple decisions, between 'buying' the
package, the black box, or rejecting it. They are not troubled by 'technical
detail'. But when programmes are no longer seen as a black box - such as
in the MX development - then 'technical' issues can become 'political' and
success elusive.
This separation of 'technology' and 'politics' is of course a
production. Very careful shaping of 'technical' decisions may be needed to
keep the black box shut and so maintain the separation. But if it is
successful this shaping will be structural rather than overt. What we will
not find is controversy, with different 'political' interests aligned behind
different 'technical' options.67 Rather^ve will see a series of apparently
smooth, entirely 'technical' decisions -what some analysts of technical
change would refer to as a 'trajectory'.
Whether the black box can be kept shut is not, however, a matter
entirely, or probably even largely, within the control of programme
managers. Certainly it has become an ever more difficult task for the FBM
programme. With Secretary McNamara in the early 1960s the Department
of Defense became more interventionist, as did Congress with the Anti-
Ballistic Missile debate of the late 1960s and the entanglement in Vietnam.
Although the Department of Defense is now perhaps less interventionist,
Congress may sometimes even be more so. 'Micromanagement' of
programmes by the formal political system [this actors' term roughly
means the opposite of black-boxing] has grown. Whereas once Admiral
Raborn alone was able to 'keep the outside world at bay' by the early 1980s
both the Director and Technical Director had to spend most of their time
doing so.68 Political interference is not an inevitability - the Trident
programme has escaped it in any significant degree - but the recent history
of MX, with the detailed interpretation of flight test results being openly
debated between the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee
67. See the debate between Pinch and Bijker and Russell.
68. Interview.
227
and the Air Force, shows how deep within the black box it is now
legitimate to go.69
The ability to maintain a black box also depends on other things,
which although susceptible to the heterogeneous engineering of
programme managers, are not completely in their control. The visibility
of the technology - as in, say, the basing of US FBM submarines at Holy
Loch in Scotland - can raise its public profile, as can determined opposition
(or as in the case of improving Poseidon accuracy, over-zealous advocacy).
Public relations is by no means an irrelevant skill for a weapons manager.
Likewise, expectation can sometimes exceed achievement by such a
margin that the programme manager's competence may be doubted.
Despite the best efforts of programme managers to shape the world so that
it does not happen, test missiles do, for example, blow up or have to be
blown up. 'Technical' failure is of course always negotiable: one person's
'failed' test is another's 'partial success'.70 And its consequences within a
black-boxed programme are containable. The ninth flight test of Trident
D5, on 21 January 1988, which was terminated in an explosion initiated by
the Range Safety Officer,71 will do the programme no harm, while what
might well be seen as smaller troubles in the MX test programme have
been seized upon in the formal political system. Much more serious
'technical' difficulties (for example, with Poseidon's re-entry vehicles and
electronics or Trident C4's rocket motors, and with Polaris and Poseidon
warhead designs) have been contained within the black box in previous
FBM programmes.
Nevertheless, that programmes require successful manipulation of
the physical world, and that this world is not wholly within managers'
control, is a feature of some importance in regard to black-boxing. The
reason this particular feature is so hard to specify is of course again the
interweaving of the physical and the social. This is most evident in a
69. See the report by that Committee's Subcommittee on Research and Development, and
Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems, The MX Inertial Measurement Unit: A Program
Review (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1987).
70. On missile testing, see D. Mackenzie, 'From Kwajalein to Armageddon? Testing and the
Social Construction of Missile Accuracy', forthcoming in D. Gooding, T. Pinch and S.
Schaffer (eds.), The Uses of Experiment: Studies of Experiment in the Natural Sciences
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
71. The Guardian (22 January, 1988), 7.
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vitally important aspect of weapons programmes almost completely
neglected in the political science literature - that these programmes
involve material processes of production. Several of the components of
missiles - notably solid rocket motors, re-entry vehicle casings and inertial
sensors together with some other guidance system parts - are amongst the
most difficult of human products, involving highly skilled 'art-like'
production processes within eliminable elements of 'tacit knowledge'.72
'Producibility' - which we have seen in the case of Honeywell and
the electrostatic gyroscope to include 'social' as well as 'physical' elements
-has been a major factor in decisions on items such as inertial components
for the FBM programmes. Although there have been problems in the
production of the Mk6 guidance system for Trident D5 - notably with the
PIGA accelerometer and charge-coupled device stellar sensor - these have
been contained in their effects, and have not endangered the programme.
J
Practical Implications
Adopting a position of empirical relativism to the study of
technology is useful because it helps reveal the social processes at work in
the creation of technological artefacts and of knowledge about them.
However, it should not blind analysts into thinking that technology can be
considered to be totally socially constructed, as if the physical world were
irrelevant, or into adopting a position of political relativism. The
development of technology is necessarily a social process because it is a
part of human society, and our knowledge of technology is socially-
mediated. Yet it would be absurd to suggest that this means that no
IS
physical reality involved, or that technology works only because we
believe it to. What exactly we take to have happened at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki is, like all history, a social construct. But it seems indisputable
that despite their lack of understanding of how an atomic weapon might
work, the unfortunate inhabitants of those cities did indeed suffer the
terrible consequences of what was a very public demonstration of an
awesome new technology working.
72. On tacit knowledge see H. M. Collins, 'The TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge and Scientific
Networks', Science Studies. Vol. 4 (1974), 165-86.
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In stressing the social nature of technology, and its
underdetermination by the physical world, it is important not to lose sight
of the very real, and too often, disast-rous effects it can have. Nuclear
weapons may be socially-shaped artefacts, our understanding of which is
socially-created, but they also could destroy the world (and all the
sociologists therein). It is thus important to attempt to view these
theoretical perspectives in a practical light which may have some utility.
In what ways does it help us to write social histories of nuclear weapons
technology?
To begin with, it is clear that such studies discredit simple
technological determinism and the fatalistic attitudes that it implies.
There is not an inevitable, internal dynamic to weapons technology which
is leading us towards the nuclear holocaust. Instead it is clear from this
study (and many others) that nuclear weapons technologyare, like other
technologies, both a product and a part of society.
In avoiding fatalistic and apathetic attitudes to technology it is
important to get inside the black box, and reveal what goes on inside. Only
then can we observe how apparently 'natural' trajectories are social in
nature. Only then can the possibilities for intervention in the
technological process be fully comprehended. Detailed studies of
particular technological developments are thus essential if there is to be
any attempt at shaping their progress. Without such studies the
technology will remain opaque, black-boxed to outsiders, and apparently ,
inevitable.
Because if technology is not completely out-of-control, neither is it
very much under control (at least not by most of us). There are powerful
vested interests involved in the development of weapons technology, and
their power in part stems from their ability to delineate the bounderies of
the black box. Institutional and economic interests push very strongly
towards 'follow-on' weapons systems, as does explicit governmental policy
aimed at maintaining specialized research teams. All this, however, is a
social process which can, and often does, involve many actors. Ignorance
of the process will not only allow it to appear as an inevitable case of
'follow-on', but it will in the end most likely be self-fulfilling.
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Those interested in continuing weapons succession are so for
generally sound reasons. Corporate managers are, of course, primarily
concerned with the financial well-being of their company. Those in the
Department of Defense and in the armed services are focused on the
military means of international relations, as well as on their own
particular organizational loyalties. In the Administration and Congress
too, questions of weapons technology are largely, and not surprisingly, left
to those most imbued with that particular culture. In this process fraud
and mismanagement do undoubtedly exist, but are probably not especially
significant. The weapons succession process goes on, not because of an
internal technological imperative, but because those involved are too
often unchecked by those (the rest of us) who are not.
This is not the place to argue what the nature of US nuclear
weapons procurement policy should be. There is, of course, the difficulty
of deciding whether weapons technology simply meets the need to deter
the threat, whether it is excessive, or indeed whether it might be
inadequate. To many the FBM programme has always seemed the 'ideal'
nuclear deterrent. The combination of invulnerability without hard target
capability seemed to make the FBM system a (relatively) non-threatening,
last-resort, retaliation-only deterrent. With Trident II, however, the
FBM's status is no longer clear. To many the move to hard-target
counterforce seems either dangerous, or at best, unnecessary and
expensive.
On past experience a successor to Trident II would be expected to be
deployed sometime around 2000.73 That would probably mean that
various follow-on proposals will be put forward before the end of the
1980s. Indeed FBM Steering Task Group meetings in 1987 were
considering what characteristics another FBM generation might have.74
But perhaps a new era in American-Soviet relations and a new American
President will build upon the example of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces
Treaty to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in international
73. IOCs of Poseidon, Trident I and Trident II have been 1971,1979 and 1989, giving intervals
of 8 and 10 years.
74. Interview.
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relations. Whether another FBM generation will then be sustainable, and
if so, how, may tell us more about the weapons succession process.
Meanwhile, however, those who doubt such a need should not wait too
long to see what a Trident in might look like. Whilst they are waiting
SSPO, Lockheed and many others will be doing what they have always
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